

# Cosmological Argument in Medieval Philosophy: St. Thomas Aquinas and Herman Dalmatin

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Undergraduate thesis / Završni rad

2022

Degree Grantor / Ustanova koja je dodijelila akademski / stručni stupanj: **University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences / Sveučilište u Rijeci, Filozofski fakultet**

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Download date / Datum preuzimanja: **2024-08-16**



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UNIVERSITY OF RIJEKA  
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES  
RIJEKA

TVRTKO SRDOC  
COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY: ST. THOMAS  
AQUINAS AND HERMAN DALMATIN  
UNDERGRADUATE THESIS

Rijeka, 2022.

UNIVERSITY OF RIJEKA  
FACULTY OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES  
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

TVRTKO SRDOC  
JMBAG: 0009087123  
COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY: ST.THOMAS  
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UNDERGRADUATE THESIS

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Rijeka, 29.6.2022.

## **STATEMENT OF AUTORSHIP**

I, Tvrtko Srdoc, declare that the End thesis entitled "Cosmological Argument in Medieval Philosophy: St. Thomas Aquinas and Herman Dalmatin" is the original result of my work and I agree to its public publication in electronic form. Statements and notes of other authors are paraphrased and cited in accordance with the used literature.

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## **ABSTRACT**

This work dealt with the analysis and comparison of cosmological arguments in St. Thomas Aquinas and Herman Dalmatin. The main goal of this work was to determine the existence (or lack thereof) of the cosmological argument in the work of Herman Dalmatin. On the basis of secondary literature, the main determinants of cosmological arguments (throughout history of philosophy and in contemporary philosophy) were given. Then, the main teachings of the selected philosophers and arguments for God's existence in their works were analyzed and contextualized - in St. Thomas' *Summa Theologiae* and Herman's *De Essentiis*. In the end, it was concluded that St. Thomas' *ways* are cosmological arguments from change and from causality. On the other hand, Herman's arguments did not turn out to be of cosmological nature, but rather special indications from numerical metaphor and diversity.

**Key words:** *history of philosophy, cosmological argument, medieval philosophy, St. Thomas Aquinas, Herman Dalmatin, philosophy of religion, Croatian philosophy*

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# 1. WORK PLAN AND METHODOLOGY

This paper will deal with the analysis and comparison of cosmological arguments for the existence of God in the works of Herman Dalmatin and St. Thomas Aquinas. Herman was chosen for two reasons. The first reason is that he is still relatively unknown, certainly in the wider academic circles. The second reason, which is more related to his philosophical work, is the fact that, when reading his only original philosophical work, *De essentiis*<sup>1</sup>, one can notice arguments about God similar to those which are still relevant in contemporary philosophy of religion<sup>2</sup>. On the other hand, St. Thomas was chosen as a reference point, given that his *ways* are examples of classical (traditional) cosmological arguments in the history of philosophy. This comparison aims to answer the following research question: Is there a cosmological argument for God's existence in Herman Dalmatin's work *De essentiis*? My hypothesis follows: In the First Book of *De essentiis* there are two *indications* of God's existence that we can be called cosmological arguments from the first cause. After giving an explanation of the methodology, an overview of the cosmological argument through the history of philosophy and in contemporary philosophy will be given. Then the general determinants of St. Thomas' metaphysics and natural theology, along with an analysis of his *ways* will follow. The primary source that will be used in this analysis is *Summa Theologiae*<sup>3</sup>. More precisely, Thomas' *ways*

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<sup>1</sup>*De essentiis* (On essences) is an original astrological-philosophical work written by Herman Dalmatin in 1143 in Béziers. The work is divided into two books - the first deals in a broader sense with the establishment of a kind of synthesis of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism. In a narrower sense, it deals with two main topics - the analysis of the cause (*causa*) as the most important of the five essences, and the analysis of the primary generation. The second book is of an astronomical (astrological) nature and deals with secondary generations, celestial spheres, astrological analogies and similar topics. Each book is divided into chapters (*capitulae*). The discussion is divided into: 1. *proemium* (introduction) – c. 1.1-5.3, 2. *liber primus* (the first book) – c. 6.1-48.4 and 3. *liber secundus* (the second book) – c. 49.1-101.7. In the later part, the most important philosophical characteristics of *De essentiis* will be briefly presented. The basic information about *De essentiis* is taken from Šanjek, Franjo. "Herman Dalmatin: Bio-bibliografski prilozi" from: Dalmatin, Herman. 1990. *Rasprava o bitima* (I). Pula: Čakavski sabor (translation: Antun Slavko Kalenić), 21-23.

<sup>2</sup>The main inspiration for choosing the topic of this work was the first chapter of the recently published monograph of co-supervisor, professor Aleksandra Golubović, in which the author deals with Herman in the context of contemporary philosophy of religion, cf. Golubović 2022 11-38.

<sup>3</sup>*Summa theologiae* (Summary of theology) is the most influential work of St. Thomas Aquinas. It was never finished, and the writing of the work began in 1266 in Rome. It is divided into three parts (*pars*) - the first deals with God's existence and nature (*questiones* 1-43), God's creation (*q.*44-49), angels (*q.*50-64), days of creation (*q.*50-64), human nature (*q.*75-102) and Divine authority (*q.*103-119). The second part deals with morality in general and is further divided into two parts. The first part of the second part (*Prima Secundae*) deals with human happiness (*q.* 1-5), human actions (*q.* 6-17), the good and bad character of human actions (*q.* 18-21), passions (*q.* 22- 48) and sources of human actions - intrinsic (*q.* 49-89) and extrinsic (*q.* 90-114). The second part of the second part (*Secunda Secundae*) deals with the three theological virtues and their corresponding vices (*q.* 1-46), the three cardinal virtues and their corresponding vices (*q.* 47-170) and life goals with special reference to the religious life (*q.* 171-189). The third part deals with the incarnation, i.e. the embodiment (*q.* 1-59) and the sacraments (*q.* 60-90) and was stopped in the part concerning the sacrament of confession. Each part is further divided into questions

are found in the Third article (*Whether God exists?*) of the Second question (*The existence of God*) in the first part (*Prima pars*) of the *Summa*. After the analysis of St. Thomas' arguments, we will move on to the analysis of Herman's thought in *De essentiis*<sup>4</sup>. After sketching the general determinants of Herman's thought in the First Book of *De essentiis*, Herman's *indications* of God will be discussed. In doing so, the first book of *De essentiis* will be used. Then, on the basis of precisely defined main determinants of cosmological arguments, the common points and the differences between their arguments will be determined. The conclusion will summarize the whole work, while trying to give an answer to the research question, and checking the validity of the hypothesis. Analysis of individual cosmological arguments will be given at two levels. Firstly, they will be analyzed within the primary sources themselves, that is, philosophical texts. However, apart from the internal coherence or meaning that a cosmological argument has in a particular philosophical work, it will be important to analyze cosmological arguments with regard to some of the general features or typologies of cosmological arguments. In this sense, three main determinants of cosmological arguments as well as a three-part categorization of cosmological arguments will be used.<sup>5</sup> The first category is the impossibility of infinite regress. There can be three different answers regarding the impossibility of infinite regress: 1) The argument mentions the impossibility of a temporal regress, 2) The argument mentions the impossibility of an a-temporal regress or 3) the argument does not mention the impossibility of a (temporal or a-temporal) regress. The second category are the principles which the argument mentions. They may or may not be explicitly stated. The first of them (which we find, for example in Kant) is the principle of complete determination<sup>6</sup>,

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(*questiones*) and articles. According to Boyle, the *Summa* was written to be a tool for the further study of novitiates within the Dominican order. Such an interpretation explains a kind of compiling tendency of the work and its brevity. It should also be said that the *Summa*, in addition to being a capital work in the history of philosophy and theology, is also important in the study of the history of education and university, given its prevalence in *curricula* inside and outside the Catholic Church since the 13th century. The main information about the *Summa* is taken from Stump 2005 9-10 and Davies 1992 6-8.

<sup>4</sup> Although Herman and *De essentiis* precede St. Thomas and his *Summa theologiae*, this work will first give a general introduction to the thought of St. Thomas, analyse his first two *ways*, and then do the same with Herman. The reason for this is that St. Thomas' *ways* are a classic example of cosmological arguments, and I considered it important that they be analysed first (given that they, in a way, define what a cosmological argument is), in order to consequently know how to determine the status and reach of Herman's arguments (*his indications*).

<sup>5</sup> The three main determinants are taken from Lojkić 2021 11, and the three-part categorization from W. L. Craig 1980 284-295.

<sup>6</sup> The principle of complete determination reads: For every object and every predicate A, it is true that that object is either A or not-A. Here I will not go into detail of the principle of complete determination, but it is a synthetic principle, although it derives from the logical (therefore *a priori*) principle of exclusion of the third (*principium exclusi tertii sive medii*).



the second is the principle of causality<sup>7</sup>, and the third is the principle of sufficient reason<sup>8</sup>. The third category is the type of cosmological argument, according to contemporary philosophy of religion. A cosmological argument can be one of the following: 1) Argument from change, 2) Argument from cause or 3) Argument from contingency. This three-part categorization will serve as a tool to help compare the arguments of St. Thomas and Herman Dalmatin.

## 2. COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY AND IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY

### 2.1. Cosmological argument in the history of philosophy

Alfred North Whitehead's well-known remark that the entire history of philosophy is a footnote to Plato is also manifested in Plato's influence on the history of the cosmological argument. Although the cosmological argument of Plato's student Aristotle has remained better remembered throughout the history of philosophy, it is in Plato that we encounter the first version of this argument. Plato's version of the cosmological argument is much shorter than Aristotle's and is connected to the ten different types of motion Plato mentions. Plato distinguishes two of the ten kinds as those which are important in the process of change - 1) self-caused change (inherent to the soul) and 2) change caused by another (when two or more beings enter into the process of change). What is interesting is that Plato's argument is *a posteriori*, i.e. he starts from the observation of change from experience. From the experience of caused changes, Plato concludes that there must be a being who is the self-caused cause of all change in the Universe (like the soul is in humans). The conclusion of Plato's argument is not an Uncaused Cause or one God, but multiple gods (polytheism) that move themselves. Some philosophers believe that the conclusion of his argument points to the Nous or World Soul.<sup>9</sup> Aristotle goes one step further than Plato by postulating an Uncaused Cause that did not move itself (like Plato's Demiurge), but is itself unmoved<sup>10</sup>. Throughout many of his works, Aristotle presented versions of the cosmological argument for the existence of God. The most well-known (and most mature) versions of the argument can be found in his *Physics* and

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<sup>7</sup> The principle of causality appears in different forms throughout the history of philosophy, but its leitmotif is always the fact (which is applied in all natural sciences) that there is a cause for every event in the world.

<sup>8</sup> The originator of this principle is Leibniz. It is similar to the principle of causality, but while the principle of causality postulates the existence of a cause in every object or event, the principle of sufficient reason postulates a reason for the existence of objects and events.

<sup>9</sup> Cf. W. L. Craig 1980 4-9.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. 20.

*Metaphysics*. Amongst other reasons, these arguments are important in the history of philosophy because they introduce the notions of potentiality and actuality into cosmological arguments. Aristotle starts from the concept of change in the world, which is evident from sense perception. He then argues that time is eternal. From this, Aristotle argues in detail that the eternity of time requires eternal change. Furthermore, everything that is in a state of change is being changed by something already actual. All things being changed either initiate the change by themselves (make themselves actual) or receive change from other beings. Such a series in which things are actualised by each other must "terminate", i.e. stop either in a being that moves itself from potentiality to actuality or in something that is un-moved, i.e. that is wholly actual. Through argumentation, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that all self-moving beings are reduced to one unmoved being. More precisely, that being is the first and only unmoved mover and is, at the same time, the cause of the eternal change in the Universe<sup>11</sup>. Medieval Islamic philosophers and theologians had a major influence on the development of the cosmological argument. There are two different types of cosmological arguments linked to two different schools of thought in the medieval Islamic philosophy: 1. *kalam* cosmological argument from temporal regress and 2. *falsafa* cosmological argument from contingency.<sup>12</sup> *Kalam* cosmological argument has its beginnings in early medieval Islamic philosophy, and it was first mentioned in the 9th century within the framework of the *Mu'tazilites*. The term *kalam* can denote several things (similar to the term *logos* in Western thought), such as speech, word or expression. However, the name is most frequently taken as a general designation for early medieval Islamic speculative theology. This argument takes as its empirical starting point the fact that things coming into existence have a cause. In the second step, it is argued that the world is also a thing that came into existence. Unlike the first cause argument or the contingency argument, *kalam* rests on the claim that the world truly began at some point, that it is temporally finite. In conclusion, from two premises (1. Things that begin to exist have a cause. and 2. The world is a thing that began to exist.), it is concluded that the world must have a cause.<sup>13</sup> The main representative of *kalam* in medieval Islamic philosophy was al-Ghazali.<sup>14</sup> Argument from contingency (*falsafa*) exists in four different Islamic medieval philosophers: 1) al-Kindi<sup>15</sup>, 2)

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid. 39-40.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid. 49.

<sup>13</sup> The main contemporary defender of this argument is William Lane Craig, cf. W. L. Craig 1979.

<sup>14</sup> W. L. Craig 1980 61.

<sup>15</sup> The first known Islamic philosopher, died in 870. cf. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Yaqub-ibn-Ishaq-as-Sabah-al-Kindi>

al-Farabi<sup>16</sup>, 3) Ibn-Sina<sup>17</sup> and 4) Ibn-Rushd<sup>18</sup>. Al-Farabi's version of the cosmological argument is the first known version of the argument from contingency. In the argument, possibility is defined in terms of essence and existence, and in all entities (except God) essence is different from existence. Al-Farabi distinguishes three types of beings at the level of modality: 1) those that cannot not exist, 2) those that cannot exist and 3) those that can both exist and not exist.<sup>19</sup> His argument can be summarized as follows: 1. Contingent beings begin to exist. 2. Everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence. 3. That cause is either contingent or not. 4. A series of contingent entities that stand in a cause-effect relationship cannot be infinite. Thus, 5. A series of contingent entities must terminate in a cause which is self-existent and first.<sup>20</sup> The second cosmological argument that will be mentioned here is that of Ibn-Sina. In order to understand Ibn-Sina's argument, it is necessary to mention his fourfold definition of all beings into: 1) those that are necessary in themselves, 2) those that cannot exist (self-contradictory), 3) those that are contingent, and 4) those that are necessary *ab alio*<sup>21</sup>. Likewise, Ibn-Sina postulates three types of essences – in things as things (the object of metaphysics), in concrete particulars (the object of natural sciences) and in our minds (the object of logic).<sup>22</sup> The goal of Ibn-Sina's argument is to prove the existence of a necessary being. He starts by stating: Every being is either contingent or necessary, if it is necessary, then the existence of a necessary being is proven. If it is contingent, then it needs the existence of a necessary being. Why? Because a contingent being needs a cause for its existence. If that cause is also contingent, then we have formed a contingent series of causes. Such a series, however, cannot be infinite, because then it would have no first cause, and therefore no existence. However, the existence of contingent beings is obvious and Ibn-Sina starts his argument from that empirical fact. Therefore, the existential series of contingent causes must begin in a necessary being, i.e. God.<sup>23</sup> Outlines of Ibn-Rushd's argument will be made, because of his most immediate influence on St. Thomas'

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<sup>16</sup> Born 878, died in 950. In the West he is known as Avennasar, cf. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/al-Farabi>

<sup>17</sup> Persian islamic philosopher and the greatest islamic medieval philosopher and theologian. He lived at the turn of the 10th and the 11th century. Known in the West as Avicenna, cf. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Avicenna>.

<sup>18</sup> Born in 1126 in Cordoba. The greatest non-arabic islamic philosopher. Known in the West as Averroes or simply The Commentator (because of his translations and commentaries of Aristotle), cf. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Averroes>.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. 81.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. 84.

<sup>21</sup> These beings are to be understood as necessary (once they exist they cannot cease to exist), but not by themselves, but by another, *ab alio*. In other words, such beings are not the source of their own existence, but (like all other beings) receive their existence from God. An example of such beings would be angels.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. 86.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. 96.

second way.<sup>24</sup> His argument is interesting primarily because it rejects the previously generally accepted distinction between essence and existence. In technical terms, it is very similar to Ibn-Sina's argument. It starts from affirming the existence of contingent beings and continues with the impossibility of an infinite essential series of contingent beings. He then concludes that such a sequence must end either in a necessarily uncaused or a necessarily caused being. After rejecting the second option by ending up in infinite regress, he concludes that there must be the first in the series, i.e. God.<sup>25</sup> Ibn-Rushd was the last great representative of *falsafa* in Islamic thought. However, his ideas (like those of Ibn-Sina) remained relevant throughout Western thought, mostly because of Jewish translators and thinkers. The most important of them was Moses ben Maimon<sup>26</sup>. Moses ben Maimon gave as many as four different cosmological arguments for God's existence. The great influence of Aristotle can be seen in all of them. The first argument starts with the postulation of the principle of causality. In other words, a principle is postulated according to which there must be a cause of change in the sublunar world. As for the entire sublunar world, so the first celestial sphere must have a cause of motion as well. Maimonides gives four different ways of existence of this cause: 1) it can be a corporeal entity outside the sphere, 2) an incorporeal entity outside the sphere, 3) an undivided force outside the sphere, or 4) an undivided force inside the sphere.<sup>27</sup> After argumentatively rejecting the other three options, Maimonides concludes that this entity is an incorporeal entity outside the first heavenly sphere and he calls this being God. The second argument is much shorter than the first, and it is actually an argument that appeals to compositeness. It starts with asserting that all material things are composed of at least two elements. Then, if one of the two elements exists separately, then the other also exists separately. Analogously, since there are entities that are in change and move others and those that are not in change and do not move others, there must be a being that moves others but itself is not in change. That being is the Uncaused Cause, i.e. God.<sup>28</sup> The next argument starts from the eternal-finite distinction and tries to prove the existence of God. Three distinctions are given regarding the existence of all beings - they can all be eternal, all finite, or some be eternal and some finite. The argument rejects the option that all beings are eternal because we see how some beings start and cease existing, also that all beings are finite because, in the context of the eternity of the past, they would once cease to

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid. 110.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. 111.

<sup>26</sup> The most influential medieval Jewish philosopher. His most famous work is *Moreh Nevukhim*, i.e. *The guide for the perplexed*. In the West he is known as Maimonides, cf. <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Moses-Maimonides>

<sup>27</sup> W. L. Craig 1980 139.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. 141.

exist and then nothing would exist now - which is absurd. According to the triad, the option remains that some beings are eternal and some are finite. Maimonides then asks about the cause of the existence of finite beings and concludes that they must derive their existence from a necessary and eternal being, i.e. God.<sup>29</sup> Maimonides' last cosmological argument is an argument from contingency. The main influence on him was al-Farabi and Ibn-Sina.<sup>30</sup> Firstly, Maimonides notices the change of things in the world from potentiality to actuality. Such a change needs a cause of transition from potentiality to actuality. Every such postulated cause needs a further cause of its own transition into actuality. Such a series of causes cannot be eternal, because then we would not notice the change we started with. Therefore, there must be some being which is completely actual and ceaselessly causes in all other beings the change from potentiality to actuality.<sup>31</sup> In the next chapter, a brief overview of the cosmological argument in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion will be given.

## 2.2. Cosmological argument in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion

According to contemporary literature, the main stages of every cosmological argument are: 1) proving the existence of a metaphysical first cause from sensory data and 2) attributing Christian or classically theistic attributes to that first cause.<sup>32</sup> Every cosmological argument has three main determinants. Firstly, some "big fact" is stated or a global (cosmic) characteristic of the world is described. Then a suitable causal or explanatory solution is sought for this „big fact“ in the form of some principle or law. In the last step, the principle of regularity or is explained.<sup>33</sup> That serves to exclude the possibility of circular explanations and infinite regress.<sup>34</sup> Many contemporary authors divide cosmological arguments with regard to their reference (or lack of reference) to temporality. Thus, two types of cosmological arguments appear - those that refer to a temporal series, i.e. the fact that the Universe is not eternal (most often identified with the *kalam* argument) and those that do not refer to the temporality (finitude) of the Universe, but can function while assuming the eternity of the Universe (they are most often identified with the cosmological argument from contingency). However, some authors take a more historical approach and group cosmological arguments based on a historical perspective: thus we get the *kalam* cosmological argument, the thomistic cosmological argument, and

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid. 147-148.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. 150.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. 151.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Lojkić 2021 11.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Peterson et al. 2012 86-87.

<sup>34</sup> Lojkić 2021 12.

Leibniz's cosmological argument.<sup>35</sup> This division does not seem to be ideal, because, unlike the *kalam* cosmological argument and Leibniz's cosmological argument<sup>36</sup> which are original contributions in the history of philosophy, Thomistic arguments are almost taken *ad litteram* from Aristotle (the first two *ways*) or Avicenna and Maimonides (the third *way*, i.e. the contingency argument). In this sense, it seems wiser to accept the division of cosmological arguments into *kalam* cosmological arguments, cosmological arguments from the first cause and cosmological arguments from contingency. *Kalam's* cosmological argument can be summarized as follows: Since everything that begins to exist has a cause for its existence and since the Universe began to exist, it too must have a cause for its own existence. Why must the cause of the existence of the Universe be a single being, and not an infinite temporal series? The defenders of *kalam* would insist that, by accepting the second option, we accept the view that it is possible for an actually infinite series to exist, which, according to the defenders of the *kalam*, is impossible.<sup>37</sup> After rejecting the possibility of an actual infinite series of causes, the defenders of this theory most often explain that the sought-after cause of the existence of the universe must be a being outside the universe itself (non-material), but also outside time, and that it must also possess all other classical theistic attributes.<sup>38</sup> Existence is considered a product of causality in the *kalam* argument.<sup>39</sup> The cosmological argument from the first cause in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion almost always has three main steps: 1) It starts from something given in experience (*a posteriori*), 2) What is arrived at by experience leads to questions that can only be answered by something outside of experience and 3) The best (and only) answer to the questions postulated in 2) is the classical theistic conception of God.<sup>40</sup> The cosmological argument from contingency rests on the distinction between existence as either contingent or necessary. Something exists contingently if it can equally be conceived that it exists and does not exist. On the other hand, necessary beings cannot not exist. Contemporary philosophers of the cosmological argument from contingency believe that the proposition "The Universe exists" is only contingently true and thus in need of further explanation.<sup>41</sup> Therefore, the Universe did not have to exist, and the reason or cause of the existence of the Universe is a

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<sup>35</sup> Lojkić 2021 13.

<sup>36</sup> It is not original because of contingency (since it already exists in Islamic medieval philosophy), but because of the previously mentioned principle of sufficient reason, which is not found in previous cosmological arguments in the history of philosophy.

<sup>37</sup> Peterson et al. 2012 86.

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Davies 1982 75. i Peterson et al. 2012

<sup>39</sup> Davies 1982 77.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. 84.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. 81.

necessary being, i.e. God.<sup>42</sup> Every cosmological argument from contingency has this structure: 1) A contingent being exists, 2) That contingent being has a reason or cause of its existence, 3) The reason or cause of the existence of that being cannot be found in the being itself, 4) The reason or cause of existence of that being is found either in another contingent being or in a necessary being, 5) Contingent beings alone cannot explain or cause the existence of another contingent being, 6) What explains the existence of this contingent being (from which we started) must be a necessary being. 7) Therefore, a necessary being exists.<sup>43</sup> It should be mentioned that the principle of causality<sup>44</sup> or the principle of sufficient reason<sup>45</sup> is implied in the 2) premise. After giving an outline of the history of the cosmological argument, as well as a brief overview of the most common definitions of the cosmological argument in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, the next part will move on to the analysis and comparison of the cosmological arguments in the *Summa theologiae* of St. Thomas, and *De essentiis* of Herman Dalmatin.

### **3. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS**

#### **3.1. St. Thomas' metaphysics and natural theology**

This chapter will deal with two aspects of St. Thomas' thought - his metaphysics and his natural theology. Such an introduction is necessary because a proper understanding of his *ways* is closely related to a proper understanding of his metaphysical and natural-theological views. St. Thomas' metaphysics is imbued with Aristotle.<sup>46</sup> St. Thomas believed that Aristotle's thought was not necessarily contradictory to Christianity. Furthermore, he thought it could be very fruitful in further expanding and understanding some originally Christian ideas.<sup>47</sup> St. Thomas' adherence to Aristotle is most evident in his metaphysics. For Thomas, metaphysics is the science of being taken in general (*ens commune*).<sup>48</sup> This is exactly why metaphysics is so important to St. Thomas. Namely, when one talks about being, one talks primarily about God and only secondarily about other beings. Therefore the object of metaphysics is primarily God,

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid. 82.

<sup>43</sup> Peterson et al. 2012 90.

<sup>44</sup> If we're more inclined to the thomistic version.

<sup>45</sup> If we're more inclined to Leibniz's version, cf. Peterson et al. 2012 91.

<sup>46</sup> As other important non-Christian philosophical influences to St. Thomas besides Aristotle, we must also mention Plato (through St. Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius), Maimonides, Averroes and Avicenna, cf. Stump 2005 2-4

<sup>47</sup> Feser 2009 11.

<sup>48</sup> Stump 2005 13.

and secondarily beings who owe their existence to Him.<sup>49</sup> In this chapter, the five most important metaphysical teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas will be explained - 1) The difference between actuality and potentiality, 2) hylomorphism, 3) the four causes, 4) the difference between essence and existence and 5) the transcendentals. Change for St. Thomas is the transition from potentiality to actuality. In order for change to occur, in addition to potentiality for change in some being, some actual entity is also needed.<sup>50</sup> Although potentiality and actuality always occur simultaneously in experience - absolutely speaking - actuality precedes potentiality.<sup>51</sup> The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, unlike an act, potentiality is always "potential", i.e. it has potential "for something". Secondly, because potentiality cannot exist without actuality, and actuality without potentiality can (this is precisely the definition of God).<sup>52</sup> The second metaphysical teaching is hylomorphism. All entities, apart from being metaphysically determined by potentiality and actuality, are also composed of matter and form. St. Thomas divides form further into substantial and accidental. Substantial form is related to the existence of a thing. Thus, the substantial form of the ball disappears, i.e. it turns into a substantial form of a plastic mass when the ball is heated. In other words, a substantial form is what makes a thing precisely what it is. The accidental form of that same ball is, for example, that it is blue. If we painted it green, it would lose its accidental but not its substantial form.<sup>53</sup> Matter is also divided into two types, but only formally. This is so because we can say that there is "marked" and "non-marked" (or primary) matter. The matter that was influenced by form is marked. In reality, we will not find matter that is not formed, because that would mean pure potentiality. Accordingly, it can be said that - just as an act can exist without potentiality, and potentiality without an act cannot - so form can exist without matter (in angels, postmortal human souls, God, etc.), but matter without form cannot.<sup>54</sup> St. Thomas accepts Aristotle's division into 4 causes - material, formal, efficient and final. The material and formal cause are connected by the hylomorphistic structure of a thing. The role of the causes is the complete explanation of the existence of an entity. In other words, any answer to a question about existence of an entity will fall within the scope of the four causes.<sup>55</sup> The efficient cause is what

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid. 14.

<sup>50</sup> For example, in order for a thing to become hot, in addition to the potential "hottness" in a thing (e.g. in wood), a currently hot thing is also needed (i.e. fire).

<sup>51</sup> Feser 2009 14.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. 15.

<sup>53</sup> In other words, it would not cease being a ball, cf. Feser 2009 16.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. 16.

<sup>55</sup> An analogy with the human heart is a common example that illustrates how causes work. The material cause of the heart is the matter from which it is made (myocardial, epicardial and endocardial tissue), the formal cause is the way in which this matter is shaped (two atria and two ventricles), the efficient cause is the process that led to the creation of the heart, and the final purpose or cause is the heart's pumping blood into the body.



is most often taken in a modern context when talking about something being the cause of something else. One usually has the producer-produced sequence in mind. In this sequence, the producer adds a formal cause to the material cause thus becoming an efficient cause. For example, the efficient cause of the table is the carpenter, and the novel a novelist. The final cause is the purpose of a thing. In other words, it is the natural inclination of some kind of thing towards some object.<sup>56</sup> The fourth metaphysical teaching is the difference between essence and existence. The essence (*essentia*, quiddity, nature) of a thing is what makes a thing that particular kind of thing. The essence is also what enables us to grasp a particular. St. Thomas believes that when we understand what a man is, we actually understand his humanity (that is, what makes him human). Where is a man's humanity located? Unlike Plato and the Christian Platonists, St. Thomas believes that universals (like humanity) exist exclusively in particulars. In modern metaphysical terms, they do not exist independently of particulars, but are exclusively instantiated (exemplified) in particular things.<sup>57</sup> What distinguishes individual particulars within a species is matter. St. Thomas tries to prove the separate existence of essence and existence in things by pointing the fact that we can imagine what a thing is, without knowing whether that thing actually exists or not.<sup>58</sup> In contrast to the metaphysical composition of matter and form (which does not exist in non-material entities), composition of essence and existence, for Thomas, exists in all beings.<sup>59</sup> The broadest metaphysical term for St. Thomas is being (existence, *esse*). We can talk about being in two ways: 1) using Aristotle's categories that deal with a certain way of being (e.g. quality, quantity, etc.) or 2) using the so-called transcendentals.<sup>60</sup> Transcendentals are concepts that are above each genus and that appear in every being. For St. Thomas there are five of them - thing (*res*), one (*unum*), something (*aliquid*), good (*bonum*) and true (*verum*).<sup>61</sup> Consequently, if an entity is, then that entity is necessarily a thing, one, something, good<sup>62</sup>, and true. When it comes to the attitude of St. Thomas regarding the relationship between faith and reason, it is similar to St. Anselm's position. Namely, he does not understand in order to believe, but believes in order to understand.<sup>63</sup> St. Thomas thinks that the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the existence and binding force of the moral law, etc. can be proven by using strictly philosophical

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid. 17.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. 19.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. 21.

<sup>59</sup> Even in God, whose essence is Its very existence, cf. Stump 2005 12.

<sup>60</sup> Stump 2005 13.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. 13.

<sup>62</sup> "Good" refers to the level of actuality of an entity within its species, and "true" to the concordance of a particular in a species with the idea (universal) of that species in God's mind.

<sup>63</sup> Davies 1992 22.

arguments.<sup>64</sup> Having said that, it does not follow that the existence of God is something self-evident. In other words, the negation of the proposition that God exists is not a logical contradiction.<sup>65</sup> The existence of God can only be known by people *a posteriori*, i.e. starting from empirical facts towards their cause, God. Natural theology is a part of philosophy and as such is completely based on principles known through the "natural light of reason".<sup>66</sup> Its goal is not to make the revealed truths superfluous, but to show that some of them can be arrived at purely by reason.<sup>67</sup> Likewise, the goal of natural theology for St. Thomas is not exclusively aimed at convincing those who do not believe in the Christian God, but also at a better cohabitation of philosophy and Christianity. Unlike natural theology, philosophical theology begins with the acceptance of revealed truths and tries to explain them. In this sense, it seems correct to say that the *Summa contra gentiles* is an example of natural theology, while the *Summa theologiae* is an example of philosophical theology.<sup>68</sup> Therefore, all questions that enter the scope of philosophical theology also enter into natural theology. On the other hand, there are those topics that enter the spectrum of philosophical theology, but not natural theology. In other words, they are not accessible to reason without Christian Revelation (e.g. the Christian God as a Trinity of persons).<sup>69</sup>

### 3.2. Analysis of St. Thomas' two ways

St. Thomas' *ways* are part of his *Summa theologiae*. They are contained in the second question of the first book or shortened 1a 2-11<sup>70</sup>. St. Thomas begins, characteristically of the scholastic method *quaestiones disputatae*, by giving two objections to the question: *Whether God exists?*<sup>71</sup> Although scholastic writers can sometimes be criticized for the tendency of their introductory objections, the two counter-arguments against the existence of God that St. Thomas spells out remain just as relevant in contemporary philosophy of religion. Although this does not directly enter the focus of this paper, it should be noted that St. Thomas' first counter-argument actually boils down to the so-called problem of evil, i.e. the incompatibility of the simultaneous existence of evil and the existence of a perfectly good God. Versions of

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<sup>64</sup> Feser 2009 13.

<sup>65</sup> Davies 1992 22.

<sup>66</sup> Stump 2005 26.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. 28.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. 29.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. 30.

<sup>70</sup> In this work I will be using an English translation of the *Summa* by the English Province of Dominicans, cf. Aquinas 1981.

<sup>71</sup> Aquinas 1981 27.

such an argument are very common even today in academic literature regarding the existence of God.<sup>72</sup> The second objection is equally relevant, and relies on the possibility of explaining phenomena in the world without referring to God, i.e. relying on a purely naturalistic explanation of nature and the world. St. Thomas here also gives an interesting argumentation that is reminiscent of the later Ockham's razor when he says: „[I]t is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many.“<sup>73</sup> After giving a *sed contra*, i.e. a short answer in the form of *auctoritas*<sup>74</sup>, St. Thomas begins to present his five *ways* in an attempt to prove that God exists. In this paper, the first two *ways* will be outlined because of their seeming similarity to what is found in Herman. However, before entering into the analysis of each of them individually, a few words should be said about the general features of all five of St. Thomas's arguments for God's existence. They all must be taken as separate demonstrations of God's existence, which means that their validity is not only of probabilistic, that is, inductive nature, but of a deductive character.<sup>75</sup> Like the first two, the third *way* is also a cosmological argument, but it is a cosmological argument from contingency. While the fourth *way* points to God through an argument from the gradation of "being, goodness, and every other perfection"<sup>76</sup>, the last *way* is essentially a teleological argument based on the purposefulness of beings that do not possess cognitive power.<sup>77</sup> Broadly speaking, all St. Thomas' *ways* start with some *a posteriori* discovered experiential fact in the world.<sup>78</sup> Then, after realizing the inadequacy of natural explanations of the causality of experiential data, it is concluded that the only possible answer is supernatural, i.e. outside of experience.<sup>79</sup> In general, it can be said that all five of St. Thomas' *ways* have four similar moments in argumentation: 1) Data given from experience, 2) application of philosophical principles, 3) the Being of all beings - the Uncaused Cause understood as the "fulfilment" of sensory data and philosophical principles and 4) identification of that Cause with the Christian God.<sup>80</sup> *A posteriori* experiential data in the five *ways* are the creation and disappearance of some things, the order of active causes in sensible things, the degrees of perfection in things, and the striving towards a certain purpose by some

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<sup>72</sup> Cf. chapter on the "problem of evil" in the capital work of contemporary philosophy of religion, Mackie 1983. 150.-172.

<sup>73</sup> Aquinas 1981 27.

<sup>74</sup> Most often it is a quote from a patristic source or from a passage in the Bible.

<sup>75</sup> W.L. Craig 2001 159.

<sup>76</sup> Aquinas 1981 28.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. 174.

<sup>78</sup> For the first *way* it is change, for the second causality, and for the third contingency.

<sup>79</sup> Cf. Davies 1991 28.

<sup>80</sup> For a detailed analysis of these moments in Thomas' ways, as well as for an excellent analytical approach of St. Thomas, cf. Ventimiglia 2021 80.

beings deprived of cognitive power.<sup>81</sup> Each of the five *ways* gives as their conclusion only one part (attribute, characteristic) of the Christian God. The first *way* proves that God is the cause of all change and is himself immutable, the second that God is the first cause of existence and is himself uncaused, the third that He is the pure act of being, that in Him essence is equal to existence and that He causes all other things to exist, etc.<sup>82</sup>

### 3.2.1. St. Thomas' first *way*

„It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion.“<sup>83</sup> This is the empirical fact on which St. Thomas bases his first *way*. The possibility of motion in things is actualised by other things that are already in motion. The example St. Thomas gives is Aristotle's. He imagines fire (that which is actual, i.e. currently warm) and wood, which begins to burn (actualizes its possibility of motion by changing its temperature) under the influence of fire. Motion must be understood as an accidental change on three levels - local, qualitative and quantitative.<sup>84</sup> In the second step, St. Thomas affirms the impossibility of beings actualising themselves, namely "[I]t is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself.<sup>85</sup> In other words, a thing cannot be actually and potentially hot at the same time. Therefore, everything that is in a state of motion, necessarily receives motion from some other, already actual, being.<sup>86</sup> However, this series cannot be infinite. Why? Before answering that question, it seems important to introduce a distinction between *essendi* causes and *fiendi* causes. *Essendi* causes are those causes without whose constant presence the effect ceases to exist.<sup>87</sup> Unlike them, with *fiendi* causes - the effect, after it has been caused - can persist without the direct presence of the cause.<sup>88</sup> With that in mind, St. Thomas believes that when we talk about a series of things in motion in the world, we are necessarily talking about *essendi* causes. Consequently, it is impossible to go on indefinitely within such a series, since (if we did not have a being which is the first cause of change and itself not subject to change) we would not be able to perceive

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<sup>81</sup> Ibid. 82.

<sup>82</sup> Cf. Pawl 2014 105.

<sup>83</sup> Aquinas 1981 27.

<sup>84</sup> Pawl 2014 106.

<sup>85</sup> Aquinas 1981 27.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Davies 1991. 28.

<sup>87</sup> It can be said that such a cause is similar to the pumping of blood into the body by the heart. Namely, as long as the heart functions regularly, blood is distributed throughout the body. When the cause (the heart) fails, then the effect (pumping blood into the body) will no longer be present.

<sup>88</sup> Ventimiglia gives an example in which the father and mother are causing the existence of a son. Namely, although the father and mother are the causes of the son's existence, the son exists (without logical contradiction) without the constant presence (causation) of the mother and father. Cf. Ventimiglia 2021 84.

change in the world. However, change in the world, which is taken as the first premise of St. Thomas' argument, disproves this.<sup>89</sup> Some authors advocate a different interpretation of St. Thomas' explanation of the impossibility of an infinite regress in a series. They do not use the distinction of different types of causes, but of different series. Namely, with motion we are talking about an essential series, i.e. one in which each member of the series depends on the previous one to possess some property or attribute (in this case, motion). We cannot explain why something moves without reference to something else. So, if such a sequence were to go to infinity and, accordingly, if there were no first originator of motion, then we would not even be able to notice the change around us. Namely, the property of motion within an essential series functions like motion that is present in a chain reaction.<sup>90</sup> If no such being that creates the original motion, i.e. starts a chain reaction existed, motion would not exist and consequently could not be observed. St. Thomas supports this with Aristotle's analogy in which a hand using a stick moves a stone. Here, the hand is the unmoved mover, the stick is the instrumental member of the essential series, and the stone is the thing in motion. Based on this, St. Thomas concludes that there must be an originator of motion in the world who is not himself subject to motion, because then he would only be an instrumental member of the series, and thus we would not reach the cause of the empirical fact we started with. That originator is exactly what "everyone understand to be God."<sup>91</sup> St. Thomas' argument rests on the Aristotelian concept of motion, i.e. *motus*. What is *motus*? It is a process of change from potentiality (*potentia*) to actuality (*actu*). It should be noted that *motus* for Aristotle is not the same as *mutatio*. Namely, *mutatio* is a change at the level of substance. In other words, it implies the creation (coming into existence) or destruction (coming out of existence) of some particular, that is, a primary substance.<sup>92</sup> On the other hand, this argument deals with a "smaller" type of change, one in which only the accidental form of a thing changes. In this regard, *motus* covers only three of Aristotle's ten categories – those of quantity, quality and place.<sup>93</sup> It may seem that these remarks are not overly helpful, but they are necessary in order to understand that this is an argument that does not imply the distinction between *esse* and *essentia*, nor does it speak about God as pure existence (a pure act of being). Rather, it views God in a strictly "physical" sense, within the Aristotelian framework. This framework wants to get to the first in the series, and not to the

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<sup>89</sup> Ventimiglia 2021 86.

<sup>90</sup> For example, with the so-called domino effect.

<sup>91</sup> Aquinas 1981 27.

<sup>92</sup> Cf. W. L. Craig 2001 162.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.* 163.

one that is outside of the series itself.<sup>94</sup> Many contemporary Thomists wanted to implant the idea of contingency in the first two *ways*, which does not seem correct.<sup>95</sup> After all, what can be said about the first *way*? It seems that from the terminology that St. Thomas uses (*motus*, the difference between potentiality and actuality, change defined as a "transition" from potentiality to actuality, etc.) but also from the examples he uses (the example with wood and fire and with the hand, stick and stone) that this argument owes major influence to the eleventh and twelfth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.<sup>96</sup> Therefore, it shouldn't at all be surprising that the God referred to in the conclusion of this argument can hardly be said to exceed the scope of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover.

### 3.2.2. St. Thomas' second *way*

While in the first *way* the empirical starting point was change in the world, in the second *way* the empirical fact is the observation of efficient causes ordered in a series. What does St. Thomas have to say about such a series? This series or order (*ordo*) is one within which its members act simultaneously. In other words, the causation of the later members of such a series depends entirely on the causation of the earlier members.<sup>97</sup> Furthermore, St. Thomas emphasizes that those efficient causes that we perceive around us are not (and they can't be) the causes of themselves. Namely, if an efficient cause were to be the cause of itself, it would need to have existed before itself, which is absurd.<sup>98</sup> Therefore, the series producer - produced is established. Just as in a series of moving things there must be a first member of that series, so in a series of things that cause each other there must be a first efficient cause.<sup>99</sup> In the first *way*, we perceive motion in the world and - realizing that an infinite series of things put in motion by one another is not possible - we conclude that there must be such a being that makes all other things be in motion. The second *way* differs from the first only in that it does not start from the concept of motion, but from the concept of production or efficient causality. According to St. Thomas, such efficient causality, which is given to us by experience, cannot exist in an essentially ordered series if there were no "first wheel" of that sequence, i.e. an uncaused

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<sup>94</sup> For a detailed treatment of the difference between the first two *ways* cf. W. L. Craig 2001 165 – 172.

<sup>95</sup> The most famous such attempt can be seen in the classic of the history of medieval philosophy of the 20th century, Gilson's work *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Medievale*, i.e. *The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*, cf. Gilson 1940 65 – 83.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. Aristotel 2001 283 – 389.

<sup>97</sup> Pawl 2014 110.

<sup>98</sup> Aquinas 1981 27.

<sup>99</sup> Cf. Davies 1991 29.

cause.<sup>100</sup> St. Thomas comes to this view after rejecting the possibility of an infinite series of efficient causes due to the inconsistency with experience. In St. Thomas' words:

Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false.<sup>101</sup>

It follows from this that there must be one or more necessary beings. However, even if there were more necessary beings, in the causal series of necessary beings one of the necessary beings must not be produced as necessary, but is necessary *per se*. It is precisely this necessary being *per se* "to which everybody gives the name God."<sup>102</sup>

### 3.3. Herman Dalmatin's thought in the First book of *De essentiis*

This chapter will lay down the most important determinants of Herman's philosophy in the First Book of his work *De essentiis*. Following from this, it seems necessary to deal with the influences on Herman's thought because they were crucial in the creation of Herman's synthesis. Namely, although his thought in the First Book of *De essentiis* is original, he owes a lot to other thinkers. This primarily refers to the Neo-Platonist thought of the "school" in Chartres and the Arab philosophy inspired by Aristotle and Plato. Furthermore, this chapter will refer specifically to the structure of the First book of *De essentiis* and the metaphysical concepts present in it. There is no consensus when it comes to the exact date of writing *De essentiis*. Dadić assumes that Herman started in 1138 and finished the work in Béziers in 1143.<sup>103</sup> Burnett shares his opinion.<sup>104</sup> When it comes to the influences on *De essentiis*, it should be noted that in historiography there is no in-depth analysis of the various influences on Herman's philosophy. There are only particular works that deal with some of his possible influences. Thus, for example, Richard Lemay dealt with the influence of Arabic Aristotelianism on Herman's thought.<sup>105</sup> Considering that Herman received Aristotelianism through al-Kindi and Avicenna - whose philosophies can in themselves be called a combination of Aristotelianism

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<sup>100</sup> Cf. Aquinas 1981 27.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid. 28.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid. 28.

<sup>103</sup> Dadić 1990 120.

<sup>104</sup> Cf. Burnett 2009 245.

<sup>105</sup> Cf. Banić Pajnić 2015 118.

and Platonism - Herman's thought can also be characterised as such.<sup>106</sup> In addition to direct philosophical influences, from a cultural perspective, some authors think of Herman's thought as "the result of both traditions - Arabic and ancient Greek."<sup>107</sup> Moreover, not only was he influenced by Arab medieval philosophy and theology, but some authors go so far as to speak of Herman as "the first author of the Latin environment who seriously contemplates and incorporates the Islamic tradition into his philosophical and astrological system."<sup>108</sup> Some historians of philosophy have attempted to provide an overview of the main influences on Herman's thought. As Haskins concluded in 1924, in Herman's work we find "a strange mixture of Chartres Platonism, Aristotelian physics, and the Neoplatonism of Hermes Trismegistus."<sup>109</sup> When it comes to Herman's Platonism, it should be said that in the medieval West there is generally a twofold way of "arriving" at Platonic and Neoplatonic thought - through Arab influences, the so-called *Plato Arabus* and through Latin writers (mainly Boethius) – *Plato Latinus*. As far as Herman's knowledge of the *Plato Arabus*, the historian of philosophy Peter Adamson believes that the greatest influence on him was the *Theologia Aristotelis*, which has been attributed to Aristotle since Late Antiquity, but was actually Porphyry's paraphrases and comments of the 4th, 5th, and 6th book of Plotinus' *Enneads*. Adamson argues that "the *Theologia Aristotelis* for early Islamic philosophy was as important as the original Aristotle."<sup>110</sup> Besides Neoplatonism, Herman also read Plato, that is the only fully translated work of Plato in the West - the *Timaeus*. It was suggested that Herman read the Calcidius' translation and commentary of Plato's work written in the 4th century. In addition to Calcidius' translation and commentary, Herman also had access to the work of William of Conches entitled *Glossae super Platonem*, which is also a commentary on the *Timaeus*, and was written between 1130 and 1135.<sup>111</sup> Apart from Calcidius and William, the West knew Plato through other sources. Parts of Plato's other works were available through Cicero, Macrobius, Seneca, Apuleius, church fathers - especially St. Augustine, Marcian Capella and Boethius. However, Proclus' commentary on Plato's *Timaeus* was not available to Herman, because William of Moerbeke would translate it to Latin in the 13th century.<sup>112</sup> Along with Platonism and Neoplatonism, Herman was also influenced by the intellectuals from the so-called school in Chartres. Herman's teacher Thierry of Chartres came from exactly that milieu. Herman's attachment to Thierry is

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid. 119 and Dadić 1990 126.

<sup>107</sup> Dadić 1990 121.

<sup>108</sup> A quote from an English historian of ideas Charles Burnett which I'm taking from Dadić 1990 122.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid. 124.

<sup>110</sup> Adamson 2002 302.

<sup>111</sup> Banić Pajnić 2015 120.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid. 122.



reflected Herman's dedication of his translation of Ptolemy's *Planisphere* to him thus calling his teacher "the reincarnation of Plato."<sup>113</sup> Although contemporary historiography partly doubts the existence of the school in Chartres as an unique institution with a specific curriculum, it can be said that there was a certain common direction which is most clearly seen in the works of John of Salisbury, Bernard of Chartres, Thierry of Chartres and others. Be that as it may, the ideas from Chartres had a great influence on the scientific revolution of the 12th century. Within philosophy, the focus was placed on the study of natural theology.<sup>114</sup> In this regard, three main sources were used when doing natural philosophy at Chartres: 1. the Bible, 2. the patristic texts, and 3. Plato's *Timaeus*.<sup>115</sup> Herman's Aristotelianism is most evident in his astrological works, where he very often borrows from Aristotle. Arab Platonism until Averroes in the 12th century was actually a synthesis of Aristotelianism and Platonism, or as Banić Pajnić puts it, "Aristotelian Neoplatonism."<sup>116</sup> The teaching of *essentiis* as entities similar to Aristotle's categories or Boethian principles is certainly Aristotelian. The same can be said for the fourfold categorisation of the cause into material, formal, efficient and final. Furthermore, the hylomorphic structure of things into matter and form, is also taken from Aristotle. On the other hand, Platonism and Neoplatonism in the work of Herman Dalmatin is equally noticeable. The difference between the primary and secondary generation, the use of the metaphysical concepts of Same and Different, the idea of the harmony of the cosmos, the postulation of demons as sublunar beings, the difference between Passive and Active, Corporeal and Incorporeal, etc. are just some of the paradigms that Herman takes from the Latin and Arabic Neoplatonism.<sup>117</sup> In the first book of *De essentiis*, Herman uses the terms "essence" (*essentia*) and "essences" (*essentiis*). It seems that these terms are not just grammatically different. Namely, for Herman, the essence (*essentia*) means that which is characteristic of a particular and what distinguishes it from another. The essence of a particular is fixed, despite the constantly changing accidents that particulars may have. In Herman's words:

But these are the things which, although, because they subsist in moving things subject to themselves, they / are disturbed in some way by the inconstancy of their subject, nevertheless their own proper and natural constancy stays intact.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid. 120.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. 121.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid. 122.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid. 124.

<sup>117</sup> Cf. the full list of platonic influences on Herman in Banić Pajnić 2015 124 – 125.

<sup>118</sup> Dalmatin 1982 77.

It also seems that the essence of a thing for Herman, as for Aristotle, is determined by its belonging to a certain kind: „Therefore, since these things are of this kind, they are properly called 'essences'. Although there are innumerable species of these things, it seems they can be included primarily under five genera.“<sup>119</sup> Thus, essence in the singular signifies that which distinguishes a thing from another, and there are as many of those essences as there are species. However, what does it mean that essences in the plural (*essentiis*) can be included in the five genera? Here Dadić's interpretation seems to be correct, according to which essences (*essentiis*) mean something very close to Aristotle's categories and Boethius' principles (*principii*).<sup>120</sup> On the other hand, essence (*essentia*) is equal in meaning to the same term in Aristotle's philosophy. How did the term essence come to be understood differently in the singular (*essentia*) and in the plural (*essentiis*)? It seems that this occurred through the translation of al-Farabi's term *mawjud*. *Mawjud* originally denotes the Aristotelian term *essentia*. However, while Gonzales correctly translated it with *essentia*, Gerard of Cremona translated it (perhaps through Pseudo-Beda's *Secretum philosophorum*) as *existentia*.<sup>121</sup> This explains why in Herman's thought the term *essentia* (in the singular) is used both as a distinguishing feature of one particular from another, i.e. as *differentia specifica* and as *existentia* (in the plural) understood as something close to the principles of all being.<sup>122</sup> When it comes to *essentiis*, Herman lists five of them: cause (*causa*), movement (*motus*), place (*locus*), time (*tempus*) and relation (*habitudo*).<sup>123</sup> Herman's essences are classified into five genera and their order isn't random. Herman's list appears to be inspired by al-Kindi's list that consists of substance, form, motion, place, and time.<sup>124</sup> Likewise, Boethius' longer list of principles (*principii*) had an important influence as well. His list includes: "quality, quantity, forms, sizes, smallness, equalities, relations, deeds, arrangements, places, times, and whatever else is discovered in some way united with bodies.“<sup>125</sup> From Aristotle's original list of ten categories (substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, doing, having and being affected), Boethius takes four (quality, quantity, place and time), and Herman, inspired by Boethius, takes three - *motus*, *tempo* and *habitudo*.<sup>126</sup> It seems that Kalenić's conclusion that Herman's list does not completely match any other pre-existing list is correct. Herman divides causes into efficient (that by which something exists),

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<sup>119</sup> Dalmatin 1982 77.

<sup>120</sup> Usp. Dadić 2016 4-11.

<sup>121</sup> Dadić 2016 10 and Dadić 1990 130.

<sup>122</sup> Dadić 2016 6.

<sup>123</sup> Cf. Dalmatin 1982 77 and Golubović 2022 20.

<sup>124</sup> Cf. Martinović 1993 11. and Dadić 1990 128.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid. 12.

<sup>126</sup> Dadić 2016 5.

formal (that which shapes a thing) and material (that in which something exists). Namely, Herman believes that „There are three principles of all *genitura* in the opinion of / philosophers. First is the efficient cause; second is that as the result of which anything is made; third is that in which everything is made.“<sup>127</sup> Some authors thought that Herman's threefold categorization of causes actually hides a fourth (final) cause, thus fulfilling Aristotle's fourfold division. These authors argue that, despite not being explicitly stated, Herman's final cause is actually hidden in the following remark: "[W]ilst one common function, controlled by reason, embraces all things."<sup>128</sup> From the mutual relationship between the material cause as that in which a thing exists and the formal as that by which a thing is, Herman concludes the necessary structure of things from matter and form (hylomorphism).<sup>129</sup> Namely, matter cannot exist without form because: „Matter provides the formless and unordered bulk itself, without the presence of which form would have nowhere to establish itself. When form puts itself over it, it consummates what is placed before it, by a kind of ordered interpretation.“<sup>130</sup> After explaining in detail each of the three (or perhaps four) types of causes and the principle of functioning of matter and form in beings, Herman moves on to the study of the of cause (*causa*) in itself. Why does Herman decide to analyze specifically the cause in more detail? It seems that Herman decided to deal with the cause because he believes that the cause (along with the force) is present in every other being and in the original movement of all things, that is, the composition of matter and form in beings. Herman explains it like this:

For that movement is a certain regulated *habitudo* of form coming together with matter, which is such that / the force and the moving cause can eventually be correctly recognised in the reason of the movement itself. Since the reason for every movement lies in the same cause, it seems that, to establish our propositions afresh, the plan of this treatise should start from there. Thus, I think, it is appropriate that the treatise about the essences should start off from whatever point is the origin for everything else, and it should be terminated at the end in that point once again, as if having completed a circle.<sup>131</sup>

Herman's sequence of argumentation within which the analysis of *essentiis* is starting and ending with cause (*causa*), some authors called a hermeneutic circle.<sup>132</sup> Herman further divides

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<sup>127</sup> Dalmatin 1982 77.

<sup>128</sup> Martinović 1993 11.

<sup>129</sup> Dalmatin 1982 77.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid. 79.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid. 79.

<sup>132</sup> Cf. Martinović 1993 9-30.

the motions caused by the movement of the first cause into two categories - creation and generation.<sup>133</sup> Accordingly, the causes are divided into primary cause (related to creation) and secondary causes (related to generation) which "obey the decision of the first."<sup>134</sup> The main difference between creation and generation is that creation is *ex nihilo*, i.e. from nothing, while generation is the subsequent formation of already existing matter. In this regard, God as the original cause does not create from pre-existing matter, but from himself, and that is why this original process is called creation.<sup>135</sup> For Herman, the craftsman and the instrument are discernible in every work, i.e. the one who generates something and the thing with which it is being generated. However, this difference does not exist in the process of creation, because in it God is both the craftsman and the instrument. When it comes to generation, there is a difference between the craftsman (God) and the instrument (the secondary causes). It seems that, for Herman, the concrete instrument in the process of generation is the sky and the stars.<sup>136</sup> The central theses of Herman's concept of creation are: 1. The identity of what God is in himself and his attributes, 2. The Creator of the world as one and omnipotent, 3. Creation beginning from nothing, and further generation obeying the will of the original Creator, 4. Differentiation of the Primary cause and the Secondary causes, 5. The divine being is like an image of all other forms that are created *ex nihilo*, 6. That which was created does not perish, as opposed to that which was generated and 7. There is a hierarchical difference of the First Cause and further causes that are subordinate to Him.<sup>137</sup>

### 3.4. Indications of God in the First book of *De essentiis*

As part of describing the most important of all essences (cause), which is the main theme of the First Book, Herman often equates the First Cause and its characteristic creation *ex nihilo* with God. That is why it seems that his hermeneutic circle goes beyond the limits of the metaphysical discussion about the First Cause and acquires the outlines of a theological inquiry into reality of being in the light of God as the First Cause.<sup>138</sup> In the context of a clearer understanding of the cause as the most important of the *essentiis* and the First Cause in particular, Herman uses examples and indications that arise from cosmological questions, that

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<sup>133</sup> Dalmatin 1982 87.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid. 87.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid. 87.

<sup>136</sup> Cf. Banić Pajnić 2017 7.

<sup>137</sup> The list of Herman's main teachings on the creation and generation is taken from Čubelić 2000 6-9.

<sup>138</sup> Cf. Dalmatin 1982 77.

is from the questions of the origin of the world as a whole.<sup>139</sup> In this paper, they will be called *indications* to God because they do not have the strict form of St. Thomas' arguments, but they contain Herman's claims that he uses to conclude to the existence of God. Likewise, his indications are not, like St. Thomas' *ways*, deductive attempts to prove that God exists. On the contrary, they can only be understood within the First Book of *De essentiis*. This paper will deal with two parts of Herman's *indications*. The first covers the Eighth Chapter of the First Book and ends with a conclusion that affirms God's existence whilst further enveloping the mechanisms of knowing God.<sup>140</sup> The second part begins with the Tenth chapter and ends with the Thirteenth, in which God's attributes are identified with God Himself.<sup>141</sup> Both *indications* seem to culminate in the Fourteenth Chapter, in which all the attributes of God derived from the *indications* are explicated.

### 3.3.1. The first *indication* of God

The first *indication* of God begins with the explanation of the principle according to which every thing that exists must necessarily have a cause of its existence. The reason for this is the impossibility of something in nature being the cause of its own existence. Herman explains it as follows: „It is obvious that nothing comes into being without a generative cause, and that it is forbidden by nature that anything should be the cause of its own *genitura*, and should bring / itself to effect.“<sup>142</sup> The general rule that applies here is *nihil genitum sine causa genitrice* (nothing born without generative cause).<sup>143</sup> Furthermore, in every generation there is necessarily a cause of generation and that which is generated. The question that arises here is: Is it possible, by perceiving the connection of cause of generation and the generated, to discern what is at the beginning of that series? Herman points out that the answer to that question is affirmative and gives a kind of argument that he takes from Boethius, who in *In categorias Aristotelis* said the following: "If I say animal, I have not yet said anything about man, and if I say man, it necessarily implies that I speak about an animal."<sup>144</sup> Following Boethius, Herman says: „[S]pecies implies genus; individual implies both genus and species. Plainly *one* principle of all things must be understood.“<sup>145</sup> Here it seems he wants to say that some terms, for example

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<sup>139</sup> Cf. Golubović 2022 17.

<sup>140</sup> Dalmatin 1982 82.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid. 87.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid. 79.

<sup>143</sup> Cf. Martinović 1993 14.

<sup>144</sup> Martinović 1993 17.

<sup>145</sup> Dalmatin 1982 79.

"Herman Dalmatin" entail (presuppose) another term or even more of them, in this case that Herman belongs to the human species and to the animal genus. Herman seems to be using this metaphor as the beginning of pointing out the necessity of the existence of one as the beginning of all. As part of the whole of the first *indication*, Herman further elaborates the example by saying:

„[P]lainly one principle of all things must be understood. For 'one' is priori to 'two', since unless one comes first there is nothing to make up two. Moreover, when there are two, there must also be one, but the opposite – that if there is one, there will be two – does not hold true.“<sup>146</sup>

If there is two (*duo*), there are necessarily units that make it up, but the reverse is not true. Namely, the one (*unus*) can exist because it does not have a two in its nature, while a two has a one and that is why it is (like all other numbers) preceded by a one, without which none of them would exist. It seems that this is not exclusively a numerical metaphor, but rather an analogy that points to the existence of one cause as the "principle of motion" and as the "first and generative cause."<sup>147</sup> Two things follow from this numerical metaphor, if God is understood analogously to the One (*Unus*): 1) God as *Unus* exists unattached to other beings that are, on the contrary, dependent on Him, and 2) He may or may not create other beings, i.e. He possesses free will. Namely, the one (*unum*) from Herman's (Boethius') metaphor does not need other numbers and does not create them out of necessity.<sup>148</sup> Furthermore, Herman rejects the possibility of the existence of two principles that would play the role of the one. It is impossible to imagine two beginnings, because even if they did exist, they would not by definition both be beginnings, because their duality would have to be explained by some beginning that precedes them. Likewise, two beginnings could not exist, given that only one principle (*Unus*) must be „included in all things.“<sup>149</sup> Then Herman repeats the division into primary and secondary causes and seems to identify the Primary Cause with God, by saying that He is "really one and simple, (...), motionless, (...), the cause and reason of movement of everything else (...), remaining stable, puts everything into motion."<sup>150</sup> This first cause is the initiator of everything, and is in a way hidden. The influence of Plato's *Timaeus* and his Demiurge on Herman's conception of the primary cause is clearly apparent: „So, therefore, what moves everything else must be the first

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid. 1982 79.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid. 1982 79.

<sup>148</sup> Cf. Marinović 1993 18.

<sup>149</sup> Dalmatin 1982. 79.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid. 79.

and efficient cause of everything, which, as *Timaeus* says, it is as difficult to discover as it is impossible to define worthily, once discovered.<sup>151</sup> The way of knowing God is described, whereby "by negation of sensible things, and those things which imagination can describe, having removed that which it is not, intellect affirms it to be that which remains."<sup>152</sup> The end of this part serves as a kind of confirmation of the identification of the First Cause (as a strictly metaphysical concept) with the Christian God. It simply reads: "He's supremely good!"<sup>153</sup> At the end of the first indication, Herman explains that God helps those who seek Him. To Him, "[T]he human mind ascends; the divine goodness descends. The former by speculation, the latter by revelation."<sup>154</sup> What is known about God by reason "[W]as hidden and transparent to almost no one from the earliest era of time."<sup>155</sup> The descent of divine goodness in the person of Jesus Christ made it possible for people to know God more truly and correctly than they could ever know Him with their own abilities.<sup>156</sup>

### 3.3.2. The second *indication* of God

The second *indication* seems to start with the Tenth Chapter in which God's Trinity and God's eternity are affirmed.<sup>157</sup> Like the first *indication*, the second starts with a general principle. Here it is the principle that asserts the necessity of a first being in order of beings. "In every series of things it is always necessary for one of the series to be first" because "those things which we see are composed of such opposites could in no way always have existed."<sup>158</sup> Then Herman gives two possibilities of the way of being of the first in the series:

[I]t is necessary that that which is first of all, if it began to be, gave birth to itself at some time, and unless it began at some time, it will never cease. For only that which rises, sets, and there is no dissolution unless it follows / composition."<sup>159</sup>

Here arises the question of the mode of existence of the first in a series. Namely, did it create itself at some specific moment or has it always existed? Although Herman does not explicitly

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid. 81.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid. 81. Such a methodology of knowing God is reminiscent of the so-called negative way of knowing God (*via negativa*) promulgated by the Pseudo-Dionysius, Scotus Eriugena and others.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid. 81.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid. 81.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid. 81.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid. 81.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid. 83.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid. 83.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid. 85.

give an answer regarding the two mentioned options, for at least two reasons it can be inferred that Herman considers the first in the series to be eternal and not (self) created: 1) In the same paragraph, Herman talks about God's eternity and 2) In the Eighth Chapter he denies the possibility of self-creation: „and that it is forbidden by nature that anything should be the cause of its own *genitura*, and should bring / itself to effect.“<sup>160</sup> It seems important to note that the entire second part (*indication*) is imbued with the idea that the Different taken from experience must be composed and cannot exist forever. Having answered the question about the eternity of the first cause, Herman now wonders if the first cause is also the "multiplier of the universe", i.e. the one that assembles the Different. Then Herman's important antithesis of beings that are created and in motion versus those uncreated and not in motion is spelled out. In Herman's words: "Things are made in that they are moved. Every movement, from wherever it comes, must have begun at some time."<sup>161</sup> With this antithesis in mind, Herman concludes that all those beings that move must necessarily be created because otherwise they would not move (the *essentiis* of motion is inherent in created beings). So, from the fact that everything that moves must be said to have been created, and from the fact that time is also a thing in motion, Herman proves that time is not eternal. In other words, that it must necessarily have a beginning. Movement is therefore associated with temporality. After giving the general characteristics of motion in Chapter Eleven<sup>162</sup>, In the Thirteenth Chapter, Herman expands on what was said before (that motion is inherent in the created, and the lack of motion to beings that are not created), adding to the non-created and non-moving the attribute of being an originator, and to the created and moving the attribute of being originated. In Herman's words: "Furthermore, these things themselves can be understood more deeply as a result of the very difference between the Creator those thing which we call 'founded'."<sup>163</sup> What troubles Herman here is the following: How can the non-created and non-moving have attributes? That which is eternal (by not being created and by not moving) has attributes, but does not possess them as created things. Namely, in contrast to the wisdom, goodness and blessedness of created things, in which we clearly distinguish that thing on the one hand, and its wisdom, goodness and blessedness on the other, in the case of a non-created (eternal) being, its attributes are equal to its being. Returning to the ubiquitous background of this second *indication*, i.e. the explanation of the composition of the world, Herman concludes that - given that what we see is: 1) composed of the Different

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<sup>160</sup> Ibid. 79.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid. 85.

<sup>162</sup> All movement is (i) of place, or (ii) of alteration or (iii) of transference, cf. Dalmatin 1982 85.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid. 85.



and 2) in motion - there must necessarily be a being who is: 1) the cause of the composition of the Different and 2) is motionless. In other words, the world is in motion and thus caused. For Herman, causation is "composition of the Different", and every such process needs an "author", because "every composition is an action which must have its author."<sup>164</sup> From this, Herman deduces that this author is precisely God. It seems that after concluding this *indication*, Herman gives a general conclusion about God in both indications. The conclusion and additional explanations about God can be summarized in eight points: 1) He alone is the first and the last, 2) He is omnipotent, 3) He is the author of the entire universe, 4) He is in the entirety of His own being beyond all motion, 5) His motion is noticeable in his work, 6) unlike the created, in Him there is no difference between being and attributes, 7) unlike temporal beings, He is eternal, 8) regarding the relationship between the created and the Creator, He sets the law for the things He creates, and not the other way around.<sup>165</sup>

### 3.4. Comparison between St. Thomas' and Herman's arguments

In this chapter, St. Thomas' *ways* and Herman's *indications* will be compared, based on the main determinants of cosmological arguments and on the three-part categorization given in the first chapter.<sup>166</sup> The "big fact" of St. Thomas' first *way* is a change in the world understood as a transition from potentiality to actuality. Starting from the empirical data understood in this way and from the principle of causality, a series of things is established that each actualize some potency in another (they "move" each other). Then the possibility of such a series being eternal is rejected and God is argued for as a suitable answer to the "big fact" with which the argument started. If St. Thomas' first *way* is analyzed using the three-part categorization, the argument refers to the impossibility of a-temporal regression, which is evident from the used example with a hand, a stick and a stone that does not depend on time. Namely, St. Thomas tries to prove that an eternal series in which beings actualize the potentiality of other beings is not possible,

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<sup>164</sup> Ibid. 85.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid. 87.

<sup>166</sup> I will list them here again. Firstly, some "big fact" is stated or a global (cosmic) characteristic of the world is described. Then a suitable causal or explanatory solution is sought for this great fact in the form of some principle or law. In the last step, the principle of regularity or foundation is explained. Trodijelna kategorizacija kozmoloških argumenata glasi: The first category is the impossibility of infinite regress. There can be three different answers regarding the impossibility of infinite regress: 1) The argument mentions the impossibility of a temporal regress, 2) The argument mentions the impossibility of an a-temporal regress or 3) the argument does not mention the impossibility of a (temporal or a-temporal) regress. The second category are the principles which the argument mentions. They may or may not be explicitly stated. The first of them is the principle of complete determination, the second is the principle of causality, and the third is the principle of sufficient reason. The third category is the type of cosmological argument, according to contemporary philosophy of religion. Cosmological argument can be one of the following: 1) Argument from change, 2) Argument from cause and 3) Argument from contingency.

because that would lead to the impossibility of the empirical fact he started with. Furthermore, when it comes to the principles to which the argument refers, here the principle of causality is referred to. Namely, for St. Thomas, there cannot be a thing that causes itself, i.e. that puts itself from potentiality to actuality. Finally, given that this argument is very similar to Aristotle's argument from the *Metaphysics*, it should certainly be classified as an argument from change. The second *way* starts from the empirical fact of efficient causality in the world. Like the first *way*, it is based on the principle of causality and creates a kind of causal series. St. Thomas then tries to prove that such a series cannot be eternal and that it warrants a first cause that is God. When it comes to the three-part categorization, in the first two categories it coincides with the first *way*. Namely, this argument also rests on the impossibility of an infinite a-temporal regress and on the principle of causality. As for the type of cosmological argument, it is an argument from causality. Herman's first *indication* of God does not seem to be a cosmological argument. Unlike in St. Thomas' *ways*, there exists no "big fact" with which a cosmological argument ought to start. Although the principle of causality is mentioned explicitly<sup>167</sup>, a causal relation is not derived from it, nor is a series created. Relatedly, since there is no postulation of a causal relation (which is visible in both *ways*), there is no mention of the impossibility of infinite regress. Regarding the three-part categorization, the impossibility of an infinite regress is not mentioned, and the mention of the principle of causality does not substantially enter into the very argument of the first *indication*, i.e. within what was called a numerical metaphor. We can take the "composition of the Different" things in the world as the "great fact" of the second indication.<sup>168</sup> This empirical fact has the role of distinguishing the created from the uncreated and the moving from the non-moving. The second *indication* does not mention any of the determinants of the cosmological argument. However, it remains an open question as to what extent the principle of causality from the first *indication* is present in the second *indication*, without being explicitly mentioned. Consequently, it is questionable whether the impossibility of an infinite regress is mentioned. Namely, the impossibility of time being eternal is mentioned in two places. In the first case, Herman mentions the impossibility of the eternity of time due to diversity<sup>169</sup>, and in the second due to the movement of things in the world.<sup>170</sup> However, arguing about the impossibility of the eternity of time without mentioning some causal series is

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<sup>167</sup> Cf. Dalmatin 1982 79.

<sup>168</sup> Cf. Dalmatin 1982 85.

<sup>169</sup> Cf. Dalmatin 1982 85.

<sup>170</sup> Things are made in that they are moved. Every movement, from wherever it comes, must have begun at some time." Dalmatin 1982 85.

not the same as arguing about the impossibility of an infinite (temporal or a-temporal) causal series. So while it has some of the elements of a cosmological argument, it seems that this *indication* isn't one either. This seems so because the main thread of this argument is to point to God based on diversity (the Different), motion and creation of things from experience, but not by creating a concrete causal connection between beings and God. So, unlike St. Thomas' *ways*, Herman's second *indication* does not discuss starting from the explanation of the mechanism of some fact in the world (such as, for example, change as a transition from potency to act), but - taking diversity (the Different), motion and creation as givens - points to God as the necessary creator of such a state of affairs, without giving a concrete cause-and-effect connection of such a conclusion. In this regard, it seems to be a special argument that bears more resemblance to a kind of a teleological argument<sup>171</sup>, rather than a cosmological one.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

This paper dealt with the analysis and comparison of arguments in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and Herman Dalmatin. More precisely, the specific goal of this paper was to investigate whether or not there exists a cosmological argument in the First Book of Herman's work *De essentiis*. In this regard, the most famous version of the cosmological argument in medieval philosophy - that of St. Thomas Aquinas and his *ways* - was taken as an orientation point. The methodology related to the comparison of arguments was given in the first chapter. It included three main determinants of cosmological arguments and a three-part categorization taken from secondary literature. Before entering into the actual analysis and comparison of the arguments, it was necessary to explain the meaning and development of the cosmological argument throughout history and in contemporary philosophy. This was done through examples of cosmological arguments from Plato, Islamic and Jewish medieval philosophers, and contemporary philosophers (especially those of the analytic tradition). Then a context was given to the cosmological arguments themselves in the form of an explanation of the basic ideas and teachings of St. Thomas (his metaphysics and natural theology) and Herman Dalmatin (his metaphysics). After that, the arguments of St. Thomas Aquinas, that is, his *ways* were analysed. Within that analysis, it has been concluded that they are cosmological arguments from change and from causality. On the other hand, parts of Herman's argumentations about God, which were called *indications* of God, were also analyzed. In the end, it was concluded that, unlike

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<sup>171</sup> Although there are several types of teleological arguments, their common place is to argue for the existence of God based on some complex functionality in the natural world (in the second *indication* it would be the diversity, motion and creation of beings in the world) that seems to have been designed by an intelligent creator, cf. Peterson et al. 2012 93 – 101.

Thomas's *ways*, there aren't cosmological arguments in the First Book of *De essentiis*. In this regard, the answer to the research question that read: "Is there a cosmological argument for God's existence in Herman Dalmatin's work *De essentiis*?" is negative. Namely, due to the lack of fundamental determinants of the cosmological argument, such as the absence of a "big fact" (in the first *indication*), failure to mention the impossibility of an infinite regress of a series (in the first and second *indication*), lack of a causal series sharing a certain property or attribute (in the second *indication*), it seems that we cannot talk about cosmological arguments in his work. Consequently, the hypothesis I presented, which reads: "In the First Book of *De essentiis* there are two indications of God's existence that we can call cosmological arguments from the first cause." has not been proven valid because they do not meet the main criteria of cosmological arguments from the first cause. Some of the steps that the author of this paper would take as future directions of research on these topics are further work on more precisely determining the character, scope and influence of Herman's indications, especially bearing in mind the influence of thinkers from the school of Chartres on Herman's *indications* of God.

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