prikaz prve stranice dokumenta Collective intentionality and autism: Against the exclusion of the “social misfits”
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Scientific paper - Original scientific paper
Collective intentionality and autism: Against the exclusion of the “social misfits”
Filozofija i društvo, 30 (2019), 1; 135-148. https://doi.org/10.2298/fid1901135l
Lekić, Kristina

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Lekić, K. (2019). Collective intentionality and autism: Against the exclusion of the “social misfits”. Filozofija i društvo, 30. (1), 135-148. doi: 10.2298/fid1901135l

Lekić, Kristina. "Collective intentionality and autism: Against the exclusion of the “social misfits”." Filozofija i društvo, vol. 30, no. 1, 2019, pp. 135-148. https://doi.org/10.2298/fid1901135l

Lekić, Kristina. "Collective intentionality and autism: Against the exclusion of the “social misfits”." Filozofija i društvo 30, no. 1 (2019): 135-148. https://doi.org/10.2298/fid1901135l

Lekić, K. (2019) 'Collective intentionality and autism: Against the exclusion of the “social misfits”', Filozofija i društvo, 30(1), pp. 135-148. doi: 10.2298/fid1901135l

Lekić K. Collective intentionality and autism: Against the exclusion of the “social misfits”. Filozofija i društvo [Internet]. 2019 [cited 2024 May 07];30(1):135-148. doi: 10.2298/fid1901135l

K. Lekić, "Collective intentionality and autism: Against the exclusion of the “social misfits”", Filozofija i društvo, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 135-148, 2019. [Online]. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:172684. [Accessed: 07 May 2024]

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Metadata
Title (english)Collective intentionality and autism: Against the exclusion of the “social misfits”
AuthorKristina Lekić
Author's institutionUniversity of Rijeka
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Scientific / art field,
discipline and subdiscipline		HUMANISTIC SCIENCES
Philosophy
Abstract (english)
The paper aims to shed light on Searle’s notion of collective intentionality (CI) as a primitive phenomenon shared by all humans. The latter could be problematic given that there are individuals who are unable to grasp collective intentionality and fully collaborate within the framework of “we-intentionality”. Such is the case of individuals with autism, given that the lack of motivation and skills for sharing psychological states with others is one of the diagnostic criteria for Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD). The paper will argue that exclusion of individuals with autism is not a threat for Searle’s notion of collective intentionality, as the notion can be read as merely a biological disposition that all human beings share. Furthermore, the paper proposes the extension of Searle’s concept of CI so it can include behaviors of individuals who have the disposition towards CI, but which was not evolved through ontogenesis ; namely, for individuals with autism.
Keywords (english)
Languageenglish
Publication typeScientific paper - Original scientific paper
Publication statusPublished
Peer reviewPeer review
Publication versionPublished version
Journal titleFilozofija i društvo
Numberingvol. 30, no. 1, pp. 135-148
p-ISSN0353-5738
DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2298/fid1901135l
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:186:172684
Publication2019
Document URLhttp://bib.irb.hr/1061332
Type of resourceText
Access conditionsOpen access
Terms of useLicence In copyright icon
Created on2022-12-19 08:17:05