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VALUES AND UPBRINGING: A LIBERAL OUTLOOK

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ABSTRACT

Although there seems to be a consensus among Croatian and international education theorists alike when it comes to the issue of values being an integral part of upbringing almost to the same extent as upbringing is considered a part of education, discord ensues as soon as implementation of specific values is attempted through official curricula. There is discord when it comes to specific values, but also when teaching methods are concerned. In this paper, we will argue that this issue could be resolved by applying Rawls's theory of justice to the prevalent practices in upbringing and education, with some minor adjustments. We argue that, since the political and familial domains share three crucial characteristics, it is legitimate to expand the application of the public reason as the main principle of political domain, so as to govern both parental and educational conduct, which could in turn result in considerable changes in the ways upbringing is traditionally viewed. By analysing the main principles of Rawls's liberal theory of justice, and applying these to parental practices at home, as well as to institutionalized educational conduct by the teachers at schools, we will try to offer an outlook on the proper educational and parental conduct from the liberal perspective. In the final chapter, we will defend the idea of cosmopolitanism as the right way to go at the crossroads of deciding on the appropriate educational policies in the liberal, democratic, constitutional regimes, the kind that most of

the contemporary (Western) societies, declaratively, strive to be, but often seem to fail in this endeavour. This is confirmed in the light of numerous crises we are faced with lately.

KEYWORDS

Liberal legitimacy, justice as fairness, upbringing, education, cosmopolitanism

INTRODUCTION

In the modern-day debates concerning the importance of both parental and institutional practices in upbringing, there seems to be an agreement that values are an indispensable part of any wholesome theory dealing with these issues. If we are to cash out useful ideas and policies about how children should be reared at homes and educated at schools, so as to create a peaceful and progressive future society, we must come up with a (coherent) set of values on which our parental and/or educational practices are to be based. That part seems to be more or less unobjectionable to everyone concerned. One might add that most would agree that just as there is a clear link between upbringing and values, there is one between upbringing and education too. What is chosen in one will undoubtedly affect the other. However, regrettable as it may be, the agreement is thus exhausted. That there are large numbers of different opinions on any given matter is not in itself a problem, on the contrary, it can create more diversified solutions to problems at hand; however, when dealing with a subject as important as upbringing and education, and in a time when everyone¹ seems to be determined to actualize the so-called “knowledge society” as soon as possible, the existing differences of opinions when it comes to the basic question of which values are to be instilled, and by which parental/teaching methods, are creating more harm than good.

One cannot but feel that some kind of consensus in the field should be reached, for the good of all. Even a casual glimpse at the current state of affairs in Croatian public debate (but also debates in most transitional countries) reveals a conspicuous vacuum of real ideas as to which values should be used, and why. Suggestions are given, true, but the reasons and justifications behind them are either lacking completely or are sadly one-sided, or even potentially undemocratic.² It is in such overall climate that we decided to take up this

¹ In this paper, we write from the viewpoint of a striving Constitutional liberal democracy, the kind that many transitional countries present themselves wanting to become.

² Here we are referring to the growing tendencies of some far-right parties and associations in the Croatian public, to forcefully impose their restrictive views and practices on the rest of the populace.

particular topic, in hopes of shedding some light on the existing divisions, but also to try and offer one possible way out of them, in the form of ideas stemming predominantly from the liberal political theory, as envisioned by John Rawls³ and further elaborated on by Matthew Clayton.⁴ We intend to show that it is through Rawls' political theory that a bridge of sorts can be created between political philosophy, ethics and philosophy of education, which can in turn solve or at least mitigate some of the problems touched upon earlier.

In the next section we will give a brief overview of the current debate concerning values in education and/or upbringing, and the problems both theories face. Then, we will move to expounding general points of Rawls' conception of *justice as fairness*. In the main argument, we will attempt to show, using Clayton's elaboration, how this theory can successfully be applied in familial and educational settings alike and, in conclusion, we will offer the idea of a philosophy of cosmopolitanism as a probable consequence and desired goal of such policies.

1. THE NON-POLITICAL APPROACHES TO UPBRINGING⁵

1.1. The direct/prescriptive approach (character-upbringing)

We start by discussing direct or prescriptive approach to upbringing and emphasizing some problems of that approach. The proponents of this approach place high value on the so-called classroom setting, where children should be taught specific moral values.⁶ It can be said that in this approach there is a list of sorts, containing the desired values for the children to adopt and internalize. These values should, in principle, be shareable by all people, regardless of their ethnicity, faith, beliefs etc. Values such as responsibility, fairness, friendly demeanour and honesty are usually put as goals, and biographies of some notable historic figures such as Gandhi or M. L. King are often used in the teaching process to help children in finding role models for

³ We will base our ideas on two of Rawls' seminal works, *A Theory of Justice*, Harvard University Press (1999) and *Politički liberalizam KruZak*, Zagreb 2000 (1993).

⁴ In applying Rawls' key political concepts to parental and teaching practices, we rely heavily on Matthew Clayton's analysis as put forward in his book *Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing*, Oxford University Press (2006).

⁵ For a general, but well-elaborated overview of the historically most important theories in upbringing, see: Milan Polić, *K filozofiji odgoja, Znamen*, Zagreb (1993).

⁶ Renata Jukić takes the same approach in her article *Moralne vrijednosti kao osnova odgoja*, *Nova prisutnost* 11, (2013), p. 401-417.

their behaviour. Role models are very important in this approach.⁷ The character (personality) that is the developmental goal in this approach, is taken quite broadly, to encompass the cognitive, affective and behavioural components of morality, while moral awareness as well as thought-out decision-making are of utmost importance. The emotional component is seen as a crucial bridge between reasoning and decision-making.⁸

This approach gained prominence in the United States at the beginning of the 20th century, when the children were mostly taught values that were in keeping with the so-called spirit of the ages at a particular place and time, and it is precisely in this fact that the approach' greatest weakness lies.⁹ First and foremost, it is not clear by which procedure(s) the desired values are chosen. If the spirit of the ages is indeed the only criterion that serves this purpose, then it is clear that as this spirit changes (and it inevitably does change), so will the values that are to be taught. If we live in the conditions of the so-called moral relativism, and there are no universal, basic, lasting moral values which could withstand the test of time, and this approach depends on the existence of such values exactly, then it remains unclear what positive use it could have in a world that is constantly and rapidly changing. Even if we set this problem aside, and it is not clear that we should, there still remains the question of why some values are chosen, and not others, as well as issues of who chooses or teaches them, and what competencies this person possesses. Second, even if we come up with a list of values that our society should adhere to, we will still face grave problems. For example, even if we were to have many common values, we are likely to rank them differently. In addition, these values are expressed in concepts that are open to a wide variety of reasonable interpretations. Thus, it is not clear how to teach values, how to choose the more important ones or how to give precise content to these values. Also, how are we to account for cultural differences? Even if there was a set of values that could withstand the test of time, in one culture, it is still unclear how one taught to be virtuous in, say, an American culture and in accordance with those values, spirit of the time, and setting could use it in the Middle or Far-Eastern setting etc. It seems

⁷ This approach is akin to the perspective of the so-called virtue ethics. For a more detailed analysis of this ethical theory see: Boran Berčić, *Filozofija*, vol. 1, *Ibis grafika* (2012), p. 305-315.

⁸ For a more detailed discussion, see Rakić, Vukušić, *Odgoj i obrazovanje za vrijednosti, Društvena istraživanja*, 19 (2010), p. 776.

⁹ One prominent opponent of this approach was J. J. Rousseau, who held the view that culture, with its tastes and norms, can only be the ruin of upbringing. For a deeper analysis of his ideas on upbringing, see Aleksandra Golubović, *Aktualnost Rousseauovih promišljanja filozofije odgoja s posebnim osvrtom na moralni odgoj*, *ACTA IADERTINA*, 10 (2013), p. 25-36; see also: Steven M. Cahn, *Classic and Contemporary Readings in the Philosophy of Education*, *The McGraw – Hill Companies Inc.* (1997), p. 162-197.

that this approach fails to offer values that could be shared by all *rational* and *reasonable*¹⁰ people, or, at any rate, fails to properly explain how it does so.

1.2 Indirect/descriptive/cognitive-developmental approach

Now we turn to an approach which is opposite to the direct approach. In this approach, which we can name as indirect, descriptive or cognitive approach, the content of upbringing is not at the center (values are considered to be relative), and neither are the so-called desired modes of behaviour. Here the 'only' virtues mentioned are openness and impartiality, but they are used only in service of the development of critical thinking. What is considered pivotal is not to 'ingrain' children with this or that value, but to develop in them their critical faculties so that they can, eventually, choose for themselves. Critical thinking is taken as both the desired goal and the method by which it is reached.¹¹ Universal values are considered impossible to find, so why even bother with something unachievable.

The main method used in teaching is the use of the so-called moral dilemmas. Children are presented with different cases of moral dilemmas, and are thus developing their sensitivity to such issues. This approach relies on the work Piaget did in developmental psychology, which means that development is seen as a gradual process. There are developmental milestones, phases all children go through, so the methods used must always be age-related.¹² Just like the former, this approach runs into difficulties immediately. Although it avoids the problem of arbitrarily imposing particular sets of values, thus running the risk of indoctrination, this is still done by omitting values completely, which is a Pyrrhic victory at best. We have no problem with conceding that a developed faculty of critical thinking is a prerequisite to having a developed moral sensitivity, but developing critical thinking without offering any moral values that could serve as a joint basis for all people, regardless of their differences, seems to be a self-defeating strategy. While before we were faced with problems of arbitrariness and indoctrinating potential, now we are faced with a critical ability which is given no concrete values to fall back on, and which becomes a purpose in itself.

From what was said, it is clear that neither of these approaches, taken separately, can provide us with basic universal values and methods to be used

¹⁰ These important concepts are explained in detail in: Rawls, PL (2000), p. 44-48

¹¹ For a deeper analysis of the importance of critical thinking and methods used in practice, see David Beckett and Paul Hager, *Life and Learning: Practice and Postmodernity*, Routledge (2002).

¹² Rakić, Vukušić (2010), p. 778

in upbringing and education. A synthesis is in order, but still, a synthesis based on which values? In the following section, we will present a theory that we find a good candidate for the job of providing us with values that all (reasonable) people could agree upon, regardless of the differences in worldviews that will surely exist between them. This theory is John Rawls' *justice as fairness*.

2. RAWLS' POLITICAL THEORY – BASIC PRECEPTS

2.1 *The Original Position, the Veil of Ignorance, and the Two Moral Powers*

As witnessed, neither of the solutions presented above is satisfactory. We can start with the premise that any form of raising or educating a person presents a way of intervening in her natural development, and, therefore, a form of manipulation, but we can see this manipulation as necessary and welcome if we are to try and create peaceful and progressive societies based on cooperation. Therefore, some form of upbringing, and some set of values, must be adopted. Then, let us try and find a form based on values that, in principle, everyone could accept, no matter what religious or moral doctrines they subscribe to. And, we can be sure that, especially in a liberal society, there will be many such doctrines, and a great difference of opinions in regard to them. This is where the problem arises. How and where are we to find such a theory? People usually look for it in various religious and/or moral codes of conduct, but these always yield differences in codes or conduct so fundamental and deep that they become insurmountable. So, some, and among them very notably John Rawls, decided to look elsewhere – in the liberal, democratic culture. It was since the times of the Antiquity that politics was considered the most proper and fitting activity for humans, one that is to help them create societies they can flourish in.¹³ Over time, many authors offered their views on the principles that should guide this activity of greatest importance.¹⁴ There is also an abundance of theories dealing with proper state structures and theories on justice on which these should be founded. Among these, we've chosen John Rawls and his (liberal) theory¹⁵ as the basis for the proposed theory of

¹³ One famous proponent of this view was Aristotle, in his book *Politika*, coining the concept *zoon politikon*. For more details, see: Aristotel, *Politika* (translated by Tomislav Ladan), Zagreb, *Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada*, 1992.

¹⁴ For an overview of some of these, see: Milan Polić, *Činjenice i vrijednosti*, *Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo*, Zagreb (2006), particularly p. 13 – 65.

¹⁵ There are, of course, other liberal alternatives to Rawls. For some of them, see: Ronald Dworkin, *Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality*, *Harvard University Press*,

education and upbringing¹⁶, because he has pinpointed the sharp differences in worldviews when it comes to values, and the problems this creates when we try to find values everyone could agree upon despite these differences, but also offered solutions based on reasons that aim at being acceptable to all the people whose lives are influenced by said values. One cannot just turn to the spirit of the ages or critical thinking, but search for the basic common capacities and values that all people share. Rawls goes about this task by envisioning a creation of a democratic, liberal society from scratch.

The basic goal of Rawls' theory is to identify the principles on which the basic institutions of a given society should be based. Rawls calls these institutions *the basic structure of society*. These basic institutions are the largest political, social and economic institutions, those that have the biggest influence on the lives of the people.¹⁷ Given this influence, we must ensure they will be fair. Rawls envisions a society of *free and equal citizens*¹⁸, who will remain as such as time progresses, and in order to achieve that, he must ensure, to begin with, a fair initial *status quo* or starting position for all participants.¹⁹ This starting position is a point from which we can evaluate the basic structure of society, and a point at which we can construct the principles for the arrangement of the basic structure. This may prove to be harder than it seems, for people are usually both unequal in various capacities by nature, and prone to be partial toward their own interests in judgment. To avoid these, Rawls envisions an *original position* as citizens being under *the veil of ignorance*. Basically, it is a theory of social contract.²⁰ Here, we will offer a brief explanation of what being under the veil entails, because a more detailed analysis exceeds the scope of this paper.²¹

Being under the veil of ignorance means that citizens are unaware of their personal preferences, abilities, race, gender, or the conceptions of the good life they subscribe to. Rawls believes that people will, under these circumstances, want to create principles of justice such that will ensure not only the fairness of

London, England (2000), or J. S. Mill, *O slobodi* (1918.), *Ivan Lorković (Hrvatska politička biblioteka) – djelo 1, svezak 1*.

¹⁶ Assisted heavily by Matthew Clayton (2006), which will be clear in subsequent chapters.

¹⁷ For more details, see: Rawls, PL (2000), p. 10

¹⁸ That they are to be free and equal is not a self-evident axiom, but rights that are justified by moral powers they possess, which will be explained further on in the paper.

¹⁹ Rawls, ToJ (1999), p. 15-16

²⁰ For an overview of the basic differences between social and individual contracts, see: Rawls, PL (2000), p. 246-249

²¹ For a more detailed analysis, see: Rawls, ToJ (1999), p. 118-123

the initial distribution of goods²², but also the continuation of fair cooperation in their society for generations to come. What they do know is that the available resources, as well as the capacity for altruism are limited, and that they live in the conditions of *reasonable pluralism*, which means that there are many comprehensive doctrines, moral, religious or otherwise, many of which are mutually exclusive, but can still be rationally advocated. Hence, they are all allowed to flourish. They also know that everyone possesses two moral powers, the power of rationality and the power of reasonableness.²³

The power of rationality is more oriented on the person; it affords each individual the ability to, at any given moment, come up with, revise, change and put into practice their own concept of good life. This means that nobody has the right to infringe with another's choice of the good life, but also, that there is always a possibility for a person to revise their conception of good, based on valid reasons. Reasonableness is, on the other hand, more oriented towards others; towards creating and maintaining just social institutions and social interactions with others, even when it is not in our selfish interest to do so. Therefore, it is perhaps the more important power, from the standpoint of justice. This power helps citizens in creating their own conceptions of justice, as well as to critically revise them, but it also obligates them to respect the institutions of the society as long as they are fair.

From these powers follows the status of the citizens as free and equal. They are equal because each one of them possesses at least the minimal level of both of these powers which are necessary if one is to enter the process of social cooperation, meaning that nobody's claim for rights could override another's. They are free because each of them possesses the capacity for creation, rational questioning and revision of their conception of good, at any given moment. It follows that nobody has the right to impose on any other person a conception of good which those persons would not rationally accept.

Having described the initial conditions of Rawls' theory, and the characteristics of the citizens in his social contract, in the next section we will briefly show which concrete principles of justice he deemed would be chosen by the citizenry to guide the process of social cooperation.

2.2 The Principles of Justice, the Liberal Legitimacy and the Public Reasons

²² In this initial distribution, what is being distributed are the so-called *primary social goods*. These include various basic liberties, abilities, rights etc.

²³ See Rawls, PL (2000), p. 43-49

Rawls thought that under such conditions, rational and reasonable persons would choose for the arrangement of basic structure of society the following two principles of justice:

1. "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others."
2. "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and b) attached to positions and offices open to all."²⁴

In Rawls' work there is an ambition to resolve a tension of sorts that exists between a goal of creating a society that guarantees all its citizens as many freedoms as possible, while at the same time offering a plausible justification of the ways in which the state could still enforce its political power when necessary. Rawls values the autonomy of the people dearly, but is aware that laws and redistribution would still have to exist and be upheld. There will be a need to coerce the citizenry, with all the diversity that exists between them and is valued in a liberal democracy, to follow the same set of laws. So, how are we to preserve freedoms and autonomy for everyone, which is the pillar of liberal democracy, and still have legitimate use of political power by the state? This is the so-called *challenge of legitimacy*.²⁵ Rawls introduces a condition that the principles of justice which are the foundation of the basic institutions of the society need to be such that they can be publicly justified, or, in other words, that they need to be known and acceptable to all reasonable citizens at any given moment. The Liberal Principle of Legitimacy reads as follows:

Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.²⁶

This means that the state can only use political power in ways that all citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse. Therefore, Rawls is in search of a Constitution the basic parts of which all citizens could reasonably be

²⁴ Rawls, ToJ (1999), p. 53

²⁵ For more details, see: Leif Wenar, "John Rawls", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rawls/>>.

²⁶ Leif Wenar, "John Rawls", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/rawls/>>. It can also be found in Rawls, PL (2000), Croatian translation, p. 122.

expected to accept. To that end, he adds to the principles of justice and liberal legitimacy the principle of *publicity*.²⁷ It requires that:

- a) it be publicly known that everybody knows and accepts the fact that the basic structure of society is regulated by the principles of justice that are accepted by all
- b) these principles are accepted on the basis of beliefs publicly accepted, which are based on non-controversial methods of reasoning such as social psychology, rational reasoning etc.
- c) the full justification of these principles of justice is publicly known, or at least publicly available.²⁸

In this way, by combining the liberal legitimacy and the principle of publicity, Rawls claims that the ideal of the so-called *full autonomy* is reached. It is a situation in which citizens completely understand and accept both the reasons and the content of the justifications behind restrictions imposed on them by the state. This is so because they are known, acceptable and available to all, at all times. That way everybody's autonomy is safe and it is possible, at least in theory, that citizens will not see these restrictions placed on them as unfair.

In the next chapter, we will turn to explaining how and why this theory should be extended so as to cover (domestic) upbringing and (formal) education as well.

3. THE PUBLIC REASON AND UPBRINGING

3.1 The Parallel Argument

Perhaps the main practical hallmark of Rawls' political theory as elaborated so far, if put somewhat succinctly, would be that the principles must guarantee that whenever decisions (of public concern) are made in a liberal society, such that will affect the lives of all citizens, they should be made in accordance with the reasons that can be held as common ground of all the people as free and equal, and not based on personal interests or comprehensive doctrines held by the lawmakers or the current holders of executive power. In other words, these reasons must be publicly justifiable. If this is respected, the people's best interests will be protected, and, in their private lives, they will be guaranteed the right to hold whatever views and values dear they see fit. They will be free

²⁷ Rawls, PL (2000) p. 60.

²⁸ *ibid.* p. 60, Our translation from the Croatian edition of the book.

to join and leave whatever associations they want, and subscribe to whatever religious or moral views they choose, as long as they afford the same liberties to others. When it comes to various ways in which said political theory could be extended so as to cover parental practices²⁹, understood primarily as those practices undertaken by parents to influence the development of their children, we will elaborate on the ways in which this could be done, and on the reasons why as offered by Matthew Clayton.³⁰

If this is to be achieved, there must be some substantial similarities between the political and familial structure of society that need to be established. Once these are found, they can form a bridge of sorts between the political philosophy and philosophy of education. Then we could "export", so to speak, the main principles (legitimacy, publicity) of Rawls' liberal conception of justice to the field of upbringing and/or education. We could then say that what holds in the political setting also holds in the so-called parental. Clayton achieves this with the use of a parallel argument, which, as the name suggests, establishes a parallel between the two domains in focus. This argument states that the parent-child relationship shares the three salient features of the political domain. These are:

1. "it is a non-voluntary, coercive relationship that has a profound effect on the child's life and her self-conception. It is non-voluntary in the sense that the child does not choose to enter it but, instead, is born into it, or placed under the custody of her parents by an appropriate public body, and is not permitted to leave it for a considerable period of time."
2. "it is coercive because parents have the authority to impose various constraints on their child and to use various kinds of force in their imposition".
3. "it is uncontroversial that the family in which one is brought up is a significant causal factor explaining one's life chances, and that it can

²⁹ The subject of education and upbringing in a liberal democracy was among many interests of a great pioneer of this field, John Dewey. For more information about his ideas, see: John Dewey, *Vaspitanje i demokratija* (1970), *Obod*, Cetinje.

³⁰ It should be noted that the attempts at extending Rawls's principle of public reason from the political arena to other fields of endeavour are by no means reserved to upbringing and education. For a detailed analysis of how it could be done in the field of Bioethics, see: Elvio Baccarini, *In a Better World? Public Reason and Biotechnologies*, *Sveučilište u Rijeci, Filozofski fakultet u Rijeci* (2015).

significantly shape one's beliefs and desires, including one's self-respect”³¹

Clayton goes on to say that if these parallels are sound, then it could be concluded that parental conduct, just like political decision-making, should be based on the ideal of liberal legitimacy and on public reasons. In practice, this would mean that parents too, and not just politicians, judges or public officials, *should* use their authority in accordance with public reason, which means that they should use it in such a way that is acceptable to free and equal citizens. It would mean that they live in a free society which protects freedoms of conscience, expression and association, in which all citizens possess the basic two moral powers, and in such conditions there will inevitably be disagreement over matters of what constitutes a good life, religious and moral affairs. In such conditions, bearing in mind that the parallel argument holds and that liberal legitimacy is the guiding principle of both domains, the parental conduct should not be based solely³² on the personal views of the parents, but should, in principle, be justifiable by public reasons and, therefore, be acceptable to all reasonable persons.³³ This is, of course, not how parental conduct is usually understood, and these restrictions could seem harsh at first, but upon a more detailed look, this first impression might be somewhat mitigated. It is true, however, that under these restrictions some traditional conceptions of upbringing would have to change. In the next section, we will discuss in what ways precisely.

3.2 Parents and Public Reasons

Once the liberal ideal of legitimacy has been established as the joint guiding principle of the political and the domain of upbringing, it is time to see which parental prerogatives and conducts would be preferred under such conditions. To put it in general terms, parents should bear in mind that their conduct should, at least in principle, be justifiable by reference to the so called *anti-perfectionist* ideals. These ideals do not appeal to the whole truth about ethics or religion.³⁴ In Clayton's own words:

As I have presented it, the ideal of liberal legitimacy insists that parents must embrace one important aspect of public reason, which is that their conduct

³¹ Clayton, *Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing* (2006), p. 93-94

³² This is an important point, as Rawls doesn't negate the right of parents to appeal to their particular views in justification of their conduct, only that this should not be the only justification they are able to provide.

³³ *ibid.* p. 94-95

³⁴ *ibid.* p. 95

should be capable of justification by reference to anti-perfectionist ideals, i.e. ideals that do not appeal to the whole truth about ethics or religion.³⁵

This doesn't mean that parents may not appeal to their own values in upbringing, only that they should not forget that these should not be their *only* source of justification. They should, at least in theory³⁶, also be able to justify their conduct with reference to ideals that are capable of acceptance by individuals who hold different, and maybe even values that are incompatible with their own. If one justifies one's conduct with their particular moral or religious view³⁷, but cannot also, in principle, justify it in terms of public reason, then such conduct, if it involves coercion of others, should be abandoned.³⁸

In practice, one of the important ideals to be observed is that of personal autonomy or self-determination. The parents should not impart their children with such values that could threaten the development of their autonomous personalities later in life. This kind of autonomy entails that a person has the right kind of relationship with her goals, beliefs and desires. There needs to be the right kind of history behind their adoption; such that shows not only that a person lives her life in full accordance with her own convictions, but that these convictions were adopted in a way that protected her autonomy, with the right kind of deliberation and context.³⁹ To that end, there are two conditions that need to be met; the intrapersonal and environmental condition of autonomy. The intrapersonal condition demands that a person must be able to exercise her ability to form, revise and/or pursue her convictions. So, it can be stated that the capacity for autonomy entails the proper development of a number of mental and physical powers that are to enable a person to rationally and critically observe and revise her beliefs, desires and goals, and to change them in accordance with available reasons and evidence. The environmental

³⁵ *ibid.* p. 95

³⁶ Rawls calls this condition *the proviso*. In its weaker version, which we ourselves accept, he states that, for the liberal legitimacy to hold, it is enough for the parents to be able to offer public reasons for their conduct *if asked*, and not in every situation. We believe this to be enough of a restriction, when compared to usual practices. For more information, see: John Rawls, *The Idea of Public Reason Revisited*, *Collected Papers*, *Harvard University Press*. (1999), p. 584.

³⁷ Their comprehensive doctrine.

³⁸ Clayton (2006), p. 95

³⁹ *ibid.* p. 11

condition demands that a person be surrounded by a proper ethical environment⁴⁰, that of *meaningful ethical pluralism*.⁴¹ As Clayton points out:

Moreover, the options available must offer genuine variety. One cannot be an autonomous eater if, despite a plethora of restaurants, burger and chips is the only available dish.⁴²

What this means is that for us to say that a person is fully autonomous in her choice of a certain moral or religious doctrine, it is not enough to show that she believes in her convictions. We need to show that she adopted these convictions in an environment where she was given ample other options to choose from, as well as a fruitful opportunity for deliberation and critical revision of both her own, and opposing views. Therefore, if one is an ardent follower of, say, Christianity, Islam, or if one is an atheist, for that matter, if this person was not familiarized with plenty of other options before firmly adopting these views, then this person cannot be considered fully autonomous under demands of public reason, because there is no proper history of adopting these views, as mentioned earlier. It is important to note that all these conditions hold for adult persons. Since children are not yet able to choose for themselves, but will one day surely be capable of making their own choices, it is important for parents to act in such ways so as not to jeopardize the future development of their children's capacity for autonomy.⁴³ They should be careful not to *indoctrinate* towards their own comprehensive doctrines. As we mentioned before, this doesn't mean they don't have the right to rear their children in accordance with their own values; just that these values should not be made the *only* available ones, and that they should not discourage their children from making their own inquiries and investigations. They should also not make certain choices increasingly more difficult or unfavourable for their children to make than others.⁴⁴

There are also political aspects to the environmental condition of autonomy, particularly liberal ones. If a person is to appeal to her religious convictions,

⁴⁰ There are numerous alternatives when it comes to ethical doctrines. For some of them, see: Nigel Warburton, *Philosophy: Basics*, Routledge (2004), p. 39-65, or William Frankena, *Etika, KruZak*, Zagreb (1998), particularly p. 63-77.

⁴¹ Clayton (2006), p. 12

⁴² *ibid.* p. 12

⁴³ They are to act as guardians of their child's future autonomy, in a way.

⁴⁴ One of these practices can be found in the Amish communities, where children are, upon their 18th birthday, given the chance to leave into the mainstream culture and see it for themselves, but then, if they choose to stay there and leave the traditional ways, they are forced to cut all ties with their families. This cannot be thought of as providing them with proper other options under the theory presented here.

she must first enjoy freedoms of religion and association. Or, if she is to form and revise her conception of the good life, she must be able to rationally and critically evaluate alternative options and adapt her chosen conception to her particular needs in life. The freedoms of religion, conscience, expression and associations are prerequisites to doing any of these, and it is precisely liberalism which ensures them, along with proper deliberation and a sufficiently rich context to choose from.⁴⁵

3.3 Institutional Education and Public Reasons

In this section we try to offer a brief overview of the ways in which ideals pivotal to Rawls' conception justice such as freedom, equality and fair cooperation can be part of the formal education exercised in the schools by the teachers. Until now the discussion was focused on informal upbringing at home, where parents play an important role in realizing certain ideals and values. We accepted Clayton's analogy between society and family based on non-voluntariness, coerciveness and influence on one's life chances, which directs us towards accepting boundaries of public reason even when it comes to upbringing. But, we want to stress that the same analogy works for formal education also. Children are required to go to school, the school has the authority to impose various constraints on the children, and it is also a significant causal factor in determining one's life chances and self-understanding. Certainly, someone can object to this analogy and say that it is not as strong as an analogy between the family and society. Family, it can be said, has a far greater influence than schools in shaping someone's self-understanding or life prospects, it has a stronger authority and it is more non-voluntary than schools are, because we are born into a particular family while there is a certain range of options in choosing schools. Of course, for this objection to be plausible it must be backed by certain empirical findings of school influence which will depend on a particular society. Nevertheless, we can say, even if on theoretical grounds, that even though this analogy may not be as strong as the former, we can take it as plausible for several reasons. First, the school is certainly an important domain of socialization. It is here that children take a step away from parental authority to connect with their peers, and get acquainted with the norms of a wider society. Thus, if we want children's autonomy to be protected while under parental authority, and also to be developed into political autonomy in a liberal society, then it seems that the same ideals must be realized in the school as well. Second, schools are

⁴⁵ Clayton (2006), p. 12

formal institutions where the society has a direct interest and influence. Thus, someone can say that Clayton's proposal for family upbringing is just that – a proposal. It would be good if parents accepted that proposal in the home setting, but society cannot have more direct influence or direct formal measures to assure that this will be so. It would surely be counter-productive to prescribe these measures and values to parents. In the final instance we have to rely on parental love, benevolence and reasonableness of parents. But, with formal education it is different. Here society has the right to prescribe the curriculum and other forms of education in the schools. So, we can say that the focus on the school as a domain of realization of Rawlsian liberal values is justified both if someone accepts Clayton's proposal for home upbringing, and if someone thinks that parents should have more moral freedom in raising their children. Proponents of both views can accept that schools create the environment for accepting certain ideals suitable for a liberal society.

Naturally, school work will be much easier if children were, up to the point of entering school, raised by their parents in keeping with the principles and ideas advocated so far. It is questionable how much teachers could do for a child raised in a closed and dogmatic environment. But, as we said, it is an empirical question and there are still good reasons to discuss schools as a separate question.

The type of education provided in accordance with the aforementioned ideals would be a civic one, aimed at developing in children the qualities of, so to speak, cosmopolitan broadness,⁴⁶ and a sense of justice in regard to other people in their culture, but, especially, in regard to those people and cultures that are in some ways different from their own. Surely, in creation of various liberal societies, some will come closer to the ideal than others, and, in such conditions we would need to decide whether to encourage children to develop, value and preserve liberal values to the fullest, or that they can choose to live their lives under different, non-liberal values, or choose to take no part in the political process at all.⁴⁷ Depending on the way in which they solve this dilemma, there are two basic types of civic education which Clayton mentions. The first model is called *political literacy*, and the aim of political education under it is to cultivate in individuals the knowledge of the nature and history of the political institutions and laws that govern their lives, an understanding of the principles attempting to justify those laws, as well as of the rival political

⁴⁶ The teaching process is done in accordance with Piaget's pedagogical work, meaning that teaching is based on the current age-related abilities of the students. Politics as such will not be addressed until students reach suitable age for such topics.

⁴⁷ For more information about political education, see: Patricia White, *Beyond domination, Routledge & Paul Kagan* (2010).

conceptions that have been articulated or defended.⁴⁸ Emphasis is also put on the explanations of the ways in which political changes can be brought about, both violent and non-violent. It is a way of getting citizens acquainted with their rights and liberties, with the various instruments of change at their disposal, and not of stirring their passions. The primary goal is to help people in understanding and critically questioning the whole political process, which will in turn help them to actively participate in it, *if they so choose*. This *if they so choose* part is crucial, since advocates of this model don't want to shape the motivation of the students in any way. As Clayton states:

Yet, fundamentally, the model of political literacy eschews any attempt to shape the political motivations of individuals. It does not aim to encourage individuals to participate in political life. Whether or not individuals participate, indeed, whether or not they affirm an obligation to obey the law, is a matter left entirely to them.⁴⁹

The decision of whether they will take part in the political process of their country, or even whether they will respect its laws (assuming they are just) is, therefore, left entirely to the students, once they become ready to make it. Teachers have no right to influence the students' motivation, not even to steer them in the direction of positive values, because that would constitute a breach of their autonomy.

The second model is called *the shaping of political motivation*. Advocates of this model consider the political literacy model to be a welcome and even necessary introduction to political education, but consider it to be insufficient. Once the basics have been taught, it is necessary to go a step further, and teach the students some specific political ideas (primarily liberal ones, but other philosophies, such as socialist, are included), as well as specific ways of active political participation.⁵⁰ To that end, they hold that it is acceptable to influence the motivation of the students, as long as it is done *only* to uphold their respect for and advancement of the basic liberal values and societal institutions. In Clayton's own phrasing:

This model facilitates political literacy, but goes beyond it by shaping educational curricula and the organization of educational institutions so as to cultivate in individuals certain political beliefs and the desire to participate in political life in permissible ways.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Clayton (2006), p. 129-130

⁴⁹ *ibid.* p. 130

⁵⁰ Clayton (2006), p. 130

⁵¹ *ibid.* p. 130

If we turn back now to the debate between prescriptive and descriptive educational methods, we find that the same division can be found here, and, again, we will turn to similar solutions. Here it can be stated that the political literacy model is descriptive, aiming at creating and developing critical thinking, while the shaping of political motivation model would be a prescriptive one. Same as before, a synthesis instead of a sharp division would be in order, difference being that now we are given concrete values⁵² that do not depend on the spirit of the ages in a given culture, as well as a set of public principles that must be known and acceptable to all, that can serve as justification to those values. On a cautionary note, the *shaping* model runs the risk of itself becoming a comprehensive doctrine, which is why plenty of other political options must be offered to students, and explained objectively and without bias, while liberal ideas must be held to the same standards of critical revision and scrutiny as all the others. Nevertheless, even though the *shaping* model runs this risk, it can still be accepted if we're talking of non-ideal circumstances, where there is a different risk at work, that of a society becoming more illiberal. What we want to say here is that in the ideal theory, that is, ideal societal circumstances from the liberal perspective, the liberal ideals of upbringing are already being respected by the parents, so there is no need for the *shaping* model. But, in the actual non-ideal circumstances where, as said above, the society must afford to parents a certain range of freedom in upbringing, and, bearing in mind that the school is the only domain under control of a wider society, the society can at least protect its liberal values in the school setting, which will presuppose making use of the *shaping* model, to a certain extent.

In the final section we touch upon the idea of cosmopolitanism as a probable philosophic end-result of an upbringing and education based on the values advocated in this paper.

4. COSMOPOLITANISM AS AN END-RESULT

As closure to this paper, we offer a philosophy of cosmopolitanism as a desirable end-result of the child-rearing and educational methods described, and a possible counterbalance to the increasing wave of animosity and divisions we have witnessed in the past several years, stemming predominantly

⁵² These being liberty, equality and fairness.

from the inflated senses of national⁵³ (nationalistic) pride and ethnic affiliation. These in turn more often than not stem from both insufficient knowledge of other cultures, and insufficiently developed critical thinking in regard to one's own culture and values, which are taken as eternal and intrinsically valid. This is the case even with the countries exhibiting the declaratively peace-loving, all-inclusive rhetoric, which quickly changes as soon as their perceived interests so dictate. In most societies nowadays words such as freedom, equality, justice or tolerance are used all the time, but too often serve as little more than bywords to get some private and partial interests fulfilled. That this is the case is nothing new, but the real questions are: does it have to continue being this way?, and what can we as educators do about it? Can we, should we do anything at all?

It is our firm belief not only that we can, but also that we must, and that the liberal values described could help in getting us closer to the ideal of peaceful coexistence, which is an ideal to which no one reasonable would object, and which most of the so-called world leaders declaratively endorse anyway. People are not born with divisive and belligerent tendencies toward different cultures and ethnicities; they are thought to think that way. Often it is one's upbringing and education that makes all the difference between a person *becoming*, say, John Rawls, or a militant suicide bomber. And it is precisely through the processes of upbringing and education that said divisive tendencies could hopefully be stopped, and then, through a long period of time, maybe even reversed completely, if proper global efforts are taken in earnest.

As a final destination of sorts of an upbringing and education led by the principles described here, we see the *kosmou polites*, the citizen of the world, as envisioned by Diogenes Laertius or the Stoics, an individual *anchored* in the local community of his birth, but also, even more so, in the universal community of *human argument and aspiration that is truly great and truly common*.⁵⁴

Clayton shapes this issue in light of the question should we foster a distinctive sense of nationality in children, and how this would reflect on their duties towards people living in other political societies?⁵⁵ In line with the precepts of (liberal) political education presented throughout the work, he is inclined to give a negative answer. As he considers the principal aim of such

⁵³ We do not equate nationalism with patriotism, as we consider the former to be malignant and divisive, while the latter can serve as a welcome first step in developing compassion towards others. However, this is a larger debate that we won't get further into here.

⁵⁴ See: Martha Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, *The Global Justice Reader*, Thom Brooks eds. Blackwell Pub. (2008), p. 7.

⁵⁵ Clayton (2006), p. 155

education to lie in the development of a sense of justice and a respect for the political and economic institutions of a society as long as they are just, even at the expense of realizing the full extent of one's interest, he deems that none of these require a formation of a sense of mutual belonging based on nationality. In fact, doing so would jeopardize the core of the liberal endeavour. People joint together by the mutual core values such as freedom, justice or mutual citizenship, understanding and compassion will be much more inclined to try and put themselves in other citizens' shoes and come to their aid, than they would be if their primary allegiance was to the people of their own national identity and public cultural circle.⁵⁶ This would in effect split the society into several little factions based on their perceived particular interests, and render the practice of a reasonable conception of justice all but impossible. Be that as it may, Clayton does not dismiss the question of nationality in political education altogether, as he finds it is a fact in today's world, and can still be used in a way that complies with liberal principles.

To that end, he distinguishes between the so-called *education for nationality* and the *nationality-shaping education*, where the former would aim at creating in children a sense of belonging and affective ties based on a shared national identity, with the goal of them maintaining their public culture, while the latter would not try to inculcate such an identity, for reasons stated earlier, but would nonetheless try to take into account that many people do consider themselves close to particular cultures or nationalities. In practice, this taking into account would mean attempting to use educational methods in a way that enables the national identity to exist, but still accept liberal principles, i.e. this identity is never to take precedence over said principles, which are based on common values and citizenry, as opposed to nationality.

Bearing this in mind, education aiming at developing a cosmopolitan outlook⁵⁷ in the students, with the values of freedom, equality and justice at its core, would not neglect or frown at the local and national identities of the people; on the contrary, it is necessary to get to know one's culture, its history and values. There is nothing wrong with loving it and relating with its ways and customs. Love and compassion begin with what is close and familiar to us; with what we know. However, it is of utmost importance to teach the pupils to also think objectively and critically about their nation and culture, about its goals and *truths*. They should learn that there are other cultures and nations too, with their histories, goals and *truths*, and they should strive to view them

⁵⁶ *ibid.* p. 157

⁵⁷ For more details, see: Martha Nussbaum, *For Love of Country?*, *Beacon Press books* (1996, 2002)

impartially and without local bias. Or, at least, without such bias that could lead to violent disagreements. Upon developing a healthy sense of compassion for their families, friends and compatriots, which is a logical first step, students could learn to view those culturally and/or philosophically different from them as fundamentally similar, owing to the universal, innate quality of humaneness that all share. Thus, eventual expansion of compassion and understanding from the familial and local community to those "distant" and "different" could gradually be achieved. Usually, everybody has compassion for those from her/his own close circle and nation, but it too often stays exclusively confined to that, which inevitably leads to conflicts. Through education for cosmopolitanism, this could slowly be changed, as students would gain knowledge about the differences, but also similarities with others. And when there is knowledge and shared common values, the room for ideological manipulation and division is narrowed. Hopefully, this can become a welcome perspective for future policy-makers when deciding where to go at the crossroads of education for values in the early 21st century.

5. CONCLUSION

In this paper we have dealt with the issue of values to be used in upbringing and education, from the perspective of the liberal conception of justice authored by John Rawls. Since there are great many proposals in the modern-day debate on this issue, but few wholesome solutions, we have attempted to show which values could serve the purpose if we extended the said liberal conception of justice so as to cover both parental and institutional educational conduct. We offered an analysis of an argument in favour of the claim that, due to the similarities existing between the familial and political domains, the same basic principles can be used to guide them both. We analysed concrete pedagogical and educational practices that would be preferred if said liberal conception was adopted. Finally, we gave a brief overview of the education for cosmopolitanism, which we see as a welcome end-result of the principles we advocated, but also as a sorely needed value in today's world, increasingly torn by conflict based on ethnic, religious and moral differences.

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