The argument from contingency falls under the family of cosmological arguments which seeks to show that the existence of contingent beings, depends on a necessary being and that this necessary being is what we refer to as God. Most notable examples of philosophers formulating versions of the argument from contingency are Thomas Aquinas and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. While Aquinas tries to show that if reality were totally contingent, at one hypothetical point in time, without a necessary being, there could be nothing to exist, Leibniz using the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) tries to show that every being has an explanation of its existence either in necessity of its existence or in some other being. The argument I'm going to present is inspired by the work of contemporary philosophers, most notably Joshua Rasmussen and Alexander Pruss. In favour of the argument we can use an analogy in which we imagine all reality, whatever it may be, as presented by this „something“ which we can call „the blob of everything“. From this we can deduce principles that show that nothing outside of „blob“ can cause or explain „blob“ itself because nothing exists outside of „blob“. In the end I will try to cross the „gap problem“ by showing why the necessary foundation might favour the theistic explanation over the nontheistic explanation.