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THE IMPACT OF SPEECH IN POLITICS

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THE IMPACT OF SPEECH IN POLITICS

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ABSTRACT (SUMMARY)

This paper explores and explains the means of gaining a following and a sense of trust among potential voters or other political figures. First off, the paper focuses on rhetoric in politics – how it has developed and evolved from the ancient times until now, and what significance it really had in each major period in history where political discourse was prominent. Following that, the focus is on persuasion and in what ways this discourse needs to be formed in order to serve its purpose. After the two seemingly theoretical chapters, various speech devices and appeals present in almost every political speech are singled out and examined. In the conclusion, I reflect upon the content of the paper and consequently give my own opinion on the topic.

SAŽETAK

Ovaj rad istražuje i objašnjava kako postići povjerenje i potporu među potencijalnim glasačima ili drugim političkim figurama. Rad će se prvo fokusirati na retoriku u politici, odnosno, kako se razvijala od antike do sada, te koji je značaj zbilja imala u svakom većem povijesnom periodu gdje je politički diskurs bio od velike važnosti. Nakon toga, dolazimo do pojma uvjeravanja, čije će značenje prvo biti objašnjeno, a zatim slijedi analiza načina na koji diskurz mora biti formiran da ostvarimo ciljeve uvjeravanja. Nakon dva poglavlja koja su više teoretske prirode, treće poglavlje se okreće primjerima iz prakse, odnosno, jezičnim figurama i apelima, gdje će se pojedine vrste opisati i analizirati. U zaključku ću se osvrnuti na cijeli rad te dati mišljenje vezano temu i sadržaj rada.

INTRODUCTION

Politics is unavoidable no matter how much we try to distance ourselves from it. Maybe one would not want to hear about it, but the fact is that it dictates the quality of their life.

The main problem is – out of all politicians out there, who can be trusted? Though certain political parties represent a set of already defined customs and ideas (e.g. right/left-wing parties), they do not necessarily act accordingly and sometimes tend to “forget” about certain aspects that may just be important to a group of people who in a way “trusted” a political party to ensure them a decent life standard or just lessen the discrimination against them as a group. This very often results in people thinking that no matter the political alignment, all parties (politicians) are the same and only think of themselves.

This may be the end result of elections, but the main topic that will be discussed in this paper is how politicians get to this position in the first place. The biggest part of that process is the attempt to successfully appeal to the masses via speech – potential candidates need to convince the audience that what they represent will be beneficial both for the country and its people in various press conferences and interviews. The saying “Actions speak louder than words” is quite true in itself, but in these situations the candidates are put in a position where they have to vocalize their future actions – since they need a certain amount of power and influence to perform specific actions (laws, regulations, etc.), they first need to gain enough power and influence over potential voters (in democratic systems) or other political figures through their words. One of the ways they can achieve that is to brush up on their rhetorical and persuasive skills. The role of rhetoric and persuasion in politics is precisely what this paper focuses on.

In the first chapter, “History of Rhetoric and Politics”, an insight will be given in terms how political matters and the practice of rhetoric regarding those matters were handled in major historical points, starting from Ancient Greece and The Roman Empire, following the influence they had on Humanism and The Renaissance and its critique formed in early modern politics, and how after those critiques political speeches and the relationship to the audience are regarded in present times.

The second chapter, “Persuasion”, deals with defining the same notion and how it is approached, as well as it serves as a guide on forming arguments in various types of dialogues that appear in political debates, interviews and in terms of propaganda.

The third, closing chapter “Speech figures and Appeals” analyzes the notions that are present in speeches in real time. Speech figures and appeals serve as a tool to rhetoric and successful persuasion. However, they will be analyzed in terms whether they actually are advantageous in political speeches, especially appeals in that regard.

Finally in the conclusion, I will give my own review of the topics mentioned in this paper, as well as point out their value in current events.

CHAPTER 1: HISTORY OF RHETORIC AND POLITICS

Before describing how it has developed and what impact it has, we must first define rhetoric as a term and practice. There is not only one clear definition, since the term itself contains a certain amount of complexity. MacDonald at first explains that “the English word "rhetoric" stems from the Greek *rhetorike*, which means the art of the public speaker (rhetor) or politician” (Macdonald, 2017: 4). However, he further elaborates the difficulties that arise when defining rhetorics:

A further difficulty in defining rhetoric is that the meaning of the English word "rhetoric:" like the Greek word *logos*, encompasses both the art of rhetoric and its products (e.g., persuasion, speeches, texts, advertisements, etc.). As a consequence, the terms "rhetoric" and "rhetorical" are today used to describe a baffling array of practices and artifacts, so much so that it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of "rhetorics" than rhetoric.” (MacDonald, 2017: 5)

It is important to note that the description and understanding of the term varied throughout history – to put it simply, due to the term being somewhat ambiguous, this has opened many doors not only in the sense of redefining the word, but also in redefining the act itself.

In the beginning, rhetoric and its practice were mostly seen as a beneficial factor regarding politics. However, when it comes to politics nowadays, rhetoric is usually looked down upon as it bears negative connotations, just as the notion of persuasion (which will be explained more in depth in the next chapter). James Martin makes a comment, stating that:

In modern democracies we despise and fear speech just as much as (if not more than) we honor it. We curse the ‘liars’ and the deceivers just as we desire inspiration and eloquence from our leaders. [...] Persuasive speech, we might say, functions as both poison and cure to democracy. By consequence, the skill of rhetoric, where speech is deliberately manipulated to render it persuasive, is quietly cherished but – more often than not – dismissed and derided. (Martin, 2014: 3)

Even though the practice of rhetorical speech is overlooked, it is important to remember its foundations and development.

1.1 ANCIENT GREECE

When it comes to rhetoric, ancient Greece is the place where it first emerged as a term and practice. Greek rhetoric refers to the emerging and evolving "discipline" that theorizes and

teaches an art of oral and written composition and performance aimed at influencing audiences (Schiappa, 2017: 33).

It all started with the sophists around 500 BCE. Sophists can be understood as teachers/wise men as the word *sophos* means wisdom. Their teachings were based on how to speak and argue in the public realm – or simply, rhetoric (*rhethorike*) (Martin, 2014: 16). Martin further explains how it could have not been just a matter of skill development, but it also went hand in hand with the Athenian democratic system:

Rhetorical instruction was not only a technical skill; it flowed from the Athenians' idea of moral and civil life. [...] The Greek polis is widely known for its highly participatory system of politics. To be a citizen in this system was regarded as an honor that bestowed important duties upon the individual. The freedoms of the citizen were understood to be closely associated with a commitment to a sense of the common good. (Martin, 2014: 17)

However, sophistic rhetoric, according to Plato's writings, was based on manipulation and deceptive use of argument to achieve political success, regardless of the truth. Also, Plato claimed that its goal was to make the worse argument appear the better (Schiappa, 2017: 36). On the other hand, some scholars believe that the teachings of practical argumentation were valuable and necessary for the democratic system as it encouraged interaction with the citizens (Schiappa, 2017: 37)

It is important to know how the democratic system of Athens worked in order to perceive the relation between the speakers and the audience. There were three main functions: the deliberative part (the Council and Assembly), the judicial and the magistrates. The Council and Assembly dealt with matters that were related to the entire community as opposed to the courts (Harris, 2017: 53). With that in regard, Harris concludes:

Speeches were therefore not designed to gain power for politicians at elections so that they could control the government. To gain the support of the Assembly, speakers had to address everyone, not just their supporters. They had to portray themselves as statesmen who aimed to benefit all citizens. (Harris, 2017: 55)

Another important characteristic of speeches was that they mostly appealed to the traditional values of the majority, again portraying the intention of benefiting everyone (Harris, 2017: 55). It seems that the most used form of argument in order to persuade the Assembly was appeal to public interest. Also, reminding the audience of past actions and encouraging citizens to live up to their past were some of the notions present in many speeches (Harris, 2017: 56-57).

It is important to mention that not all kinds of speeches were suitable for the Assembly. In fact, Aristotle and the (unknown) author of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* divided speech into three parts: the judicial, deliberative, and epideictic. Aristotle explains each one and to whom it is applicable. A judicial speech, as the name suggests, is concerned with the court:

In the law court, there is either an accusation or a defense. This kind of speech concerns the past because the accusation and the defense examine what has been done. The goal of the speaker is to prove that an action is just or unjust. The audience for this speech is the judge. (Harris, 2017: 60)

A deliberative speech is described as follows:

A deliberative speech aims either to exhort or dissuade and concerns the future because the speaker discusses future events. The goal of this kind of speech is to show that a certain course of action is going to be either advantageous or harmful. The audience for this kind of speech is the member of an assembly. (Harris, 2017: 60)

And finally, the aim of the epideictic speech is:

The aim of the epideictic speech is to praise or to blame. This kind of speech generally looks to the present and praises or blames existing qualities but may also glance at the past and future. The audience of the epideictic speech consists of spectators who are concerned with the speaker's ability. (Harris, 2017; 60)

Aristotle, unlike Plato, thought persuasive oratory to be valuable to the community. However, the goal was not to meet certain ideal principles, but rather, it was the ability of the orator to make a case in matters that did not require an ideal foundation (Martin, 2014: 23).

To conclude, the main goal of Greek rhetoric was to convey ideas and persuade the audience, in order to gain influence over a collective, the speakers had to ensure that with their ideas the collective will not only be ensured safety, but also moral and interpersonal strength that binds the audience closer to each other. Notions such as appealing to past successes and the popular opinions of the time, as well as respecting the values of the majority is what, according to these sources, made a speech convincing.

1.2 THE ROMAN EMPIRE

Rhetoric was vital to the young male elite, as it served as a guide on how to maintain and defend their position in the public field. The practice of rhetoric was a sign of social privilege as it implied social and political power of the patrician class (Dominik, 2017: 159).

In the beginning, Roman rhetoric was essentially Greek rhetoric adapted to the Roman environment, principally the law courts and public assemblies, though it always involved more than just public speaking (Dominik, 2017: 160)

In her essay, Connolly describes how status affected the ability of being a speaker:

Roman politics, economic, religious, legal, and political authority thus intersected and supported one another, made visible and audible through common patterns of stance and gesture and familiar patterns of speech. Cicero and Quintilian are keenly alert to the skills and the opportunities for self-distinction that rhetorical training grants to men engaged in the intraelite competition for ruling power. In this context, the audience possesses little political significance beyond its service as a marker of elite popularity and prestige. (Connolly, 2017: 184)

However, Connolly stresses that giving a speech itself is prone to uncertainty and the outcome cannot be controlled, therefore, mutual understanding and connection of both sides is crucial for the speech to result in success. Also, it is mentioned that in the speeches unnecessary complexity was avoided – they were cohesive and dynamic (Connolly, 2017: 184).

Furthermore, she describes how Jacques Ranciere thinks the relationship between the patrician and the plebeians in the matter of speaking should function:

Acts of narrative are based on the assumption of the existence of a relation of equal exchange. [...] The hierarchy of the relationship of a single patrician to the plebeians is thus replaced by a different relationship, that of narrator to listeners, a relationship whose egalitarian elements are enacted in the course of storytelling itself. (Connolly, 2017: 184)

Cicero very often referred to this principle. As Connolly explains, Cicero defines politics not as the possession of power but as persuasive communication, which arises from the common capacity of human beings to convey meaning to one another (Connolly, 2017: 185). In his work *De Oratore* the senators Crassus and Antonius discuss the functions of rhetoric. The functions are described in this manner:

Crassus describes the orator's practice as engagement in a serial contest that holds gatherings of human beings together and retains them in their civil state. In the act of turning men toward one another, eloquent words substitute for weapons and defenses in the ongoing struggles of the law court and public assembly that maintain the conditions under which the state can survive. (Connolly, 2017: 185)

Some of the topics politicians or speakers would often bring up in order to connect to the plebeians were: the people's liberty, the rights of protection against the Senate, as well as the

senators' duty towards the citizens, Rome's cultural superiority and the spread of corruption (Connolly, 2017: 187).

In Roman rhetoric the emphasis was on *ethos*, one of the three formal parts of rhetoric along with *logos* and *pathos*. In other words it is the presentation of character, and it was important because it bears a feature of transforming political values and propositions into moral ones (Connolly, 2017: 185).

Another important feature used relating to the audience in Cicero and Quintilian's practice was the *sensus communis* of emotion and taste. Connolly describes it as the common denominator shared by all citizens – the capacity to feel emotions and to render judgments of taste. By using that, the speaker can make his message come across with ease, as he takes the audience's perspective into consideration (Connolly, 2017: 188).

In the end Connolly briefly summarizes this period stating:

Roman rhetorical discourse [...] sees the creation and sustaining of collective enterprises from law and elections to war- and treaty-making as action, the action of speaking for persuasive purposes in the context of a collective involved in decision-making about its past (in the law court) and its future (in the assembly or the Senate). [...] The potential for oratory to legitimize power in the status quo is matched by its power to undermine the status quo. (Connolly, 2017: 192)

1.3 HUMANISM AND RENAISSANCE

According to the humanists, true eloquence could arise only out of a harmonious union between wisdom and eloquence. The ideological basis of humanist rhetoric is the *ratio-oratio* principle, namely, that the unity of reason and rhetoric is the presupposition of an ideal or truly humanist society (Plett, 2017: 377).

In Humanism and the Renaissance, Greek and Roman rhetoric was rediscovered, especially the works of Cicero. His texts made a big impact on the system of education and art practice, but also they were paramount for the political sphere, since Cicero himself was very involved in political matters. To master rhetoric in the Renaissance did not only mean to follow Cicero's texts, but also to be well versed enough to encounter those who thought rhetoric to be a matter of both politics and law (Reborn, 2017: 388).

W.A. Reborn explains how the duality in Cicero's texts affected the politics of the Renaissance:

The republican Cicero was, of course, a *liberalis*, a free man with the right to participate in the political activities of the Roman state, but when he thinks of the

orator's power he describes it paradoxically as worthy of both free men and kings. [...] One face offered a free republican rhetor engaged in combat with other rhetors; the other face made him a ruler who controlled an audience. [...] The result is that the politics of Renaissance rhetoric can be defined as something like a debate or a dialogue between these two conflicting political models. (Rebhorn, 2017: 388)

However, it is important to mention that in the Renaissance most countries were monarchies, dukedoms or empires. Rhetoric was not only understood as a means of ruling in the ancient world – it also served as a guideline on how to rule to monarchs and dukes, as many rhetoricians dedicated their treatises to the members of the ruling class (especially in England and France) (Rebhorn, 2017: 388-389).

On the other hand, Juan Luis Vives, a Spanish humanist, claimed that although eloquence is the most important rudder of society, it could not be applied in states where one man or an oligarchy rules, whereas in a democratic state the power of speech has enormous influence in many aspects such as public opinion, law, and even military matters (Rebhorn, 2017: 389). His opinion opposed the popular concepts of the time; however Rebhorn in a way compares him to Machiavelli:

While Vives is not known as a political thinker, he seems remarkably close to Niccolò Machiavelli here, whose *Discourses* identified the vitality of the Roman Republic precisely with the constant internal strife and disorderliness of the state. In the Renaissance, a period in which political order was generally valued, Vives's celebration of republican rhetoric and the disorder it entailed could not fail to put him at odds with almost everyone. (Rebhorn, 2017: 390)

Montaigne also refers to republican rhetoric and the fact that it belongs only in democracy, however unlike Vives, he portrays its practice as a negative thing:

Rhetoric is a tool invented to manipulate and stir up a mob and an unruly populace, a tool that is employed only in sick states, like medicine; in states, such as those of Athens, Rhodes, and Rome, where the crowd, the ignorant, where all the people had power over all things, and where things were in perpetual tempest, there the orators flooded in. (Montaigne, quoted by Kinney, 2015: 41)

Though in the Renaissance the republican aspect of rhetoric was put aside, still, the teaching of rhetoric was presented through debate. The students were taught the *argumentum in utramque partem*, argument on each side (of a case), which was implicitly based on the ontological and epistemological assumptions common to a rhetorical understanding of the

world, namely, because there was no fixed truth and every question could have different answers depending on the perspective (Rebhorn, 2017: 392).

Ending the discussion on the duality of Cicero's rhetoric, Rebhorn concludes that:

We can see that no matter how hard Renaissance rhetoricians sought to keep the two faces of Cicero's political rhetoric distinct from one another, the closer one actually looks at the discourse, the more difficult it becomes to keep those faces apart. (Rebhorn, 2017: 395)

1.4 EARLY MODERN PERIOD'S CRITIQUE OF HUMANISM

The turn toward absolutism in the later 16th century entailed a reconsideration of the political status of rhetoric (Gowland, 2017: 484). In this part the focus will be on the critiques by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes.

Bodin's critique of rhetoric is short and quite simple. Bodin states that whatever the potential benefits of rhetoric, it has commonly caused factionalism and sedition – especially when orators are granted excessive freedom of speech (Gowland, 2017: 484). Gowland further adds that Bodin thinks that political matters should not be manipulated by rhetoric as it diverts from the truth:

For Bodin, the potentially destabilizing power of political rhetoric should be strictly bounded, and not be permitted to encroach upon the formal preeminence of absolute sovereignty. Although eloquence is useful in dealing with the ignorant in democratic assemblies, it has no place in the senates or councils of aristocracies or monarchies, where discourse should be truthful and unadorned by rhetorical manipulation. (Gowland, 2017: 484)

The only discourse that Bodin approves of is the one of the sovereign to his subjects, without any replies and the subjects' consent (Gowland, 2017: 484).

Thomas Hobbes elaborates a little bit more on why rhetoric cannot persist. He argues that deliberation in democracies is inherently flawed, exposing the *arcana imperii* to enemies and foreigners, permitting reasoning by eloquence, preferring the opinions of the many to the wisdom of the few, and provoking factional quarrels (Gowland, 2017: 489).

James Martin briefly summarizes Hobbes' viewpoint on power and public speech:

For Hobbes, political power was to be conceived as the formation of an independent authority fundamentally separate from the people who authorized it. Yet Hobbes's defense of absolute sovereign power was also theorized as a kind of

‘social contract’ – that is, as an agreement among those subject to power themselves. Once agreed as a legitimate power, however, the sovereign was free to decide the laws and determine the liberties – or not – of its citizens. [...]

Thereafter, citizens were not to speak on public matters. (Martin, 2014: 27)

Furthermore, in *Leviathan*, Hobbes remarks that popular assemblies encourage those "whose interests are contrary to that of the Publique" to persuade others to adopt their views with passionate eloquence (Gowland, 2017: 485).

Hobbes may give out the impression of being radical, but some believe that his idea does not come from a place of selfishness. In his text, Martin refers to Terrence Ball, who says that:

The uncertainty of the state of nature, as he depicted it, was a consequence not of humans with the speechless instincts of wild animals but, rather, of the surfeit of interpretations, ambiguities and misunderstandings among people who use language only too freely. (Martin, 2014: 29)

However, in the end Hobbes comes to the conclusion that even though a form of eloquence will be required for the political implementation of rational arguments, it must be shaped "by Education, and Discipline" to correspond to reason and ensure that it is used "for adorning and preferring of Truth" rather than "Errour" (Gowland, 2017: 485).

1.5 MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

In his book, Martin approaches contemporary politics from three standpoints – liberalism, critical theory and postmodernism.

Starting with liberalism, the viewpoint of which is that in order to achieve individual freedom, the state and society should be separated. In that sense, individuals are free to choose to participate in public matters if they want to, but are not bound to do it. Also, Martin adds that the co-existence of separate public and private domains is achieved by constitutional controls on government and mediation between government and society by an informed elite (Martin, 2014: 43).

One of the most significant liberal thinkers in the second half of the 20th century was John Rawls.

In terms of rhetoric, Martin describes that Rawls thinks it is only a matter of individual choice if someone wants to deal with rhetoric:

His argument defends the idea that particular private needs can be reconciled because a universal rationality demonstrates the justness of redistributive measures. In that argument, rational judgement is a subjective exercise and not a

practice of actual individuals communicating and persuading each other to shape their judgements. The ‘impartial’ reasoning that Rawls expounds is deemed to be transparently available to all rational individuals and does not require active debating among citizens. (Martin 2014: 44)

It seems that liberalism implies that rhetoric and public speaking are not thought to be extremely serious matters, but rather just a loose form of practicing freedom of expression and opinion.

Finally, Martin compares how mild liberalism is in comparison to other theories:

The virtue of a liberal order is not that it is philosophically grounded but that it sustains a common allegiance to individual liberty (however defined) and refuses the alternatives of moral coercion (as in Plato) or endless, disruptive conflict and insecurity (as in Hobbes). (Martin 2014: 45)

The second standpoint, which is critical theory, aims to introduce greater practical involvement of citizens in the formulation of shared principles. Its proponents are open to the interaction of universality and particularity and to the place of aesthetics in shaping public life (Martin, 2014: 45). A key figure representing this view is Jürgen Habermas. He developed a theory of communicative action, in which citizens debated and held to account the authorities and powers that shaped their lives; so consequently, the goal of the theory is to advocate an intermediary space of dialogue where public life is exposed to the critical interrogation and opinion of its citizens. There was no concept of a preconceived common good and citizens themselves were to form moral principles via democratic procedures that structured their communication and enabled them to test the ‘validity’ of the normative claims they make (Martin, 2014: 46).

Moreover, Martin describes the impact that discourse ethics brings to Habermas’ theory:

By instituting forms of deliberation based on discourse ethics, he argues, citizens can – together – reach common judgements about their shared arrangements, eliminating claims that are untrue, inappropriate or insincere. The achievement of a rational consensus is, of course, only an ideal; any actual dialogue may fall short of fulfilling all the criteria to everyone’s satisfaction, but that does not, in his view, undermine its value as a democratic answer to the conditions of modern societies. [...] Discourse ethics are designed to uphold the separation of state and society, yet also to mediate between the two in such a way that particular differences can be reconciled by means of (discursively revealed) universal principles. (Martin, 2014: 47)

Martin finishes off the critical theory part by mentioning that some critics think that discourse ethics may well pass off forms of power and control under the guise of universal reason (Martin, 2014: 47).

The last view Martin touches upon is postmodernism. Martin remarks that:

While there is no single dominant thinker in a postmodern approach, ‘poststructuralist’ figures such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida stand as influential representatives. Central to their work is a rejection of the idea of the human subject, or self, conceived as a naturally autonomous, self-sufficient agent directed by its own conscious purposes and free will. This so-called ‘anti-humanism’ undermines the view that universal principles can ever be finally found by gaining access to an uncontested truth free from contamination with particularity. (Martin, 2014: 48)

Foucault thinks that an individual is the product of various ‘disciplinary’ practices and discourses that shape it from birth and impress upon it certain truths and abilities. However, he deems these pressures to be a form of power that grants the individual freedom of action in society. Also, Martin states that according to Foucault, “society is not a total structure operating around a power center that amasses control, but a diverse and uneven assemblage riven with forms of resistance and subversion” (Martin, 2014: 47).

Derrida “refused the view of language as a transparent medium of communication by means of which an autonomous actor could represent an independent reality to another without in some way interfering in it.” He claimed that speech does not have power over writing as language in any form is still prone to misinterpretation and delays (Martin, 2014: 47).

Finally, Martin summarizes the postmodern theory by noting that:

Postmodern politics does not dispute the effect of all rhetoric and rhetorical strategies. Rather, it disputes the claim that there is a single language of communication that can stand outside of power relations and arbitrate between all voices without remainder. [...] It suggests that all universal claims are – at least in principle – open to dispute and controversy. The emphasis in postmodern political theories is often therefore on legitimizing difference and conflict in rhetorical encounters among citizens rather than harmonizing them. (Martin, 2014: 49)

To conclude this whole chapter, we can see how the development and theorization of rhetorical skills changed over the course of history, through different political systems

such as democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, absolutism and modern democracy. All of the theories in way show how the goal is to persuade the audience, and respectfully, this was followed by criticism, as rhetorical practices were perceived to only be a tool of ill-intent and manipulation. The next chapter focuses exactly on what many deem to be the aim of rhetoric, which is persuasion. We will see how persuasion is defined, and later analyze how to apply different aspects of it in different kinds of dialogue.

CHAPTER 2: PERSUASION

2.1 PERSUASION AS A BYPRODUCT OF RHETORIC

When we think of rhetoric, we automatically connect it to the concept of persuasion. On the other hand, according to Yoos, when it comes to politics, rhetoric seems to have a much wider range of aims than just plain persuasion and along with that, consequences. He explains this in the following quote:

Politics, as with morality, aims at shaping mutually accepted commitments. It aims at creating trust. It aims at agreed-upon concerted action toward shared ends and agreed-upon negotiated compromises. Such political rhetoric is more than a rhetoric that aims at persuasion. It is a rhetoric of bonding. It is a rhetoric of *ethos*. It is a rhetoric that uses ethical appeals that gives confidence and trust to people seeking to work together and in wanting to share their lives together in mutual understanding. (Yoos, 2009: 55)

That in fact does make sense, but also, there has to be a certain amount of persuasion involved in the process – maybe to form a better bond with potential voters, politicians may have to resort to persuasion in the sense that they try to create the impression that they measure up to some ethical or other standard. Yoos brings up the notion of ethical appeals, however they can very much be seen as tools of persuasion themselves – appeals may not always be backed up by a speaker's genuine intention or belief. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the audience may not always hold an opposing view. In her essay, Mao presents the general situation:

Our audience normally falls under three general categories: (1) those who are opposed to our proposition; (2) those who are neutral to our proposition; and (3) those who are sympathetic to our proposition, though not yet having really formed their own opinions. (Mao, 1990: 135)

However, Mao herself does not quite stand by this categorization, as she feels that the dynamic of decision-making cannot be systematized – the audience is often prone to switching opinions and falling under more of these categories at once, either this being the result of the way a speech was delivered, or simply, a shift in their personal convictions (Mao, 1990: 135).

So, this brings out the question of what persuasion is and what it should be defined and practiced as to become a tool of gaining support and not a disadvantage (this can be the

result of it not being done right – the audience can see through the speaker’s motives and disregard whatever they were talking about) in the political aspect?

In the beginning of his discussion of persuasion, Walton acknowledges that rhetoric and persuasion as terms often carry a negative connotation – “Both are then linked with deception and sophistical trickery. That line of thought was, of course, Plato’s view of both rhetoric and the Sophists” (Walton, 2007: 46). Walton himself does not really accept this view as he believes persuasion can be a “legitimate function of argumentation” (Walton, 2007: 46). He describes the process of persuasion and what it is:

Obviously, it involves some sort of change of opinion or acceptance of a belief, from an initial state to a new state that is the outcome of the act of persuasion. The transition from the one state to the other takes place within an agent, and is brought about by a second agent. (Walton, 2007: 46-47)

Though he mentions only two agents, when we think of political speeches, we usually think of way more people, where usually there is not much feedback in the moment it is taking place. However, a big part of campaigns and elections are in fact, various interviews and debates the candidates have to go through, where immediate feedback is possible or even expected, but at the same time it is viewed by the masses – therefore, persuasion on a one-on-one level is equally as important as it is on a mass level. How to manage both of these aspects in terms of persuasion in theory will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter.

2.2 THE BDI AND COMMITMENT-BASED APPROACH

One of the problems that we face when we deal with explaining what persuasion is the fact that it has not really been researched in depth as a process. Walton states that:

Persuasion has always been regarded as central to rhetoric as a discipline, as reflected in Aristotle’s view of rhetoric and the long tradition stemming from it. But somehow no attempt to analyze the cognitive structure of persuasion in a precise or logical way has ever been undertaken, or ever been successful at any rate. Persuasion has always seemed too psychological for logic, and the social sciences have concentrated on the experimental and empirical aspects of it. (Walton, 2007: 48)

Though psychology describes persuasion in a stimulus-response framework concept, Walton believes that the perception of the term on such a simple empirical level is not enough to truly grasp the full concept of persuasion, especially in politics:

Persuasive messages, for example, in political campaign rhetoric or in advertising, often strongly depend on the capability of the respondent to recognize and interpret actions and statements as being forms of rational argument connecting sequences of reasoning. (Walton, 2007: 48)

However, he states that those who deal with social sciences usually disregard this opinion, as they perceive persuasion as purely psychological (Walton, 2007: 49).

Here he proposes two approaches which appear when dealing with persuasion. The first one is the belief-desire-intention approach (or commonly abbreviated as the BDI approach), and the other one is the commitment-based approach.

The BDI approach has been the leading model in analytical philosophy. Walton notes that “for the past fifty years or so, the leading work in analytical philosophy of mind has been built around the central notions of belief, intention, and desire, and it still is” (Walton, 2007: 49). However, when it comes to multi-agent systems (such as the general audience) the commitment-based approach has been more used in recent times. Walton describes the flow of argumentation in this approach:

The proponent has a claim to be proved, and he must use the respondent’s commitments as premises in an argument having his own (the proponent’s) claim as the conclusion. [...] The principle of commitment-based argumentation represents a normative ideal that is present in all my previous writings on argumentation. It derives from the notion of commitment first set out by Hamblin (1970, 1971) as the core of the method of formal dialogue theory used to analyze fallacies. [...] Commitment is determined by given speech acts or moves in a dialogue, in line with the type of dialogue and the rules governing the moves in that type of dialogue. (Walton, 2007: 50)

Also, he mentions that another important feature in the commitment approach is the possibility of retraction, though it cannot always be done freely, as some types of dialogue pose certain limitations in that sense (Walton, 2007: 50).

In order to clarify the distinction between the two approaches, we need to explain the difference between belief and commitment. Walton says that “belief is an internal psychological notion. Beliefs and desires are private “mental states.” In contrast, commitments are public” (Walton, 2007: 51). Walton here refers to what Hamblin states, further explaining the distinction:

At the beginning point of any dialogue, there is a set of commitments called a commitment store. As the dialogue proceeds through the various moves,

propositions are added to this set or deleted from it. In a dialogue, when a commitment is incurred or retracted, the act is external and public. Belief is different. It is a matter of private mental states. [...] Beliefs are obviously very important in psychology. But from a viewpoint of critical argumentation, or informal logic and the study of fallacies, it may not be necessary to know what an arguer's actual beliefs are. What matters is how he argued and what positions he took. (Walton, 2007: 51)

Though they seem different, Walton also quotes Hamblin by saying that in a way “commitment can act as a kind of *persona* of belief” (Walton, 2007: 51). In the end, he concludes that the commitment approach is better in the field of mass communication, as the BDI approach can sometimes lead to unnecessary complications (Walton, 2007: 52).

2.3 DEFINING PERSUASION THROUGH ARGUMENTATION

Though there is no active dialogue present when giving a speech, it is a foundation of debates and interviews. Walton describes how in a commitment set there has to be a notion of correct argumentation in dialogue. As he says: “An argument is deductively valid where if the premises are true, then necessarily the conclusion is true. Notions of an inductively strong argument and a presumptively plausible argument need to be added as well” (Walton, 2007: 54). Thus, in his attempt to define what persuasion is, he gives out the first out of three definitions he proposes throughout the text. This definition divides persuasion into a three-part sequence:

So defined, persuasion has three elements. The first element is that the argument put forward by the proponent is deductively valid or is otherwise structurally correct. This indicates that the inference in the argument is such that the conclusion follows from the premises. [...] The second element is the commitment of the respondent to the premises of the argument. In persuasion, commitment is transferred from the premises to the conclusion of an argument. The third notion is that of the special proposition that is designated as the conclusion of the argument. This proposition is the aiming point of the persuasion. (Walton, 2007: 54)

Moreover, he divides persuasion into two kinds regarding the outcome – a successful act of persuasion and a persuasion attempt. This definition is considered to produce a successful act of persuasion. However he believes that in this manner persuasion is defined in a limited sense, since “There are various ways an arguer might attempt to persuade another arguer to

accept something or to do something without being successful or without completing all the requirements of the first definition” (Walton, 2007: 54).

He brings up a critique of the first definition which is modelled as following:

It isn't really persuasion if the respondent is already committed to the proposition A. For the speech act to be one of persuasion, the respondent must not accept the proposition A prior to the act of persuasion. After the act of persuasion by the proponent, the respondent then comes to accept A, due to the argument presented by the proponent. (Walton, 2007: 56)

Here we face the problem of how different the propositions must be from one another, since the goal here is to change the mind of the respondent – and what happens when that does not turn out to be the case. He only proposes that the first definition needs to contain further requirement in the case of changing the respondent's mind, but more setbacks are to happen when this is further analyzed (Walton, 2007: 56).

One of the problems that arise with that is the fact that chaining of argumentation is not taken into consideration:

In persuasion dialogue, the speech act of persuasion is typically not a one-step process. Instead, it starts out with one small step of argument, and then proceeds through a series of connected steps forming a chain of argumentation. [...] The reason that the chaining notion is so important to persuasion dialogue is that a respondent will naturally tend to resist any argument that seems to go directly against or refute his ultimate thesis. (Walton, 2007: 56-57)

With the assumption that the respondent is initially opposed to proposition A, Walton presents the second definition for persuasion:

The proponent persuades the respondent to accept a designated proposition A as true if and only if the proponent puts forward a chain of argumentation meeting the following requirements. First, each step, or single inference in the chain, is a deductively valid argument. Second, the premises of the argument are all propositions that are already commitments of the respondent in the dialogue. Third, the ultimate conclusion of the chain of argumentation, at the final step of inference, is the proposition A. [...] The second definition provides a set of criteria that are both necessary and sufficient for the speech act of persuasion (Walton, 2007: 59-60)

Along with that definition given, Walton then proceeds to single out different types of persuasion dialogue that can appear in political talk in order to see if this definition is truly representative in all the types of persuasion dialogue.

The first one is called critical discussion, and it is described simply by stating that “the goal of a critical discussion is to resolve the initial conflict of opinions” (Walton, 2007: 61). This type is conditioned by the fact that fallacies are violations of its rules (Walton, 2007: 61).

The second is inquiry or the process where “an investigating group tries to prove some designated proposition, to disprove it, or to show that it cannot be either proved or disproved” (Walton, 2007: 62). This is very common in interviews and press conferences.

Another one that is present is interviews and news in media, but not necessarily connected to the practice of rhetoric is information-seeking. It is described as “a type of dialogue in which one party tries to communicate information to another party” (Walton, 2007: 62).

Eristic dialogue is very much present in presidential debates as it is “a quarrelsome type of dialogue in which the two parties “hit out” at each other and try to attack each other verbally. The goal of each participant is to articulate some grudge or grievance against the other” (Walton, 2007: 62).

However, it seems that persuasion is not exactly the central concept in these types of dialogue. In inquiry the goal is more of “trying to collectively prove something by establishing it with evidence that cannot later be challenged” (Walton, 2007: 63) rather than persuasion itself. Also, persuasion may be involved in how the information is later used, but the speech of persuasion is not central to the exchange of information that is the principal function of information-seeking dialogue (Walton, 2007: 63). In eristic dialogue the purpose of making any move is not to persuade the other party by using a chain of reasoning with premises that are commitments of the other party (Walton, 2007: 63).

The other two types of persuasion dialogue left to define are deliberation and negotiation. However, negotiation is not exactly a part of political speeches as it is more of a matter of international relations.

When it comes to deliberation,

Deliberation is a type of dialogue in which an agent or group of agents is confronted with having to make a decision about which course of action to take in a given situation. [...] In postmodern times, the advent of mass media political rhetoric has cast doubt on the ancient Greek notion that deliberation is a form of rational discussion that people can engage in with their peers in a city-state. Even

so, in the theory of democracy that came to us from the Greeks, deliberation is an ideal we can still strive for. (Walton, 2007: 64)

In situation of multi-agency, deliberation still seems not to have persuasion as a central goal, as well as it is not the function of arguments expressed in the process, as it is apparent that two opposing sides may have a commonality of goals, which does not help to solve the problem of previously given governing questions (Walton, 2007: 68-69).

In the end, Walton proposes a final definition that explains the process of persuasion, as well as encompasses the situation of multi-agency more than the previous two. In short, the concept is explained as:

One has to come to understand the role of retraction in persuasion dialogue. It should generally be possible for the respondent to retract a commitment. Retracting a proposition, once the other party has shown it is false or indefensible, is an important part of rationality. An arguer should be open-minded, and should not just stick dogmatically to his opinion, even when he is shown it is wrong. [...] On the other hand, a respondent should not always be free to retract, in any situation. If this were possible, then the proponent could never, at least realistically speaking, be capable of successful persuasion. (Walton, 2007: 89)

This follows that the concepts of successful persuasion and the attempt of persuasion need to be distinct from one another. In the aspect of media (or mass-agency) where response is not an option, commonly in propaganda, this does make sense in way:

In persuasion dialogue, the proponent's goal is to use the commitments of the respondent as premises in order to persuade the respondent to also become committed to some particular proposition he previously had doubts about accepting. This process of persuading a respondent to accept some particular proposition as true is tied in with how propaganda is used. (Walton, 2007: 106-107)

However, propaganda has more goals than just the one above, as correspondingly, "the aim of propaganda is to get the respondent to act, to adopt a certain course of action, or to go along with and assist in a particular policy" (Walton, 2007: 107). Thus, there arises a question of whether propaganda is fully a device of persuasion. Consequently, "defining propaganda as a kind of action-getting dialogue, as opposed to a persuasion type of dialogue, it is harder to condemn propaganda as being inherently negative in nature" (Walton, 2007: 108), but persuasion actually is very present in the process as explained in the previous quotes.

In conclusion, Walton thinks of propaganda as a separate type of persuasive dialogue:

It seems to be a distinctively different type of discourse altogether, even though it can directly involve elements of at least five of the six types of dialogue noted. [...] It can function in its own right as a normative structure in which arguments can be evaluated as used correctly or incorrectly (provided the other normative models of dialogue are also used) in a given case. (Walton 2007: 108-109)

Therefore, along with using different forms of persuasive dialogue, in final, propaganda is consisted of ten characteristics: dialogue structure, message content, goal-directed structure, involvement of social groups, indifference to logical reasoning, one-sided argumentation, involvement of persuasion dialogue, justification by results, emotive language and persuasive definitions, and lastly, eristic aspect (Walton, 2007: 109-112). It is clear that it has some deviations, but it still uses some characteristic of persuasion discourse types mentioned before.

Finally, Walton gives his explanation on what propaganda is:

Primarily, it is meant to be part of a normative model of a type of argumentation familiar in a kind of conversational discourse known to us in examples of mass media argumentation. The definition is primarily dialectical, in that it relates to norms of conversation. The normative model is meant to be used in a helpful way to identify, analyze, and evaluate argumentation used in particular cases in a given text of discourse. (Walton, 2007: 113)

In conclusion, when mentioning persuasion in terms of politics, we automatically connect it to rhetoric. However, it seems that there are more layers to it than expected – the way that argumentation is supposed to be formed in order to achieve success of persuasion is quite different than the rhetorical practices mentioned in the first chapter. Thus, this chapter sheds a light on another way to view speeches, further describing how politics are managed in present times. What makes persuasion and rhetoric similar is the intent of influencing an audience through speech, but they stray from each other when theorized upon – when it comes to rhetorical teachings, the emphasis was mostly on the topics the speakers should address while making a speech, and with persuasion, we are more focused on the way we need to form an argument to be successful in a certain type of dialogue. I suppose the main distinction can be simply presented like this – rhetoric is about *what* to talk about, while persuasion is more about *how* to talk about something.

Since both the notions of rhetoric and persuasion have been clarified, it is time to bring up what has not been mentioned, yet should be apparent. The discussion connected to them mostly serves as sort of a guideline, rather than it is an analysis of actual speeches. In other

words, these two chapters showcased a set of rules, and as it is known, sometimes rules only seem to work in theory. The next chapter will show what devices are used at achieving these goals.

CHAPTER 3: SPEECH FIGURES AND APPEALS

Though rhetorical texts and discussion of persuasion serve as guidelines to make a speech, when it actually comes to the very act of speeches, it is apparent that they are prone to a certain level of improvisation. Keeping in mind that a good number of political speeches are usually previously written at least in a form of notes, in order to make a successful speech, it is important to highlight every topic that is to be mentioned, but also, a set of speech techniques is required to make these messages come across. This chapter will thus describe and discuss these techniques, as well as discuss which of them in the form of appeals are truly effective when it comes to persuasion.

3.1 SPEECH FIGURES

3.1.1 USAGE OF PRONOUNS

Fahnestock starts her discussion on the impact of pronouns by saying:

Whenever there is text, there is an implicit *I* or *we* as a source and an implicit you addressed, but the personal pronouns need not appear. So actually using them to draw attention to the speaker or addressee is a choice the rhetor makes, a choice with consequences. (Fahnestock, 2011: 279)

As mentioned, pronouns serve as a device of emphasis – if there were not so many, the possibility of the audience losing concentration would be quite high. Fahnestock also concludes that “in speaking, then, between people physically present to each other, the use of even an apparently unambiguous referential *I* or *you* can have persuasive effects” (Fahnestock, 2011: 280).

When using the pronoun *I*, it usually implies a position of authority:

When the speaker’s position or status is clear to the audience, this *authoritative I* need not be foregrounded; it underwrites every statement. *I* is also sometimes used to direct the audience [...]. This methodological first person usually features speech act verbs: *I will argue; I concede; I acknowledged*, etc. (Fahnestock, 2011: 280)

Also, when it comes to the usage of the pronoun *I*, the speaker may shift his identity from the dominant form to another, in order to give the audience more perspective – Fahnestock gives an example of this:

When, for example, General Douglas MacArthur, dismissed from command by President Truman, spoke to Congress in 1951, he specified, perhaps

disingenuously, “I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American” (Fahnestock, 2011: 281)

Here we see a shift from the dominant *I*, which is him as a General, to the other *I*, which represents him as a “fellow American”.

On the other hand, the pronoun *you* serves as a *direct address* when the speaker acknowledges the presence of the audience, or makes a demand of them (Fahnestock, 2011: 281).

Also, the second person perspective can be used to state a hypothesis and Fahnestock gives an example:

The second person also appears in scenes constructed by the rhetor, who by using *you* invites the audience member to imagine himself or herself in a particular situation. These scenes starring *you* are often real scenarios fictionalized, as in the following excerpt from Tony Blair’s speech. [...] It was Blair himself who crossed that room, but he chooses to give agency to *you*. This choice could be described as the *generic you*, but it has the effect of substituting the listener for the speaker so that the audience member fills the prime minister’s role. (Fahnestock, 2011: 282)

However, the usage of the pronoun *you* can have adverse effects, as it can sometimes come off as threatening or discomfoting.

The pronoun *we* carries great potential in achieving successful persuasion. The first type, the *inclusive we*, unites the speaker and listener, for example: “We, the people of the United States” (Fahnestock, 2011: 285). The other type, which is the *exclusive we*, refers to a group of people the speaker belongs to, but the audience may not.

In her text, Fahnestock also mentions Burke’s notion of *identification*, the purpose of which is that “it elevates unity between speaker and audience into the primary source of persuasiveness” (Fahnestock, 2011: 285). Thus, she quotes that “You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his” (Fahnestock, 2011: 285).

The last notion is not in fact a pronoun, but it encompasses an audience where the usage of pronouns fails to express an influential message, but it has similar usage. This notion is called *the objective voice*. As quoted: “The *objective voice* emerges as the apt choice for rhetors who believe they are addressing what *The New Rhetoric* calls the “universal audience” (Fahnestock, 2011: 286). The universal audience is a hypothetical audience, and it can be described as “the individual rhetor’s conception of what a correctly prepared and endowed

audience would have to agree with” (Fahnestock, 2011: 286). This concept can be of great value when it comes to politics:

This conception of the universal audience clearly changes from person to person, group to group, and time to time. A rhetor in 1350 would have a very different sense of what any normal person would agree with compared to a rhetor in 1950. But with this notion of a universal audience as “what any sane person would agree with,” the rhetorical definition of facts comes into view. These are statements that the rhetor counts on as believable by anyone. (Fahnestock, 2011: 285)

Finally, to further explain this notion, Fahnestock gives an example from the debate between Richard Nixon as a presidential candidate and J.F. Kennedy as a senator in 1960, by the usage and comparison of rhetorical questions:

What has happened to you? [...] What about the prices you pay? [...] What’s the net result of this? This means that the average family income went up 15 percent in the Eisenhower years as against 2 percent in the Truman years. [...] Following its operational definition as absence of address, only the last statement can be described as in the objective voice. It does not deliver its content from a particular source to a particular addressee as the previous statements do. By contrast, in his opening remarks in the first debate, John F. Kennedy stayed in the objective voice and never addressed the audience directly. (Fahnestock, 2011: 287)

3.1.2 AMPLIFICATION

Amplification as a term is quite straightforward. It is, in other words, emphasis and enlargement of a certain element. According to Fahnestock, many things can be amplified: “The element amplified can be anything from a key word to a factual detail, a telling image to an abstract concept, an individual line of argument to a structural feature of the entire discourse” (Fahnestock, 2011: 390). However, the use of amplification, especially in politics, can sometimes backfire in its intention. In order for this act to be successful, we can turn to Quintilian’s five methods which explain how amplification can be achieved successfully.

The first method, *auxesis*, is heightening through strategic word choices. As quoted: “The basic tactic behind *auxesis* as an isolated figure of speech might be described as finding a term with associations that push in the direction of the assessment the rhetor wants” (Fahnestock, 2011: 391).

Also, another notion in this method that Quintilian presents is the process of word substitution, citing Cicero as an example for this:

“I have brought before you, judges, not a thief, but a plunderer; not an adulterer, but a ravisher; not a mere committer of sacrilege, but the enemy of all religious observance and all holy things” (Fahnestock, 2011: 391)

The second method is series construction. This refers to positioning of a certain word in a certain part of a statement. The concept is presented like this:

An item is heightened when it is placed last in a series that builds up to it as an end point, a culmination, the possessor in the highest degree of whatever determines the series in the first place. (Fahnestock, 2011: 391)

Along with that, this method also includes using an item that tops or extends beyond the given series. Fahnestock gives an example for this that resonates more with present times: “He was best pitcher ever—except for Cy Young.” (Fahnestock, 2011: 392). Also, this also entails the usage of “topping” the topping strategy, which in a way, emphasizes the statement and at the same time avoids the loss of commentary that can be misinterpreted by the audience. Fahnestock gives an example of Lyndon Johnson’s commentary on Kennedy’s assassination, where speechlessness is verbalized: “No words are sad enough to express our sense of loss. No words are strong enough to express our determination to continue the forward thrust of America that he began” (Fahnestock, 2011: 392).

The third method is the use of comparison to inflate or deflate a situation. This method is quite simple and straightforward, as Fahnestock states by giving an example: “The tactic here is obvious and frequently used: the comparison of choice in political invective for last sixty years has been and still is Hitler” (Fahnestock, 2011: 392).

The fourth method is heightening through reason or “leading the audience to make an inference that results in an amplified assessment of something else” (Fahnestock, 2011: 392). As quoted, the purpose of this method is:

One thing is magnified in order to effect a corresponding augmentation elsewhere, and it is by reasoning that our hearers are then led on from the first point to the second which we desire to emphasize. (Fahnestock, 2011: 392-393)

The fifth and last method, that is somewhat connected with the fourth, is heightening by directing inferences. This method was usually present in epideictic arguments of praise and blame. Fahnestock gives a brief description of such situations: “To enhance the heroism of an army, for example, the skill and size of the opposing army is emphasized” (Fahnestock, 2011: 393).

3.1.3 SCHEMES

Schemes, as Martin puts it, have the following purpose: “Rhetorical schemes arrange words in ways that heighten their effect – that is, they draw our attention to the way we read or hear them.” (Martin, 2014: 75). Or in other words, schemes “concern the *phrasing* of sentences and produce their effects primarily by way of techniques of repetition, word order and even the omission of words.” (Martin, 2014: 75). Martin comments that “schemes enable a degree of interaction with the audience that invites them to anticipate the reasoning of the speaker” (Martin, 2014: 77).

The most common techniques used are anaphora, epistrophe and antimetabole, anastrophe, antithesis, parallelism, asyndeton, the tricolon (or three-part list), and finally, the rhetorical question.

An anaphora is the repetition of the first words in successive clauses of a sentence. (Martin, 2014: 75). Martin gives an example from Churchill’s speech:

“No survival for the British Empire; no survival for all that the British Empire has stood for; no survival for the urge and impulse of the ages, that mankind will move forward towards its goal” (Martin, 2014: 75)

An epistrophe is repetition of the final words of a clause in successive clauses, and antimetabole is the repetition of words in reverse order in successive clauses (Martin, 2014: 75-76). An example of epistrophe would be “live young, die young” and of antimetabole would be Kennedy’s “Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country” (Martin, 2014: 76).

An anastrophe is the inversion of normal word order (present in the previous example – “ask not” is an anastrophe) (Martin, 2014: 76).

An antithesis is placing emphasis on contrasting terms, for example: “We seek freedom, not tyranny” (Martin, 2014: 76). Martin comments that antithesis is “clearly central to political debate, where arguments typically aim to differentiate themselves from and declare their superiority over each other” (Martin, 2014: 76).

Parallelism “involves creating a balance or sense of structural equivalence between terms (words, phrases or clauses) by omitting intervening words (for example, “our cause is just, our goal is clear”)” (Martin, 2014: 76).

An asyndeton is the omission of conjunctions between clauses to create a continuous flow. An example of this is Julius Caesar’s famous “I came, I saw, I conquered” (Martin, 2014: 76).

The tricolon, or three-part list is frequently found in political speeches. It can involve three parallel words (‘Friends, Romans, Countrymen’) or phrases (‘I came, I saw, I

conquered’), which build to a powerful conclusion (Martin, 2014: 76). Martin notes that “the third step is usually triumphant in relation to the others; it both adds to the order of their succession and completes them” (Martin, 2014: 76).

The last, but certainly not least, is the most recognizable of all schemes – the rhetorical question. When using a rhetorical question, “the speaker explicitly asks a question that she then goes on to answer herself” (Martin, 2014: 77). Martin again gives an example from Churchill’s speech:

You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival. (Martin, 2014: 77, quoted from Churchill, 1940: 188)

3.1.4 TROPES

Martin defines tropes as:

Tropes involve the use of particular words to connote certain meanings. Here effort is directly focused on creating or specifying meaning rather than arranging words and phrases for effect. By consequence, tropes are often closely connected to the premises and conclusions of an argument. (Martin, 2014: 77)

Metaphors, analogies, metonyms and synecdoches all belong to the group of tropes.

A metaphor is basically a “substitution of one or more terms for another in order to invoke a kind of comparison and [...] implies an identity between otherwise different things” (Martin, 2014: 78).

Martin gives an example how it can be used:

The substantive content of a speech may well use a metaphor either as a premise or even as a conclusion. For instance, after 11 September 2001 the claim to be undertaking a ‘war on terror’ was used as a premise to enable some fairly extraordinary uses of military and legal powers by western states against ‘terrorism’. (Martin, 2014: 78)

Analogical reasoning or simply, an analogy, is “an inductive style of argumentation that works by presenting a particular case as ‘being like’ or sharing features, with another case such that we should react in the same way” (Martin, 2014: 78). Martin notes that these arguments are common when it comes to pragmatics in politics, where practical examples are more used than universal principles to make sense of specific issues (Martin, 2014: 78).

Martin singles out some of the most noticeable analogies used in politics:

Analogies of war, ‘rape’, ‘theft’ or being on a ‘battlefield’ are common in international politics and conflict, but so too are more cooperative analogies, such as appeals to ‘family’, ‘humanity’, ‘special relationships’ and so on. (Martin, 2014: 78-79)

A metonym “involves the substitution of a word or concept with another that has particular connection with the object in question” (Martin, 2014: 79). Martin clarifies this by giving an example: “Governments are often referred to in the media by the location of their executive seats (for example, ‘Washington’ for the US, ‘Beijing’ for China)” (Martin, 2014: 79).

Lastly, a synecdoche is “a type of metonym for which an actual element of an object comes to stand in for the whole, or the whole for a part” (Martin, 2014: 79). Synecdoches can sometimes carry negative connotations as they are used as generalizations of groups:

Referring to whole groups or communities by distinguishing one feature, for example, is a common use of synecdoche: ‘gays are demanding equal rights’, ‘Muslims are under threat’, ‘the French capitulated to the Germans’ and so on. (Martin, 2014: 80)

In the end, Martin concludes that the flexibility of tropes can benefit politicians in their speeches:

One way for political actors to escape a downturn in their fortunes – such as hostile public opinion or a series of events that go against stated aims or principles – is to redescribe the situation by changing the dominant metaphors. (Martin, 2014: 80)

3.2 APPEALS

Speech figures are mostly stylistic components of appeals by which the speaker influences the audience. Appeals are usually distinct in themes – in this part, the appeals that will be analyzed in terms of their efficiency are those to fear, pity and popular opinion.

3.2.1 APPEALS TO FEAR

Walton notes that appeals to fear are nowadays commonly used in many fields: “Fear appeal arguments are currently in vogue with advertisers, corporations, public relations firms, and government agencies – all the powerful organizations that use the media to mold public opinion.” (Walton, 2007: 131). When it comes to politics, they are used “particularly by advocacy groups in rhetoric designed to influence legislation on public policy issues” (Walton, 2007: 132).

However, the issue that arises when dealing with the notion of appeals to fear is the uncertainty of the audience in terms whether these statements are actually reasonable due to the fact that fear itself a very negative term. Walton points out that:

Social scientists have conducted many empirical investigations of fear appeal arguments to try to see how they work to change behavior and attitudes with experimental subjects. The general perception is that fear appeal arguments do work, but not everyone agrees. Some think that such arguments are inherently negative and that positive ones work better to persuade an audience to take action. (Walton, 2007; 133)

The thing with appeals to fear is the fact that they have a proneness to be fallacious. Walton remarks:

In the logical tradition, fear appeal arguments have been treated under the category of the *argumentum ad baculum*, which includes the use of threats and force in argumentation, as well as fear appeals. (Walton, 2007: 134)

The structure of these appeals is based on two premises.

The first premise has the following property:

The first premise presents a state of affairs that is dangerous to the respondent, and is often called “threatening.” It represents a harm to the respondent, in the sense of something that is very much against the respondent’s personal goals and interests. (Walton, 2007: 148)

The second premise and the conclusion are described as:

The second premise cites a recommended course of action such that if the respondent takes it, he will avoid the disastrous outcome stated in the first premise. The conclusion is that the respondent should take the recommended course of action. (Walton, 2007: 148)

Here is an example of this argumentation:

In the fear appeal ads used by the NRA [...] the dangerous situation portrayed is that of young women being killed by a serial murderer because they had to wait to buy a gun and were unable to defend themselves. The recommended course of action is not to vote for or support the Brady bill or other policies advocated by the “antigun lobby.” The reason is that these policies delay the buying of a gun to be used for self-defense. (Walton 2007: 148)

This example might seem straightforward, but the issue occurs when we weigh out whether this is the only way to prevent such a situation from happening. Walton explains this issue through the empirical model of persuasion:

According to the dual process model of persuasion, receivers of a persuasive message may go for the short-cut solution instead of engaging in the extensive elaboration required to think through the problem. In this case, the solution is not all that easy. [...] Instead of immediately either accepting or rejecting the argument expressed in the ad, the rational approach would be to think critically about the practical aspects of the proposal being advocated. (Walton, 2007: 150)

In conclusion, it is hard to explain whether appeals to fear actually work or not. For a certain amount of time they can be successful, but eventually it can be proven that there were other alternatives. In the political aspect, this usually appears in the form of post-election regret.

3.2.2 APPEALS TO PITY

Walton says that appeals to pity “have been widely used by public relations experts in commercial ads and initiatives of various kinds” (Walton, 2007: 134).

The structure of appeals to pity is similar to the one of appeals to fear: “As with the fear appeal argument, a way out, in the form of some recommended action, is offered. The conclusion is that the respondent should take this recommended course of action” (Walton, 2007: 151).

Appeals to pity are also prone to uncertainty and fallacies:

The fallacious uses of appeal to pity have been widely illustrated in the traditional treatment of the *ad misericordiam* fallacy in the logic textbooks. It is not hard to appreciate why this type of argumentation has been classified as a fallacy. (Walton, 2007: 136)

Appeals to pity also have another disadvantage, but this disadvantage can sometimes turn into an advantage, especially in public debate:

One fault often cited in logic textbooks is failure of relevance. But in some cases, appeals to pity can be relevant, yet still fallacious because they are exploited to have a much greater impact than should properly be the case. The successful use of such arguments for purposes of persuading an audience often has to do with the timing of the argument at the opportune moment in presenting a larger body of evidence. If the case hangs in the balance, a strategic use of appeal to pity just at the right moment can tilt the burden of proof enough toward one side to make a

big difference in the outcome of the case. [...] Emotional arguments, such as appeals to fear or pity, are in fact often the most highly persuasive on matters of public debate. In principle, then, such arguments should be regarded as relevant, unless it can be shown in specific cases why they are not. (Walton, 2007: 137)

To sum up, just like with appeals to fear, appeals to pity can be disregarded only if we find proof that they are only used as a device of persuasion without an actually beneficial end result.

3.2.3 APPEALS TO POPULAR OPINION

When referring to this appeal, “the proponent tries to get the respondent to accept an opinion or perform an action because that opinion is accepted by the popular majority” (Walton, 2007: 198).

Walton remarks, just like the other appeals aforementioned, appeals to popular opinion are also prone to fallacies:

Traditional logic textbooks have portrayed the *argumentum ad populum* as a fallacy. Yet many arguments used in media ads are based on appeal to public opinion as a means of marketing commercial products. (Walton, 2007: 198)

However, appeals to popular opinion are significantly more flexible in nature than those of fear or pity:

What is involved in such mass media influence attempts is a feedback effect. The proponent bases his argument on what he takes popular opinion to be at any given point. Then as developments change and new information comes in, the proponent must also try to get some notion of how public opinion has changed on the issue. (Walton, 2007: 201)

The basic structure of this argument is “Everybody accepts proposition A, therefore A must be true.” (Walton, 2007: 202). Though the majority of the people in the audience tend to think of themselves as authentic individuals, this argument is quite successful in the aspect of democracy:

As Hamblin noted, “it is not clear from the name (*argumentum ad populum*) that it does not consist of the purest valid reasoning, and only an anti-democrat could unhesitatingly assume the contrary.” Thus there is ambivalence about appeal to popular opinion as a form of argument. [...] In mass media rhetorical arguments of the kind so commonly used in democratic politics, public opinion is probably

the most important factor in the success of any argument. (Walton, 2007: 202-203)

The points given in this type of appeal always change, so it is to conclude that:

What appears to follow from this assumption is that the latest moral viewpoint must be more enlightened than any previous one. If you do not follow the dictates of this viewpoint, negative language may be used to describe your conduct or viewpoint, like “racist” or “sexist.” (Walton, 2007: 212)

Finally, it is quite easy to close this topic with the assumption that in order for the appeals to public opinion to work, the speaker must be careful, attentive and always up to date; otherwise whatever intentions are contained in political messages will be most likely disregarded.

CONCLUSION

To summarize the discussion of the whole paper, we must be aware of historical changes in political conduct that had shaped the way we approach politics in this day and age, so we can form our opinions and propositions as effectively as possible.

In the first chapter this development has been explained in terms of how rhetoric was shaped with regard to the political environment of a certain point in history, from Ancient Greek democracy and Roman oligarchy to monarchism in the Renaissance and the absolutist early modern period, and finally, contemporary democracy. The importance of this chapter is to show how political relations and rhetoric used to work through history, which can give us an image on how we may divide our attention in speeches when certain topics that are still relevant come to mind. I feel that disregarding some practices made in the past are pointless, as sometimes these mistakes make a ground for future changes.

Then, in the second chapter, the notion of persuasion shows its complexity even though it seems that it has only one goal in mind, which is often followed by negative connotations. When it comes to types of persuasive dialogue, we get an insight on how to divide our goals of persuasion in that respect in order to achieve success. This chapter highlights how we should look beyond a concept that seems to be quite simple, especially because it is present everywhere. It also helps us to understand how different dialogues are formed and how they function in different situations. I personally think that persuasion can be used for both good and bad causes – that just depends on the matter of what the persuasion is about.

Lastly, the third chapter shows us the significance of speech figures and appeals used in rhetoric and forms of persuasive dialogue. Speech figures and appeals are tools by which a speaker's plan to influence an audience as effectively as possible is made easier. In theory, all methods make sense, but when it comes to the moment of speech, a lot of these methods can be either omitted or used in an improper way. Personally, I believe that for example, the appeal to public opinion is fundamental, but it is not exactly executed in the fashion it has been set to operate. To give an example, the main thing about appealing to public opinion is to always be up to date. As we have seen in these past two years, Trump, who has been called both racist and sexist became the president of the United States. His use of appeals to fear seemed to work (immigrant issues) though many disagreed, and also, he used quite old-fashioned values when it comes to popular opinion, and a lot of people were taken aback. His speeches and debates are known for using much emphasis as well as interruptions, and I feel

his most used form in terms of persuasion discourse was the usage of eristic dialogue (where speakers just seem to 'hit out' at each other to prove a point), which in a way, while debating in a very different manner from previous candidates, might have intrigued the audience and eventually ensured him the victory.

All in all, following this example, we cannot completely predict the course of events after a political speech has been made just by referring to the usage of certain rhetorical practices and persuasive devices in it, though they are helpful when creating political theories. In addition, we must see how the audience interacts within itself and how it perceives the speaker as a figure and take that into consideration.

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