

Felicity Conditions of Speech Acts

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Felicity conditions of speech acts

Master's thesis

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Abstract

Speech acts are utterances whose issuance changes the states of affairs in the world. They were first introduced by J. L. Austin in his seminal book *How to Do Things With Words* (1962), who divided them into locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Illocutionary acts in particular have, since then, provided a great deal of interest for many philosophers of language. Speech act theories are aimed to explicate how illocutionary acts such as threatening or promising operate and produce an effect. To examine these issues, Austin introduced felicity conditions, which need to be satisfied in order for illocutionary acts to obtain. Felicity conditions that Austin introduced are characterized mostly by convention. Alternatively, conditions that govern illocutionary acts can be viewed as depending mostly upon intention of the participants in the act. In this vein H. P. Grice's intentionalism provides another way to account for illocutionary acts. Conventionalism and intentionalism are two main approaches in speech act theories in pragmatics. This thesis will examine both of these approaches, as well as the possibility of implementing both of them in a speech act theory. In this way, Austin's felicity conditions will be evaluated and I will conclude that they are not sufficient for an adequate explanation of illocution because they do not fully acknowledge the importance of intentional elements.

KEY WORDS: philosophy of language, speech act theory, illocution, felicity conditions, conventionalism, intentionalism

Sažetak

Govorni činovi su izričaji koji mijenjaju stanje stvari u svijetu. Prvi ih je uveo J. L. Austin u svojoj istaknutoj knjizi *How to Do Things With Words* (1962) te ih je podijelio na lokucijske, ilokucijske i perlokucijske činove. Mnogi filozofi jezika su se od tada bavili govornim činovima, posebice ilokucijskim činovima. Teorije govornih činova su namijenjene eksplikaciji načina na koji ilokucijski činovi, poput prijetnje ili obećanja, djeluju i dovode do posljedica. Kako bi istražio ova pitanja, Austin je uveo uvjete uspješnosti govornih činova koji trebaju biti zadovoljeni kako bi se ilokucijski činovi ostvarili. Uvjeti uspješnosti koje je Austin uveo su uvelike određeni konvencijom. Nasuprot tome, uvjeti koji normiraju ilokucijske činove se mogu promatrati kao uvelike određeni namjerom sudionika u činu. Glede toga, H. P. Griceov intencionalizam pruža alternativni način eksplikacije ilokucijskih činova. Konvencionalizam i intencionalizam su dva najistaknutija pristupa u pragmatičkim teorijama govornih činova. Ovaj će rad istražiti oba pristupa zasebno, kao i mogućnost kombinirane teorije govornih činova. Na taj način će Austinovi uvjeti uspješnosti govornih činova biti vrednovani te će zaključiti da oni nisu dostatni za adekvatno objašnjenje ilokucije zato što ne zahvaćaju u potpunosti intencionalne elemente.

KLJUČNE RIJEČI: filozofija jezika, teorija govornih činova, ilokucija, uvjeti uspješnosti, konvencionalizam, intencionalizam

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1. Introduction

In February 2022, numerous news outlets published an unexpected story: pastor Andres Arango, Catholic priest from Phoenix, Arizona incorrectly performed baptisms, rendering them invalid. He resigned after the diocese discovered the problem, after which the Church informed individuals that he baptized that their baptisms, along with following sacraments they might have received, are not accepted by the Church. Pastor Andres Arango has said ‘We baptize you’ instead of the approved formulation ‘I baptize you’ for decades. He is remorseful and says that he had not been doing it on purpose. Nevertheless, the Church claims that their sacraments must not be altered, even minimally, otherwise they do not hold (Salcedo A., 2022). One might wonder: should the fact that pastor Arango changed one word of a baptism have such dire consequence not only for him, but also for his parishioners? The answer to that question depends on how one views the act of baptism in Catholicism and the decisions of the Church. In any case, the Church is the one that regulates how all sacraments are to be carried out successfully. Their conditions range from stipulating which persons are to perform acts of sacraments, under which conditions and, of course, what exactly they are to say. Setting aside the reasons to support or oppose the decision of the Church, it is clear that religious and other types of acts, such as those related to law (like getting married and divorced) need to be done under certain conditions to be successful. They are examples of speech acts, i.e. acts in which one does something with language. Speech acts do not need to be institutionally determined, since apologizing and promising, among with many others, are also normally regarded as speech acts. Conditions of successful performance of these acts were called ‘felicity conditions’ by British philosopher of language John Langshaw Austin. In this thesis, I will provide a background on how the discussion of speech acts progressed and present some important notions and problems of speech act theories. In order to differentiate between Austin’s felicity conditions and other types of conditions that relate to speech acts, I will use the phrase ‘conditions of successful performance of speech acts’ as an umbrella term to refer to those types of conditions, independently of which speech act theory they constitute. Furthermore, I will discuss Austin’s theory of felicity conditions as a conventionalist contribution to the discussion, Grice’s program as a representative of the alternative intentionalist approach and consider how the

difference between the former and the latter influenced the development of speech act theories in philosophy. Furthermore, I will examine which approach is better suited to account for conditions of successful performance of the act and whether or not there is a middle ground. Finally, I will provide arguments in favor of an ‘integrative’ or mixed approach to the discussion between conventionalism and intentionalism, based on Harnish’s (2009) distinction between externalism and internalism of speech acts.

2. Background of speech acts in philosophy of language

Ideal language philosophy and ordinary language philosophy

The 20th century had been shaped by a greater interest in a systematic study of natural language in the scope of philosophy than previously, resulting in two types of approaches to investigation of language: ideal language philosophy (ILP) and ordinary language philosophy (OLP). To sketch out the distinction between ILP and OLP, it is important to provide a brief general definition of the notions of semantics and pragmatics of natural language. Semantics is the study of meaning of expressions of natural language (i.e. linguistic expressions). Conversely, pragmatics is the study of the use of linguistic expressions and how that use is affected by the context of the speech situation.

‘Ideal language philosophers’, among whom were the logical positivists, early Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gottlob Frege, focused on “studying formal languages and, through them, language in general” (Recanati 1998, p. 620). Bearing in mind the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, ILP aimed to answer questions that related to the former and based their approach on providing semantic theories to account for issues in natural language, with a special focus on logic and mathematics. As such, one of the most important tendencies in that kind of approach was to attempt to compare natural language with formal languages of logic and mathematics. Since natural language can be ambiguous and unclear, formal language was taken to be a model by means of which one could rectify it.

This view did not appeal to ‘ordinary language philosophers’, who set out to investigate natural language with a departure from the insistence on logic and truth function, focusing instead on language use. Contrary to ‘ideal language philosophers’, ‘ordinary language philosophers’, such as Herbert Paul Grice and John Langshaw Austin, as well as later Wittgenstein, held a belief that natural language should be investigated in its own right, without a persistent insistence on idealized properties of formal languages. The methodology they used and viewpoints they held about natural

language subsequently led to the development of pragmatics in philosophy of language. This development had an effect on many other philosophical disciplines, as well as linguistics, artificial intelligence development and law.

Ordinary language philosophers defended the view that “the important features of natural language were not revealed, but hidden, by the logical approach” (Recanati 1998, p. 620). The approach in question, they believed, is not adequate to illuminate certain properties of natural language, since it does not tolerate a degree of variability present in natural language. Furthermore, certain language phenomena, such as metaphoric language, seems to be outside the scope of (classical) logic due to its ambiguity and a plethora of possible interpretations. As Bach (2006, p. 463) suggests, philosophy of language based on the logical approach present in the first half of the past century was predominantly occupied with treating statements as propositions, independently of the type of indicative sentences they were derived from.

Speech acts and contexts in which they occur are shaped by factors that are outside of logic, so logic cannot give us an adequate and comprehensive account of what constitutes a successful speech act (Austin 2018, p. 52). Logic provides an account and analysis of propositions, and thus is unable to factor in these elements that are clearly outside its scope, since they relate to linguistic and extralinguistic factors.

Furthermore, morphosyntactical classification of the majority of the sentences (of the English language) distinguishes between indicative sentences (sentences that contain a verb in an indicative mood, such as *I play the flute*), imperative sentences (containing a verb in an imperative mood, i.e. *Play the flute!*) and interrogative sentences (with a verb in an interrogative mood, for instances *Do you play the flute?*). It is evident that an approach to language based (almost) exclusively on insight into classical logic will have concerns with the sentences of the second and third type, since they are arguably not considered bearers of propositional content. Consequently, such an approach will be better suited for sentences of the indicative type. Nevertheless, even those kind of sentences do not always contain a clear truth value, which is a very important issue in the realm of speech act theories. The distinction between types of grammatical moods and their relation to speech act types will be covered in the following chapter, which will deal with properties and classification of speech acts.

The inception of the speech act theory

Although it can be said that speech acts are a common topic in contemporary philosophy of language, their systematic investigation is in its relative infancy, beginning since the middle of the 20th century (Smith 1990, p. 29). As Smith (1990, p. 29) points out, action-generating aspects of language had not been properly investigated until then and one could even suggest that they were neglected due to their ‘unusual’ properties, i.e. not fitting into the standard, traditional view of analysable language. More specifically, it could be said that speech acts were not investigated thoroughly until that time because they seemed too difficult or even impossible to be a subject of investigation.

Austin himself points out that “It may be said that for too long philosophers have neglected this study” (Austin 2018, p. 100), failing to investigate performative utterances in favour of those utterances that describe or report and whose truth-conditional value can be determined (at least in principle). He calls this phenomenon a “descriptive fallacy” (Austin 2018, p. 3). The fallacy in question refers to a tendency to investigate only ‘descriptive’ utterances, i.e. those that have a standard truth value through which they can be analyzed.

To clarify, performative utterances were introduced by Austin serve as an ‘action’ or can be referred to as ‘doing something’ (Austin 2018, p. 6). The name ‘performative utterance’ itself “indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action – it is not normally thought of as just saying something” (Austin 2018, pp. 6-7). He contrasts performative utterances with constative utterances, which are utterances that have a truth value (are either true or false, independently of whether or not its truth value is or can de facto be known) (Austin 2018, p. 6). Many constative utterances have a descriptive function, but there are many examples of those that do not (Austin 2018, p. 6). The distinction between constative and performative utterances is not a definitive or clear one, and Austin shows in which ways it is difficult or unsatisfactory to draw a firm line between these concepts, since performativity seems to pervade speech situations (Austin 2018, p. 67). In other words, Austin viewed every speech situation as performative, at least in a primary sense (Hornsby 2008, p. 668).

There is quite a large number of speech act theories (theories that account for, classify, define, provide examples of and/or explain the phenomenon of speech acts). Consequently, their approaches and objectives diverge, which is why there is a discrepancy between the usage of fundamental terms and notions used by different speech act theories, sometimes even in the scope of the same theory. For instance, there is (at least) two ways in which the term ‘speech act’ is used. In its broad sense, speech acts are, as Austin (2018) posited, a group of speech occurrences that contain three types of acts: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. According to him, locutionary acts are made when a sentence with sense and reference is produced and their characterization corresponds to what is generally considered ‘meaning’ (Austin 2018, p. 108). Frege’s notion of sense and reference was presumably important for Austin to include in his theory because it permits the stability of truth value across different utterances that use the same reference but different senses. For example, in the sentence “John’s dog is sleeping” we could identify sense and reference according to what the sentence ‘means’ in a traditional sense, not accounting for any departures from that kind of analysis (not including the notion of illocution).

Nevertheless, even though we could extract locutionary elements, locution is always a part of illocutionary acts and never occurs on its own (Austin 2018, p. 99). Illocutionary acts are, according to Austin (2018, pp. 108-109) generated by means of utterances that have an illocutionary force, which is grounded in linguistic and social convention. For instance, “I assert that I did not see John’s dog sleeping” counts as an illocutionary act because it not only has elements that could be identified in terms of ‘meaning’ in a locutionary sense, but it also has some properties that mould the utterance into an action of a certain kind, in this case an assertion. Perlocutionary acts are produced when an effect on the hearer is a consequence of the utterance, and they involve a change in their beliefs or emotions, such as those involved in persuading the hearer to do or believe something (Austin 2018, p. 117). As such, the utterance “John persuaded me that his dog is sleeping”, is an expression of the perlocutionary act that was previously performed by John. Of course, if a perlocutionary act will be successful or not is out of control of the person intending it to be, in fact, successful. John might try to persuade someone, but their mental state is out of his reach and there is no guarantee that he will be able to do so.

Considering this, verbs usually associated with perlocution (persuade, insult, frighten, inspire annoy and scare) cannot be used in the same way as explicit performative (illocutionary) verbs. Specifically, to say to someone ‘I hereby insult you’ or ‘I convince you to buy me lunch’ would be (pragmatically) inappropriate, since indicative first person singular verb form is not suited for perlocutionary usage. As such, these verbs are used when a person is describing or retelling what was done to them or someone else (i.e. ‘He insulted me by criticizing my work’ and ‘Peter convinced Jane to buy him lunch’).

Even though the notion of speech acts can refer to all three types of acts, illocutionary acts are, naturally, the overriding focus of Austin’s speech act theory. This is the case because speech acts and illocutionary acts are often used synonymously by Austin and many other philosophers. Furthermore, performativity seems to be the focus of most speech act theories and it relates to illocution.

In a narrow sense, the term speech act applies to only those acts that *make* certain state of affairs the case. This type of usage of the term supposes that ‘the world’ is changed by producing an utterance (or, if a specific theory allows, producing a sign of another sort, such as waving). What does it mean to change the world, or state of affairs by means of an utterance? It can mean that the effect of the utterance is such that it produces a concrete consequence, one that is different than those resulting from *standard* (not action-generating) speech production. For instance, conventional procedures of apologizing, saying *I do* in a marriage ceremony, christening or promising can count as speech acts in a narrow sense. Austin named these types of utterances ‘performative utterances’, or more specifically, ‘explicit performatives’ (Austin 2018). They are a subtype of utterances that are used in the formation of illocutionary acts. This is the type of usage that seems to be in mind when one is asked to provide a smaller number of uncontroversial examples of speech acts, since they really do seem to count as *actions, deeds or acts*.

One of the main problems in the discussion of speech acts that affects the ambiguous nature of the term is that the characteristics of illocutionary acts are in dispute and the acts themselves are often presented “ostensively, by examples” (Recanati 1998, p. 623). Specifically, speech act theories are so vast and show a great deal of variety in the characterization and classification of illocutionary acts. Providing examples of utterances that are aimed at illustrating the nature of illocutionary acts generally seems to be aimed primarily at the aforementioned ‘narrow’ sense.

The focus of Austin's investigative efforts in the scope of his speech act theory was to shed light on illocution and acts which it expresses or creates. He was motivated to do so because he believed that the 'descriptive fallacy' had detrimental effects on a systematic inquiry into important speech phenomena, such as speech acts.

In a similar vein, Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish (1979, pp. xii-xv) state that throughout history language had been mostly viewed in terms of it serving a purpose of conveying a message or information. Bach and Harnish (1979, p. xiv) call this "a commonsensical view" of linguistic communication. Speech acts clearly do not satisfy this purpose because of their unique characteristics that set them apart from other language structures and seem not to be characterized by 'regular' function of information carrying.

Harris et al. (2018) and point out that "speech act theory was born of a central insight: language is a medium for many kinds of action, but its superficial uniformity tends to mask this fact" (p. 1). The uniformity in question refers to the fact that a specific sentence can be a constitutive part of numerous speech acts, depending on which type of illocutionary force it is marked by in a specific context. Many speech act theories (particularly those of a pragmatic character) express the view that utterances are bearers of not only propositional content, but also an illocutionary force. The illocutionary force is a type of act or action that is performed by that specific utterance. It is the force that 'drives' the utterance in the intended direction and that makes the utterance count as 'doing' that specific kind of action.

For instance, the same utterance can be a complaint, a threat or an advice in different contexts (Harris et al. 2018, p. 1). Correctly interpreting the utterance, then, seems not possible by simply referring to the utterance itself (the language- words and phrases used in the utterance), since it does not change by changing the speech act type or force. In this way, the language used in a sentence can 'mask' the illocutionary force behind the utterance it employs. For example, as Searle (1969, pp. 71) points out, the utterance "It's really quite late" could be meant as a statement, suggestion or request, if uttered by someone in the context of a social gathering. In other words, starting from Austin (2018), the issuance of the utterance (the actual words produced by the speaker) is generally viewed as having (at least) two constituents: propositional content and illocutionary force.

It is argued that Austin's proposal of the theory of speech acts profoundly changed the way philosophers viewed language and its use, since it marked a departure from the commonsensical view (Bach and Harnish 1979, p. xiv). Since Austin's work brought forward an important change in the discussion surrounding speech acts, it is important to examine it in more detail.

To show that their approach was better suited to account for natural language, 'ordinary language philosophers' brought up several speech phenomena that, in their opinion, defy or challenge the approach taken by ILP. Speech acts have been a common topic in this regard, since they are normally viewed as highly context-dependent and potentially subject to many psychological, cognitive and social factors. Since Austin's proposal of the first speech act theory, speech acts have become one of the most discussed topics in pragmatics. However, speech acts are also a part of linguistic semantic and formal semantic theories, particularly in terms of theories providing semantic rules governing speech acts.

Reverting to the aforementioned distinction between semantics and pragmatics, the latter can offer an insight into speech acts by means of a usage-based investigation. In order to delineate the theoretical scope of this thesis, it is important to mention that it will deal with mainly pragmatic theories. Felicity conditions, as speech acts in general, were introduced and proposed by Austin, who undoubtedly advocated a pragmatic approach. One could, generally speaking, approach the issue of speech acts semantically, and there are a number of such theories. Nonetheless, the notion of felicity conditions is used (almost) exclusively in the domain of pragmatics, since semantic theories provide their own notions.

As previously mentioned, systematic study of speech acts is generally regarded to have been introduced by John Langshaw Austin in the 20th century. Austin and his student John Searle have been regarded as most influential philosophers to tackle the issue of speech acts. Austin's seminal book of lectures at Harvard University *How to Do Things With Words* (1962) and Searle's *Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (1969) are viewed as the most important philosophical texts in this domain. It should be noted, however, that some scholars deem Austin's contribution to be a continuation of earlier discussions on concepts akin to his notion of speech acts. Notably, German phenomenologist Adolf Reinach's conception of 'social acts' can be viewed as a precursor to Austin's speech act theory (Burkhardt 1990, p. 91). Be as it may, Austin's conception of speech acts is still discussed today. Furthermore, the terminology that he used to

introduce various speech phenomena, such as felicity conditions and performative verbs, has never ceased to be significant from its conception, evident in its consistent use in contemporary philosophy.

Generally speaking, one of the defining qualities of speech acts is that they are regarded as actions or deeds. According to Burkhardt (1990, p. 92), “(...) it cannot seriously be denied that linguistic utterances create social facts, relations and commitments, and, therefore, bring forth actions”. This view is in the basis of speech act theories.

In other words, a person carrying out a speech act is by virtue of doing so performing an action. Such an action may not have ‘physical’ consequences (such as actions brought on by moving one’s body, like the act of writing) or visible outcomes, but it counts as an action nonetheless. To state that the occurrence of a speech act is in itself an action is, of course, a provisional characterization. As such, it might sound somewhat satisfactory, but it can also appear naïve, ambiguous and overly inclusive if no further restrictions are implemented. Particularly problematic are the semantically connected notions of ‘action’, ‘deed’ and ‘doing (something)’. Austin identified that the reason for this issue is the fact that it could be argued that speaking *itself* constitutes performing an action (doing something) (Austin 2018, pp. 91-92). In other words, it could be argued that producing sounds (noises), words and meaning is *doing something*, whereby all instances of speech would be classified as acts (Austin 2018, p. 93).

If we define speech acts (in virtue of their being an action) too loosely, allowing production of sounds to be enough to satisfy the requirements, all sorts of speech occurrences would count as speech acts. For instance, a learned utterance “Anna eat” by a parrot would be a speech act, while it can in fact be viewed as a production of speech. Because of this issue, and many other that can result from overinclusion, it was important to Austin to stipulate that ‘doing something’ in the sense required by the speech act theory is not to be confused with production of speech in general.

However, Austin’s investigation of speech acts led him to believe that, since there seems to be no clear-cut difference between constative and performative utterances (2018, p. 67). For this reason his theory has a wide scope and his notion of speech act applies to a broader set of phenomena than other speech act theories after his (Hornsby 2008, p. 676).

Briefly after the publication of his speech act programme, many speech act theories emerged and counterarguments were made against entirety or parts of his theory. Especially controversial seems to be his view that speech acts, particularly illocutionary ones, are undeniably conventional acts that are shaped by social practices. Apart from Searle, English philosopher Peter Frederick Strawson made a lasting impact in the discussion of speech acts. Unlike Austin, Strawson's main aim was to show that speech acts are, for the most part, characterized by (speaker's) intention as proposed by Grice, and that they should not be viewed solely as conventional procedures (Strawson pp. 443-444). Since he believed that Austin failed to fully acknowledge the importance of intention in speech acts, his theory focused on how intention is in the basis of any speech act situation.

To illuminate how convention and intention relate to illocutionary acts, the following chapter will provide a characterization of illocution from its inception, since Austin proposed the first speech act theory.

3. Speech act theories: content and force

Identifying illocutionary acts

Austin's account of speech acts (illocutionary acts) states that “ (...) the idea of a performative utterance was that it was to be (or to be included as a part of) the performance of an action” (Austin 1962, p. 60). When a person (in this case a speaker) utters this type of utterance, they are thereby doing something, i.e. performing a certain action (Austin 2018, p. 60). Performance of the action can only be done by the hands of a person on Austin's account (Austin 2018, p. 60). It can therefore be supposed that Austin deemed animals or other communicative agents (such as those related to technology) excluded from performing speech acts or unable to do so.

One of the main questions in speech act theory is how to treat speech occurrences in which the utterer has no intention on *actually* performing a speech act, but still goes through the procedure of performing it. For example, producing utterances while being an actor in a play (or a movie), or joking, are situations in which there is no sense of seriousness which Austin and other philosophers deemed necessary for their speech act theory. If an actor (being in the capacity of playing a character in a theatre play) says the following words: ‘I promise to pay you on Tuesday’, how would that utterance be classified? Clearly, the actor produced the words needed for the production of an illocutionary act of promising. However, he did not *mean* these words, since he is playing a part. Austin views speech situations of that kind as “parasitic uses of language” (2018, p. 104) that do not constitute a normal linguistic convention. Convention was the central notion of his speech act theory. Therefore, they are not examples of speech acts. Searle (1969, p. 57) holds the same view and calls them ‘non-serious’ utterances.

Another way to attempt to differentiate illocution from other speech phenomena is to examine the distinction between performative and constative utterances. So, if performative utterances are distinct from constatives, how can we differentiate them effectively? Austin proposes a ‘hereby test’ as a way to determine if an utterance is performative. If an utterance can be preceded by the phrase “I hereby ...”, then it has a performative function and essentially satisfies the criteria needed

in order to be placed into the category of speech acts (Austin 2018, p. 62). Some performative utterances, in particular shorter ones, would need to be rephrased in order to pass the ‘hereby test’, but as long as the meaning has been preserved, they too can be classified as speech acts (Austin 2018, p. 62). However, Austin identifies two problems with the test: it is overly formal and some constative utterances can pass it (Austin 2018, p. 62). Therefore, it is not a good candidate for a differentiation between those two types of utterances. As a matter of fact, Austin concludes that there is no test to effectively distinguish constative and performative utterances (Austin 2018, p. 133). The reason for this inability is the fact that the obvious candidates for constative utterances are ‘statements’, and they too exhibit signs of performativity (Austin 2018, p. 133). The distinction between performative and constative utterances is thus analogous to the one between illocutionary and locutionary acts, because they are not, in his opinion, relating to different *types* of utterances and acts. That is to say, the difference between performative and constative utterances is not as clear as one might imagine and the distinction between those two notions is one of viewing various aspects of utterances, since he believed that performativity generally tends to pervade communication (Austin 2018, p. 133).

Differentiating between content and force in speech acts

According to the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy by Blackburn, ‘content’ is defined as “that which is expressed by an utterance or sentence, the proposition or claim made about the world” (2016, p. 103). When beliefs are formed, they contain propositional content. For example, for the sentence “I believe that dogs have four legs” we could isolate the expression of the propositional content of that sentence: “Dogs have four legs”. So, the sentence has two parts: the first part contains reference to a subject and the mental state they are in (belief), and the second expresses the propositional content of said belief.

When this procedure is applied to some illocutionary acts, the latter part of the sentence expresses propositional content, and the former is an expression of an illocutionary force. Searle (2018, p. 32) used the formula ‘F(p)’, wherein ‘F’ stands for illocutionary force and ‘p’ for propositional

content, and called it “illocutionary force indicating device”. He believed that this formalization is applicable for most illocutionary acts. One could, given straightforward examples, observe this structure.

For example, let us take look at the following utterance: “I apologize for breaking your vase”. Naturally, the propositional content is “I broke your vase” and the first part of the utterance, “I apologize”, is an expression of the illocutionary force. Of course, this is a gross oversimplification of the issue of the connection between illocutionary force and propositional content. The utterance is a clear example of what Austin called “explicit performatives” (Austin 2018, p. 83), and as such counts as the more transparent demonstration of that connection than is the case with other types of illocution. If we consider the utterance “I will call your parents”, it is much more elusive, and in different contexts could have different illocutionary interpretations. While it could count as a threat, it could also be meant as a promise or a simple case of notifying the hearer. Even if we stipulate that it counts as a threat, as it is said, for example, to a misbehaving child in order to stop them from repeating an unwanted behaviour, there is nothing stated directly in the utterance to categorically indicate that it is, in fact, a threat.

Comparing it to the first utterance, “I apologize for breaking your vase”, we would not be able to differentiate between propositional content and illocutionary force, since the utterance has a considerably different syntactic structure. However, being aware of the context of the utterance, we would be able to infer that it is meant as a threat and thus exclude other types of illocutionary forces. In any case, we would, according to the view that instances of illocutionary acts have two elements, know that the utterance has an illocutionary force, independently of whether or not it is clearly stated.

The second utterance, therefore, has an illocutionary force that is ‘hidden’ in its syntactic structure. Even though the force as an element of speech acts does not need to be explicitly stated, it is necessary for the characterization and interpretation of the speech act.

In speech act theories of a pragmatic character it is thus generally accepted that illocutionary acts have two distinct elements: propositional content and illocutionary force. To illustrate this, Green (2000, pp. 435-436) puts forward the following analogy between speech acts and chemistry:

propositions are like radicals (in that they are not able to stand on their own) and need illocutionary force, which is analogous to a functional group since it assembles radicals into larger units like compounds. Even though a radical is not able to exist on its own, it can be extracted from the compound by the chemist and this is also what can be done to parts or elements of speech acts (Green 2000, p. 435). Having this in mind, most speech act theories argue that propositional content is not able to function as a communicative element if it is not accompanied by a force, which is a purpose or mode in which it was produced by a communicative agent, but it can nevertheless be investigated (Green 2000, p. 436). Searle calls the act involving the propositional content a propositional act and states that it can never occur on its own, only in an illocutionary act (Searle 1969, p. 159). Austin's speech act theory also operates under this assumption. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is not uncontroversial, and we can examine why the notion of illocutionary force can be viewed as quite contentious.

Some argue that force is an unclear and ontologically problematic concept, especially for those philosophers that employ a semantic approach to speech acts, such as Armin Burkhardt and Laurence Jonathan Cohen (Burkhardt 1990, pp. 92-93, Cohen 1964). Actually, illocution and illocutionary force is discussion in semantics and pragmatics alike, with some differences in approach and viewpoint. Semantic theories often approach the issue of illocution as an entirely semantic phenomenon (claiming that there are direct illocutionary 'markers' in the utterance, from which one can infer illocutionary force) (Sbisa 2009, p. 237). Pragmatic theories generally deny that illocutionary force can be viewed as the property of the utterance that can be accounted for from the semantic meaning of its constituents.

Speech act theories of a semantic character do not always concede that force (illocutionary and perlocutionary) should be used at all. One of the reasons many semantically-inclined speech act theorists have issue with the notion of force is the fact the conditions of successful use of illocutionary acts are grounded in pragmatics, in which the notion of force is applied, and as such are viewed to be 'outside' of the utterance itself (Burkhardt 1990, p. 99). For Burkhardt, who has a semantically-oriented approach to speech acts, (1990, p. 99) this constitutes an 'ontological fallacy', since in his view one does not need to go beyond the realm of the utterance itself to account for its meaning. In other words, he denies that there is anything essential for characterization of speech acts that is not included in the meaning of words in the utterances they

are expressed in. Partaking in a pragmatic methodology and its commonplace usage of the notion of illocutionary force, this thesis will, in fact, make use of it.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the same propositional content can be a part of many types of illocutionary acts, depending on the type of force. Conversely, a type of illocutionary force can be joined by different expressions of propositional content. An assertion can be made about various states of affairs. For instance, “I assert that there is no sugar in my coffee” and “I assert that my brother sold the house” have the same type of illocutionary force, but express different propositional content. The distinction between illocutionary force and propositional content is only one of the many ways in which one could approach the analysis and classification of speech acts. The following section will provide an overview of Austin’s classification of speech acts, which is important for determining felicity conditions that apply to speech acts of various kinds in the following chapters.

Classification of speech acts

Austin distinguished five types of speech acts (illocutionary acts) according to the main verb in the utterance: “1) verdictives, 2) exercitives, 3) commissives, 4) behabitives and 5) expositives” (Austin 2018, p. 150). Verdictives, as the name suggests, are normally used to give one’s verdict, description, interpretation, estimate, assessment and the like (Austin 2018, p. 150). They are characterized by involving one’s appraisal of the value or adequacy of an object or situation. Verdictives can also be aimed at providing facts about objects or situations, or at least they possess a pretense of doing so (Austin 2018, p. 152). This which applies to the case of describing, insofar if a description is an untrue one, it still *pretends* to describe accurately. The second group is exercitives, which are marked by making a decision (for or against some action) on part of the utterer (Austin 2018, p. 150). They include verbs such as appoint, vote, urge and dismiss (Austin 2018, pp. 152-153). As they involve exercise of power on part of the subject, their consequences can include others being allowed to do a certain action or, on the contrary, forbidden from doing it (Austin 2018, p. 154). The third group are commissives, and they are used to make the utterer commit to doing something (Austin 2018, p. 156). They include verbs such as guarantee, agree, vow and adopt (Austin 2018, pp. 156-157). The fourth group are behabitives, which are most

commonly expressions of reactions to the behaviour of other people (Austin 2018, p. 159). The group includes some frequently used verbs, such as apologize, thank, congratulate, welcome and criticize (Austin 2018, p. 159). The final type, expositives, are used to propose views and set forth argumentation (Austin 2018, p. 160). Examples of expositives are state, affirm, deny, answer, agree and correct (Austin 2018, pp. 160-161).

These verbs are “explicit performatives”, which means that they contain direct reference to the act performed and thus appear in utterances that are deemed by Austin apparent examples of illocution (2018, p. 32). Their explicitness is determined by their literalness, because they are to be understood according to their primary meaning.

In turn, the illocutionary acts they constitute are normally more easily interpreted than other kinds of illocutionary acts. For instance, the utterance “I estimate that there are 150 beans in this can.” may, if used standardly, best be interpreted by invoking the primary meaning of the main verb ‘estimate’. Explicit performatives are contrasted with indirect speech acts, whose issuance does not include a literal meaning of their constituents. More specifically, speech acts can occur and be issued by means of nonliteral meaning, identified by Searle as “nonliteralness, vagueness, ambiguity and incompleteness” (1969, p. 20). Speech acts containing nonliteral meaning are examples of semantic underdetermination, i.e. the phenomenon in which the semantic meaning of the constituents of an utterance (its words and phrases) does not determine the meaning of the utterance. To interpret the utterance correctly or appropriately is, in that case, achieved not by relying on the primary meaning of its constituents, but by taking into account context of the utterance. By doing so, one constructs an appropriate nonliteral interpretation of the utterance. For example, the utterance “The train leaves soon” uttered by the speaker to his travel companion, might in some cases be most accurately understood as “We should leave soon (as to not be late for the train)”. What is apparent is that the original utterance does not serve as a statement about the departure of the train, but a request to leave at once or an appeal for urgent departure. To infer the meaning one should be aware of the context of the utterance, otherwise it would not be possible to interpret the utterance as a request. There are many instances of such speech acts in everyday communication, and it seems that they occur very often. They possess a degree of covertness, which is why they require additional theoretical assumptions to account for their interpretation in a speech act theory.

Of course, there is no consensus on whether or not investigating speech acts must include these nonliteral instances. Searle (2011, pp. 20-21) has a view that a proper investigation into the issue of speech acts need not include any reference to nonliteral meaning, since literal meaning on its own is enough to meet the standard for an adequate speech act theory. However, since many illocutionary acts are performed indirectly, using nonliteral speech, it is helpful to provide an overview of the possible explanations of their use and what they are intended to convey. To do that, Grice's theory of implicature and meaning is often invoked, since they account for nonliteral meaning and offer a use-oriented approach to language. The aforementioned train example is a straightforward instance of what Grice would call implicature.

In the following chapters, I will take a look at how Grice's theory of meaning and theory of implicature might facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of speech acts. Also, the impact his theories have had on the study of speech acts as primarily intention-driven will be set against the view that convention is the focal point of speech acts. Furthermore, some remarks about a comparison between different approaches in determining the conditions of successful use of speech acts will be made, particularly those related to conventional and intentional aspects of illocution.

4. Felicity conditions

Austin's conception of felicity and felicity conditions

One of the central elements of Austin's speech act theory is the distinction between felicity (happiness) and infelicity (unhappiness). As discussed previously, illocutionary acts serve as 'doings' or 'actions' and they do so beyond the scope of the physical act of moving one's speech apparatus. The notion of felicity amounts to how successfully these actions are carried out. Speech acts that are successful in this regard are called felicitous, and those that are not are called infelicitous (Austin 2018, p. 16). Infelicities are "things that can be and go wrong" (Austin 2018, p. 14) in illocutionary acts. Much of *How to Do Things With Words* is dedicated to naming, determining, classifying, describing and providing examples of infelicities. To understand how a certain speech situation is able to be effective, one also needs to delineate unsatisfactory cases. The investigation into 'what can go wrong' in speech acts lead Austin to investigate under which conditions felicity is made possible. In order for felicity to obtain in illocutionary acts, certain linguistic and extra-linguistic conditions need to be met, and Austin called them 'felicity conditions' (Austin 2018).

Felicity conditions are defined by Austin as conditions that "have to be satisfied if the utterance is to be happy" (Austin 2018, p. 45). He believed that, without satisfying these conditions, a speech act cannot be redeemed. The fulfillment of these conditions should serve as a criterium for determining whether or not a specific speech act (illocutionary act) constitutes a fruitful contribution to the speech situation.

For Austin, illocutionary acts are grounded in convention, and to carry them out successfully, making them 'felicitous', they need to abide by felicity conditions (Austin 2018, p. 14). Austin viewed felicity conditions as realization of specific social conventions (Harris, Fogal and Moss 2018, p. 2). The notion of convention in the scope of a speech theory seems to imply that these conditions are 'outside' of the speaker. In Chapter 6 (Convention and intention in relation to conditions of successful performance of speech acts) I will provide a closer examination of the 'external' nature of such conditions, as opposed to 'internal' ones, drawing on the account of the distinction between externalism and internalism of speech acts provided by Harnish (2009).

Generally speaking, context seems to be of an insurmountable importance when dealing with speech acts. Context of the utterance is determined by the circumstances in which the speech act occurs. Therefore, circumstances play a central role in whether or not a speech act will be felicitous. Circumstances of the act are not contained in the utterance itself, and constitute extra-linguistic factors. Illocutionary acts are, at least from the perspective of pragmatics, acts that depend upon the circumstances of the speech situation. Austin (2018, p. 52) concludes that, in order to come forward with a competent speech act theory, one needs to consider “the total situation” and “the total speech act”. Furthermore, when referring to felicity conditions, Austin treats them as if they were unspoken, implicit rules that are dependent upon conventions. In turn, circumstances that create the context of illocutionary acts should align with these conventions.

He proceeds to address the importance of suitability of circumstances in bringing about success in illocution: “Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the *circumstances* in which the words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, *appropriate*, and it is very commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons should *also* perform certain *other* actions, whether ‘physical’ or ‘mental’ actions or even acts of uttering further words.” (Austin 2018, p. 8).

Therefore, in order to deem an illocutionary act as felicitous, one needs to take into account not only what is said (the words uttered by the speaker), but also the behaviour of others and the circumstances in which they occur. In short, elements of the communicative situation as a whole need to be taken into account to determine if an act is felicitous, and if not, what the reasons are for it being infelicitous.

Similar to the view that Austin held on felicity conditions, Searle states that his method is to determine “what conditions are necessary and sufficient for the act of promising to have been successfully and non-defectively performed in the utterance of a given sentence” (Searle 1969, p. 54). Searle’s theory also states that what he calls a ‘defective illocutionary act’ is quite similar to Austin’s ‘infelicitous illocutionary act’ (Searle 1969, p. 54). It is thus evident that, though Searle’s and Austin’s theories were quite different in many respects (some of which will be dealt with in the following chapters), Austin’s notion of felicity conditions provided an incentive for the development of further types of conditions in other speech act theories.

Before moving forward with Austin’s classification of infelicities, we will take a look at the distinction between truth conditions and felicity conditions.

Truth conditions and felicity conditions

The classical account of logic views propositions as necessarily either true or false, and ‘tertium non datur’ principle excludes other options. The property of a proposition of being true or false is called its truth value. Truth value is determined by truth conditions, i.e. “condition(s) the world must meet if the statement is to be true” (Blackburn 2016). If we consider the following proposition: ‘There are exactly 25 billion stars in the Milky Way’ then, we could say that its truth condition could be that there are, in fact, that many stars in the Milky Way. How can we determine the truth value of that proposition (i.e. whether or not it is true)? In fact, there is currently no way of knowing if it is true, since we have no means of ascertaining the exact number of stars in the Milky Way. Considering this, what do we make of its truth value? A way to approach this problem while having a classical account of logic in mind is to acknowledge that, even though we do not know its truth value, the proposition *must* have one, i.e. must be either true or false. This is the case because *all* propositions must conform to this criterium. In other words, independently of whether or not anyone knows if the proposition is true or not, it is the case that one of those two options obtain.

Felicity conditions of speech acts can be brought into comparison with truth conditions, one of the essential notions of semantics in the classical account of logic. In the previous chapter, Searle’s formula for illocutionary acts $F(p)$ was discussed, in which ‘F’ stands for illocutionary force and ‘p’ for proposition (propositional content) of said act (2018, p. 32). Since propositions necessarily have to be either true or false, case has to be made that the proposition the act expresses has a truth value. However, Austin believed that the entirety of the speech act does not have a truth value, which means that either the whole utterance lacks it (by virtue of containing ‘explicit performatives’) or that the illocutionary force is hidden in the utterance. If the latter case is at play, the act itself still amounts to be more than a proposition (due to the fact that it has an illocutionary force), so it does not have a truth value (Austin 2018, pp. 139-147).

However, to view illocutionary acts as, by definition, lacking truth value is not at all universally accepted among speech act theorists. Tsohatzidis (2018, p. 96) states many of them (such as John Searle and Kent Bach) have adopted what he calls the “anti-Austinian view” that states that performative utterances are those that, in fact, have truth conditions that can be satisfied and that have a truth value. Their truth value is rendered by them being issued or produced in an appropriate way, since producing them makes what they express true (Tsohatzidis 2018, p. 103). So, the truth condition of a speech act is the fact that it was produced.

Austin stated that the view that performative utterances have no truth value is apparent and requires no arguments to support it (Austin 2018, p. 6). His evaluation of illocutionary acts, as well as his entire approach to language, rely on the fact that illocutionary force is a deterrent to determining their truth value. Of course, he did delve into the issue of how the concepts of truth and falsity can be applied to certain elements of speech acts, albeit not to the illocutionary force.

In this way, investigation of speech acts in general or their specific instances can facilitate the discussion about the nature of the relationship between speech acts and the concept of truth. A question arises; If a speech act relies on certain thoughts on part of one (or more than one) of its participants, do these thoughts need to be grounded in reality and accurately represent the ‘world’ (Austin 1962, pp. 41-42)? Austin explores various instances of speech acts that exhibit some kind of discrepancy in this regard. One of the speech act types that Austin viewed as crucial in the discussion of the relationship between truth and illocution are verdictives. Verdictives (verbs that are associated with giving one’s verdict) form illocutionary acts such as ‘I convict you of fraud’, said by the judge to a defendant. Of course, by producing such an act, along with the satisfaction of certain conditions (such as obliging to the legal procedures of that area) *means* that the person is convicted of fraud. However, the fairness, soundness or appropriateness of that conviction (and verdictive speech acts in general) can be brought into question (Austin 2018, p. 152). Considering this, Austin believed that they can be said to bear some relation to truth or falsity (Austin 2018, p. 152).

Furthermore, he states that “the requirement of conforming or bearing some relation to the facts” (Austin 1962, p. 91) applies to performative utterances, as well as the requirement of ‘happiness’ (felicity). So, in a way, performative utterances need to, in Austin’s opinion, be grounded in truth

if they are to be successful. This requirement, as discussed previously, does not suppose that the notion of truth or 'relation to the facts' applies to the whole performative utterance.


Although Searle does not agree with Austin when it comes to the issue of whether or not illocutionary acts have truth values, he criticizes the tendency of 'traditional' approaches to language to turn a blind eye to illocution: "The older philosophers were not wrong when they said: to know the meaning of a proposition is to know under what conditions it is true or false. But their account was incomplete, for they did not discuss the different illocutionary acts in which the proposition could occur." (Searle 1969, p. 125). In this way Searle, not unlike Austin, argues that the analysis of speech acts should contain more than what the traditional focus of truth conditional semantics could offer.

To conclude, there is no consensus on whether or not illocutionary acts taken as a whole have truth values and, by extension, truth conditions. While Austin takes a negative answer to that question as a certainty, many other speech act theorists disagree, stating that the speech act's truth condition is its own issuance in specific conditions. In the following section, Austin's theory of felicity conditions will be discussed, along with some other proposed answers to the problem of conditions needed for a speech act to be successfully performed, such as those proposed by Searle.

Austin's taxonomy of felicity conditions and infelicities

To identify felicity conditions, Austin introduces a classification of infelicities. It is based on the manner in which the infelicity presents and the way in which it affects the speech act.

The following diagram represents Austin's taxonomy of infelicities (Austin 2018, p. 18):



Austin observed that infelicities can apply to ‘conventional acts’ that are not performed with language as well, such as betting (Austin 2018, p. 19). We could also suppose that examples such as handshaking (in function of politely greeting another person) or waving (for the purpose of bidding someone farewell) could also count as conventional acts that infelicities could apply to. In any case, it is clear that, by raising the issue of nonverbal communication in relation to infelicities, some felicity conditions could apply to acts that do not involve language. Furthermore, Austin is

of the opinion that nonverbal ‘ceremonial’ (conventional) acts occur more frequently than one usually supposes, which is why it is important to him to include them in his speech act theory (Austin 2018, 25). With that being said, Austin does not discuss the nonverbal acts with much detail, but determines that it is necessary that they have some sort of convention behind their use. The issue of nonverbal speech acts is discussed by Searle as well, who believes that a smaller number of less complicated illocutionary acts, such as those facilitated by nodding, can be performed without the use of language. However, most speech acts do indeed require language to be realized, which in turn brings about certain conventions associated with language and certain rules (Searle 1969, p. 38).

Austin states that violating or failing to satisfy felicity conditions is a result of speech characterized by infelicities. He identifies two major groups of infelicities: misfires and abuses. They differ in whether the act was such that, technically speaking, it was not performed at all or it was carried out without satisfying some important conditions or (Austin 2018, p. 16). The former group relates to misfires, and the latter to abuses. Misfires, Austin states, are such failures to satisfy felicity conditions that the act is rendered null and void (2018, p. 136). In other words, the type of illocution the act purported to was not achieved at all. For instance, not being qualified to christen a child (and nevertheless going through the procedure) is an example of misfire (Austin 2018, p. 23). Misfires count as attempts to perform an illocutionary act, but without success (Austin 2018, p. 16).

On the other hand, abuses occur when an act is performed, but without the person(s) doing so possessing the adequate ‘state of mind’. For this reason this type of infelicities is called insincerities, and it is marked by the lack of appropriate “thoughts and feelings” (Austin 2018, p. 15) needed for the happy performance of the illocutionary act. When one, for example, says ‘I congratulate you’ without feeling content for the person one congratulates (Austin 2018, p. 40), there is a clear case of insincerities. Clearly, the act is, in this case, produced and should not be thought of as void (empty) like in the cases of misfire, but its failure of being sincere is detrimental to it being successfully carried out (Austin 2018, p. 40). The reason behind this failure is that there is a deeply rooted intuition that to truly congratulate someone one must do so sincerely.

As previously discussed, Austin devised the taxonomy of felicity conditions from the taxonomy of infelicities. Each infelicity (being represented by a branch in his diagram) is such that it goes

against a felicity condition. Considering this, felicity conditions are rules Austin believed govern illocutionary acts. There are six types of infelicities, with two being represented by a question mark (Austin 2018, p. 18), presumably due to difficulties in naming them. Misfires are divided into misinvocations and misexecutions (Austin 2018, p. 18). Misinvocations are a violation of two rules for an act to be felicitous: A.1- (“There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, the procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances” (Austin 2018, p. 26)) and A.2- misapplications (“The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked”) (Austin 2018, p. 34).

It is evident that both A.1 and A.2 deal with the requirement of satisfying external states, i.e. states that are not mental. Furthermore, the frequent usage of the word ‘conventional’ indicates the status of these conditions. They are such that their satisfaction is a matter of observing certain conventions. These conventions are dependent upon not only the act of uttering specific words that render the words a part of an established procedure (as is the case in A.1), but also by ‘context’, i.e. circumstances of the act and persons involved in it (discussed in A.2) (Austin 2018, p. 26). Because of the fact that Austin does not provide a definition of convention itself, it can be supposed that, when A.1 and A.2 are concerned, social and institutional conventions (customs or social practices) are at play.

To violate rule A.1, one produces inadequate “verbal or nonverbal procedure” (Austin 2018, p. 27). In other words, the utterance produced by the person was not accepted because it is deemed by other relevant individuals as an inadequate procedure. That means that the procedure performed by the utterer was not conventionally accepted.

For instance, not adhering to the rule A.1 could be saying ‘Welcome to my house!’ to a person leaving your house. This is clearly inappropriate, since the verb ‘welcome’, called a behabitive by Austin (2018, p. 159), is normally used to greet someone, thus being applicable for usage upon one enters your property.

Violating rule A.2, producing misapplication, can be exemplified by the case in which in ancient Greece, an aspiring physician performs the act of taking the Hippocratic Oath. Taking the oath in ancient Greece resulted in an obligation, one that had not only moral, but also legal ramifications. In Austin’s terms, such an act could be classified as a ‘commissive’ performative, such as ‘swear’.

But if the student of medicine takes an oath at home, producing the correct utterances with the lack of satisfaction of other conditions (being in presence of medical authorities with other students at a prearranged time and place, etc.), then the act itself would be characterized as violation of the rule A.2.

The following subtype of misfires Austin considered was classified as misexecutions. He states that to violate these two rules would render the act “vitiating” (Austin 2018, p. 18). Misexecutions are a result of non-observance of two rules: B1-flaws (“The procedure must be executed by all participants correctly” (Austin 2018, p. 35)) and B.2-hitches (“The procedure must be executed by all participants completely” (Austin 2018, p. 36)).

The case of the priest from Arizona (Salcedo 2022) from the Introduction of this thesis is an example of non-observance of B1 rule. The priest performed an act that was deemed invalid due to the error in word choice, because the set of words used for the baptism in question was not entirely appropriate in the sense that it was different from the norm.

Non-observance of the rule B.2 would be, for instance, attempting to sue someone, but not completing the whole procedure. For instance, one can go to the competent authority (such as the court authorised to execute the process of suing) and file the papers to sue, thus commencing the procedure necessary for such a lawsuit. If, however, the defendant has not been served with the papers informing them of the lawsuit, the act is not performed fully. Of course, this would only count as an incomplete procedure in those countries where this particular procedure is necessary in order to initiate legal proceeding against another person.

After discussing misfires, Austin focused on abuses (*I*). He identified two subtypes: *I*. 1 (insincerities) and *I*. 2 (an unnamed subtype). Their violation leads to two felicity conditions: “*I*.1- where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts, feelings, or intentions, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those feelings, or intentions, and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves” (Austin 2018, p. 39) and “*I*.2- and the participants must so conduct themselves subsequently” (Austin 2018, p. 39).

To exemplify rule $I.1$, one might consider an example of a physician saying “I recommend that you take this medicine” to a patient. If the physician actually does not believe that the patient would benefit from that medicine (and is recommending it, for instance, because they are paid by the company producing the medicine), then the doctor has actually performed the act of recommending, but with a serious breach of the norm of sincerity.

Considering $I.2$, the utterer must, for instance, intend to keep a promise after the illocutionary act was uttered. In other words, they should not only make a promise, but also have the intention of keeping said promise (Austin 2018, p. 11). A promise that is made in accordance with appropriate procedure, but is not intended by the utterer to be kept, is thus an infelicitous promise.

Abuses are, therefore, distinct from misfires because of their dependance not on the external states or circumstances, but on mental states of the participants. When we reviewed how Austin approached misfires, it was found that he focused on acts that were highly conventional or even institutionally determined. It is quite unsurprising that he chose to do so, since it seems that acts such as marrying and baptism are very dependent on circumstances. In other words, to perform these acts, one should ensure that the context in which they occur is appropriate for them to be carried out. For instance, Austin (2018, p. 27) gives an example of a breach in A.1 rule, an infelicitous act in which a wife says to the husband ‘I divorce you’, where procedure of divorce is such that it is not enough to produce that utterance, while there are some other states of affairs that need to obtain in order for the wife to proceed with the divorce. Other types of misfire discussed by Austin also exhibit these kinds of conventional conditions.

Abuses, on the other hand, are infringements of felicity conditions that deal with “feelings, thoughts and intentions” (Austin 2018, p. 40). As one could probably assume, these conditions are not directly associated with the performance of speech acts that are institutionalized in character. While it might be deemed necessary that the speech act of opening the museum is performed by a relevant person (such as curator or the director), it does not seem relevant what the persons involved think, feel or intend, since it will not affect how felicitous the act itself is.

Austin’s I conditions thus apply only to those illocutionary acts in which there is a requirement of having particular feelings, thoughts and intentions. As such, examples that he offers (such as illocutionary acts of advising, acquitting, congratulating) (Austin 2018, p. 40) appertain to illocutionary acts of common, everyday communication and thus are different from those he

offered to present misfires. However, his approach to misfires and abuses states that misfires render the act not performed at all, and abuses ‘only’ make the act defective. Since misfires are entirely based upon non-observance of conventional conditions, and abuses deal with mental states of the participants, it can be said that Austin placed more importance on conventional infelicities than the latter kind. In fact, as Harnish (2009, p. 13) asserts, Austin seems to be more focused on speech acts that are a part of institutional or custom-based practices (such as marrying, baptizing a child, christening a ship and giving one’s verdict in court) than speech acts that occur in everyday communication. Furthermore, the examples he provides are predominantly based on the former group of acts. This aspect of his theory is in line with his conventionalist inclinations, but many speech act theorists disagree that such importance should be placed on convention.

In the following chapter, we will examine how the notion of intention can be understood as the fundamental aspect of illocution. For these purposes, theories of Paul Grice, key figure for the development of the intentionalist approach to illocution will be presented, particularly his theory of meaning and theory of implicature.

5. Grice's program (theory of meaning and theory of implicature) and its impact on speech act theory

Grice and illocution: preliminary remarks

Herbert Paul Grice was a philosopher of a broad set of interests in analytical philosophy, ranging from metaphysics, philosophy of language, epistemology to history of ancient and modern philosophy. While his contribution to many philosophical disciplines cannot be overlooked, he is best known for his work in the field of philosophy of language. Most significantly, his pragmatic and semantic theories caused a great number of subsequent philosophers to venture into disputing or validating his approach to language phenomena. In this way, just like Austin, Grice produced a lasting effect on philosophy of language.

Two of the most distinguishable Grice's theories are theory of meaning and theory of implicature. I will present both of them and examine the impact they have had on investigating illocutionary acts and conditions that determine their successful performance in the following parts of this chapter. It is, nevertheless, important to note that Grice did not participate in the same type of inquiry as Austin (Sadock 2006, p. 58), since he did not directly deal with illocution as such. To fully grasp the assumptions under which his theories operate, it is beneficial to inspect Grice's approach to language in general.

Assumptions of Grice's theory of meaning are quite different from what would be expected from traditional theory of meaning. Instead of determining the meaning of a sentence by reducing it into the meaning of its constitutive parts (i.e. words or phrases), Grice employed an approach that enabled him to account for a greater flexibility in the meaning of a sentence. His main idea was that meaning is best understood "in terms of the psychological states of individual human beings" (Lycan 2019, p. 91). Meaning is, therefore, positioned in the mental states and thoughts of the

individual, and as such can be elucidated exclusively by making reference to them. Grice approached meaning of sentence with identifying it “with a complex of intentions with which it is uttered” (Blackburn 2016). As can be predicted, such a theory does not view meaning as a fixed and unchanging phenomenon.

Following his theory of meaning, Grice developed theory of implicature and was the first person to use the term. Before discussing specific features of implicature, it will suffice to say that, just like his theory of meaning, theory of implicature operates under the assumption that speakers often achieve successful communication independently of the literalness of what they say.

As a matter of fact, Grice objected to the tendency of some philosophers to study the meaning of utterances exclusively by analyzing standard meaning, i.e. meaning of signs or words in the utterance (Grice 1957, p. 216). This is the case because he held a belief that, in order to account for meaning in a constructive way, one should explore and make judgements about “what a particular speaker or writer means by a sign on a particular occasion” (Grice 1957, p. 216), which he thought was often quite different from the standard view of meaning and irreducible to it.

Grice’s theories and the entirety of his novel approach to language led to a development of a new view of speech acts and illocution. Namely, intention, which is the cornerstone of much of his insight into language, has a broad application on speech act theories. It also affects how conditions of successful performance of illocutionary acts are to be determined.

Grice’s theory of meaning

To introduce his theory of meaning, Grice begins by focusing on the word ‘mean’ itself, identifying two broad senses in which that word could be used: natural and non-natural sense (Grice 1957, p. 214). Natural sense (natural meaning) is “factive”, as the sentence in which it is expressed commits the speaker to believe that something is the case (Grice 1976, p. 290). For instance, a person who says “Those black clouds mean rain” is obliged to accept and believe that it is going to rain (Grice 1976, p. 291). To deny that it is going to rain would not be appropriate if the utterer simultaneously accepts that the aforementioned utterance holds. Non-natural sense (meaning) is “nonfactive”, since it does not produce commitment in the speaker to accept or believe certain states of affairs

that the sentence refers to (Grice 1957, p. 217). When one says “His gesture meant that he was fed up” (Grice 1976, p. 291), then the non-natural sense of ‘mean’ is used, since the speaker is not obliged to ‘him’, in fact, being fed up (Grice 1976, p. 291).

Non-natural meaning is one that Grice directs his attention to, because it is much more in line with the assumptions usually made about language than natural meaning (Grice 1976, p. 291). Since non-natural meaning can comprise different subcategories, Grice’s theory of non-natural meaning generalizes upon ‘utterer’s meaning’, which is fairly more complex. In short, characteristics of non-natural meaning seem to apply to utterer’s meaning, but the utterer’s meaning has more variables that determine it. Another characteristic of non-natural meaning is that it does not need to be realized through means of language, such as instances of non-verbal communication in traffic show (Grice 1957, p. 220). For purposes of providing an account of non-natural meaning, intentionalists commonly use the following formulation: “ ‘A meant_{NN} something by x’ is (roughly) equivalent to ‘A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention’ ” (Grice 1957, p. 220). This is the formulation that Strawson (1964, p. 446) uses in his account of intentionalism in relation to speech acts, albeit he substitutes ‘effect’ with ‘response’, which certainly does not seem implausible. ‘A’ (the utterer) is thus said to have produced a meaningful utterance if he had the intention for it to have a certain effect on the hearer(s) that is obtained by the fact that the hearer(s) recognize that intention. The information about the intention of the utterer, then, must be ‘transferred’ to the hearer, since the hearer must adjust their response or effect in accordance to the correct representation of utterer’s intention.

In examining Grice’s theory of non-natural (_{NN} meaning), one does not find any direct reference to illocutionary acts or illocution in general. As Harris, Fogal and Moss (2018, p. 5) state, Grice did not use Austin’s terminology, i.e. vocabulary that deals with speech acts, but his work was subsequently adapted to develop speech act theories of intentionalist character, such as Strawson (1964) and Bach and Harnish (1979).

They brought intentionalism into the context of speech acts because they stated that, in some way or another, intention is pivotal in understanding speech acts. Grice states that he uses the word ‘intention’ with flexibility in mind, not only for those instances of speech that the utterer has

planned or, otherwise, directly stated their intention (Grice 1957, p. 222). For intention to be a well-grounded and crucial element of meaning, it does not need to be overt (Grice 1957, p. 222). Instead, intention is, in a way, intertwined into how we approach communication and how it obtains. In cases where it is unclear which intention the utterer had while producing an utterance, one should rely on context by comparing different possibilities in terms of their relevance (in that particular situation or circumstance) and come to the conclusion on what the utterer intended in this way (Grice 1957, p. 222). Apart from the obvious intentionalist foundations of Grice's theory, he also states that, unless there are good grounds on supposing that the utterer intended something peculiar in his usage, we are to believe that the utterer is communicating in terms of what is standardly meant or intended (Grice 1957, p. 222). This assertion seems quite conventional in nature, since Grice supposes that there exist "normal consequences of our actions" (Grice 1957, p. 222).

However, if we take intention as the central determinant of communication, then one might end up with the Humpty Dumpty problem (Harris, Fogal and Moss 2018, p. 6). By taking intentionalism at face value, any utterance would mean anything that the speaker intended, which produces an unwanted consequence of there being no barriers on which expressions we can use in communicating what we intend to convey.

In order to handle this problem, let us revert to the aforementioned Grice's assertion about preference for standard interpretation of meaning in cases where there is no reason to suppose that the utterer is attempting to produce a non-standard speech situation. By invoking this norm or convention, it is, then, easy to suppose that Grice believed that it would be *reasonable* to follow it. The following section on implicature, particularly the Cooperative Principle, will show why that might be the case.

Furthermore, intentionalists generally claim that the performance of illocutionary acts is necessarily determined by the speaker having a communicative intention (Harris, Fogal and Moss 2018, p. 4). If that is the case, what are the conditions of the satisfactory performance of a speech act and how are they different from Austin's felicity conditions? To answer the first part of that question, intentionalism proposes a tripartite account of conditions of the satisfactory performance: 1) performance of the act itself is carried out when what is said is done so with a communicative intention (no response is needed from the hearer in this stage), 2) communicating the act is done

in virtue of the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intention to produce a certain 'effect' or 'response' on part of the hearer and 3) hearer's production of the response intended by the speaker (Harris, Fogal and Moss 2018, p. 4). There has been much debate on whether or not Gricean intentionalist interpretations in fact deal with perlocution or illocution (Searle 1969, Fogal, Harris and Moss 2018, Burkhardt 1990). Clearly, if we examine the third condition, it seems perlocutionary, since an effect or response is expected by the hearer. However, the first two conditions, albeit not using Austin's terminology, do not show signs of being about perlocutionary acts. One should at least suppose not, because they do not suppose that the hearer responds in any way. It seems that this account does not treat locution, illocution and perlocution in the same way that Austin envisioned and proposed in his theory. By determining that intention is the central characteristic of communication, intentionalism seems to be radically different from Austin's conventionalist view.

Grice's notion of conversational maxims and implicature

Grice's theory of conversational implicature, which draws on cooperation as the primary principle of success in communication, is a common way to deal with indirect speech acts (Harris 2016, p. 181). Grice expressed the Cooperative Principle in the following way: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice 1975, p. 26). He believed that speakers should observe this general principle and that they, in fact, usually behave in accordance with it (Grice 1975, pp. 28-29). Cooperation is crucial for understanding Grice's view of language and communication in general. It establishes them as processes in which participants share a common goal and work together to achieve it. That common goal is achieving success in a shared communicative situation, which is determined by a certain purpose that that particular communicative situation requires (Grice 1975, p. 26). Of course, it is not always easy to determine which purpose is at hand, since conversations will differ considerably and the same conversation can change in this respect (Grice 1975, p. 26). However, Grice believes that there is a general principle that governs communication, while also taking this variability to heart. Furthermore, he

states that the principle comprises categories that specify which particular rules speakers should obey to observe it.

Thus, the Cooperative Principle generates four categories of maxims and supermaxims that act as rules that govern successful communication: quantity, quality, relation and manner (Grice 1975, p. 28). When the participants in the communicative exchange fail to observe one or more of these maxims (intentionally or unintentionally), there are two possible outcomes: 1) they are not cooperative, i.e. they violate the Cooperative Principle and 2) their non-observance of the maxims is done with a purpose of creating an implicature (the Cooperative Principle itself is in that case unscathed) (Grice 1975, pp. 30-39).

In other words, Grice differentiates between cases in which the Cooperative Principle is violated (for instance, due to the fact that the speaker is lying and thus attempting to deceive their interlocutor) and cases in which the speaker is only seemingly making an inappropriate speech move. In the latter type of cases, the speaker is not observing one of the maxims, but he is not violating the Cooperative Principle because he has a purpose or intent to produce an implicature. And since implicatures are not considered a hindrance to the speech situation, they can be a part of “purposive, indeed rational, behaviour” (Grice 1975, p. 28).

Conversational implicatures obtain when a speaker is saying *p*, but implicating that *q*. To be able to say that a speaker is thus ‘conversationally’ implicating that *q*, he needs to observe the Cooperative Principle and accurately ascertain the ability of the hearer(s) to understand his particular intention by making the implicature (Grice 1975, p. 30). Intentions of the speaker can be various, but in the case of this type of implicature he is producing an utterance that is to be understood non-literally (Grice 1975, p. 31). The hearer should be able to infer that the utterance is not literal and “search for an alternative, indirect interpretation” (Harris 2016, p. 182).

The following example is one of conventional implicature. A is a person attempting to buy a pack of cigarettes in a tobacco shop and B is the cashier.

A: ‘I would like a pack of Camels.’

B: responds by telling A how much he needs to pay and handing him the cigarette pack.

In literal terms, A produced a statement, however it is not difficult to infer that, in the context of the speech situation A and B are in, he actually intended for B to understand that he was asking B to sell him the cigarettes. If he were speaking literally, A would presumably be violating the Conversational Principle and B infers that he should understand A's utterance non-literally.

This example can be viewed as indirect speech act. Indirect speech acts, as discussed previously, seem particularly difficult to explicate. Since they do not rely on what Austin called 'performative verbs', one needs to take more steps to explain their intended interpretation. That is the reason some philosophers, particularly intentionalists, claim that using Grice's theory of implicature can be extremely beneficial.

When we examine conversational maxims more carefully, they resemble conditions of successful performance of (at least some) illocutionary acts. In fact, Oppy calls them 'norms of assertion', but states that, apart from assertion, they apply to questions and orders (2007, p. 226). As discussed before, Grice did not use Austin's terminology on speech acts, which is why it is difficult, if not impossible, to state with certainty which (if any) language phenomena of illocutionary or perlocutionary character should be affected by these norms. But, it seems unproblematic to say that the general norms behind conversational maxims may carry some weight when it comes to certain illocutionary acts. This is clear when we take into consideration that many speech act theories suppose certain conditions of successful performance of illocutionary acts that seem to be particularized conversational maxims. For example, Searle states that an assertion must not contain obvious utterances (1969, p. 149). This is, of course, in line with Grice's maxim in the category of Relation- "Be relevant" (Grice 1975, p. 27), since to produce utterances that are obvious would mean not adhering to the rule of avoiding irrelevant utterances.

Grice's program was used to develop speech act theories also by means of implementing his idea that "complex propositional attitudes" are necessary to explain intention connected with meaning (Harnish 2009, p. 15). Since propositional attitudes are mental states, Grice believed that, by constructing meaning through mental states, he would be able to provide an explanation of how the process of producing and understanding language works. The assumptions of this process is often used in intentionalist theories for illocutionary acts. Due to the fact that illocutionary acts are carried out by expression and recognition of propositional attitudes, process of inference and information about the speech situation is needed to enable the understanding of propositional

attitudes (Harnish 2009, p. 15). Without them, one would not be able to ‘decipher’ the intention of the speaker or discern what he meant by his utterance.

Because of the fact that Austin believes that illocutionary acts are predominantly conventional (and, at the same time, had a very broad view of what falls under the category of illocution), that leads him to have a conventionalist outlook on language and communication as a whole. Grice, on the other hand, does not concede with that view. He states that ordinary communication is characterized, in large, by intention or, more specifically, speaker’s intention (Grice 1957, pp. 222-223). Namely, for Grice “ordinary communication takes place not directly by means of convention, but in virtue of a speaker’s evincing certain intentions”, as well as audience’s recognition of that particular intention (Sadock 2006, p. 58). Bearing this in mind, Austin and Grice had a very different view of what constitutes linguistic communication in its usual usage. When one applies these opposing views on illocutionary acts, naturally, conditions that underlie their success will be at odds. The following chapter will provide an examination of conventional and intentional elements in conditions of successful performance of speech acts. Based on Harnish (2009) and his classification of speech act theories, I will inspect differences and similarities between those theories.

6. Convention and intention in relation to conditions of successful performance of speech acts

The distinction between Austinian and Gricean views on conditions of successful performance of speech acts

The disagreement between conventionalist and intentionalist speech act theories is traditionally viewed as a clash between Austinian and Gricean tendencies (Harnish 2009, p. 13). I have presented both Austin's and Grice's perspectives on speech acts and linguistic communication in general. While discussing speech acts, I have focused mostly on illocutionary acts, because they are the focus of most speech act theories and the notion of illocutionary acts is often used synonymously with that of speech acts. Austin and Grice have instigated the development of conventionalism and intentionalism, arguably the most influential types of characterizations of speech acts, and many (if not most) subsequent accounts of illocution have endorsed them and built upon them. To that end, Harnish (2009, p. 13) uses descriptors "Austinian and Gricean" for those theories that have inclinations to employ Austin's or Grice's viewpoints. These viewpoints, naturally, in general relate to their most prominent features, and those are Austin's conventionalism and Grice's intentionalism.

As discussed previously, Austin's felicity conditions are mostly grounded in (social) conventions and depend largely upon conditions that relate to the world, i.e. conditions that are outside the speaker. On the other hand, intentionalists usually claim that conditions that are essential for most illocutionary acts to obtain are positioned in the mental states of the participants in the act. In general, these mental states are contained in propositional attitudes that need to pass the process of inference to be understood and the intention of the speaker to be recognized (Harnish 2009, p. 15). One of the main points of disagreements between conventionalists and intentionalists is also the difference in opinion on the suitability of Grice's theory of meaning for investigating illocutionary acts (Petrus 2010, p. 221).

Usage of notions of convention and intention can, as previously discussed, become a source of scepticism and hesitancy to accept how they are used in a particular theory. This marks another difference in viewpoints between the two views of illocution. Bearing this in mind, Strawson (1964, p. 442) challenges Austin's view of convention, asserting that it is, in fact, the case that all human communication (which includes illocution) is marked by convention, but that convention is of a linguistic (not social or institutional) kind. In other words, Strawson disagrees with Austin's conceptualization of convention, which is exacerbated by the fact that Austin does not provide a detailed definition of it nor explains to which phenomena it applies to. Considering this, Strawson implies a broad critique of Austin's conventionalism on grounds of convention being too inclusively applied.

Intentionalists usually claim that conventional acts are performed with "complex overt intention" (Strawson 1964, p. 458), as well as bringing more attention to acts that seem to be more obvious examples of intention. Considering this, conventionalist outlook would take the concept of intention to be too broadly understood.

[Similarities between speech act theories of conventionalist and intentionalist character and the outlines of mixed theories](#)

Even though there are many differences between conventionalist and intentionalist theories, they also agree on certain aspects of illocution. The discussion between conventionalists and intentionalists is not as straightforward as it might seem at first glance. As we have seen, there are many instances of illocutionary acts, from assertions, promises and apologies to institutionalized acts such as marrying or baptism. Austin's conception of some felicity conditions that need to obtain in order to avoid infelicities are based on mental states of the participants of the illocutionary act. In fact, he discusses intention in length when presenting them (Austin 2018, p. 38-41). Although in his theory intention is not the central element, he acknowledges that, for certain acts, intention plays a large role. His view does not make him depart from conventionalism per se, because a large number of speech act theorists of conventionalist and intentionalist background agree that it cannot be denied that there are acts in which both convention and intention are

important. More specifically, conventionalists generally admit that there are some illocutionary acts in which conditions related to intention of the speaker are crucial for the successful performance of those acts and, analogously, intentionalists view some acts as largely conventional in nature. If we consider some commonly used, ‘non-ceremonial’ acts such as apologizing, it is intuitively understood that, for instance, sincerity is highly valued.

Austin does refer to the intention of the speaker and his other mental states as determinants of whether or not the act of apologizing is to be taken as ‘happy’, i.e. felicitous (Austin 2018, 46). Furthermore, his description of performative verbs of commissives is based on, in part, them being declarations of intention (Austin 2018, p. 162). Most notably, some elements in the previously discussed taxonomy of felicity conditions seem to reflect intention. In particular, felicity conditions related to abuses (symbolized by Γ in his diagram) are brought on partly by the lack of certain intentions (Austin 2018, p. 39). Furthermore, Austin’s introduction of “securing of uptake” in illocution (Austin 2018, p. 120), i.e. determining that the utterance is not felicitous if the hearer does not hear it or understand it in the correct way, seems to exhibit some likeness to Grice’s theory of meaning.

In a similar vein, intentionalists such as Strawson (1964, p. 457) do not deny that there are conventional acts, i.e. acts that are predominantly determined by conditions of successful performance that are essentially grounded in convention. Strawson (1964, p. 457) gives examples of acts of marrying, playing games (such as bridge) and legal acts like giving a verdict as acts that would not be able to exist if it were not for rules or conventions that underlie them. Also, some intentionalists claim that they do not undervalue the significance of conditions that related to the ‘world’, because propositional attitudes need to be fulfilled, in part, by being aligned with what is true (from the perspective of the speaker), which is especially pertinent to the case of mental state of belief (Harnish 2009, p. 20). If one, for instance, performs an illocutionary act by virtue of having a false belief, his false belief will render the act unsatisfied.

Now that we have seen how convention and intention present in these theories, a question arises: Can they somehow be integrated in order to form a theory that would contain valuable insight into both conventional and intentional aspects of illocution? An integrated account of illocution could provide a more comprehensive view because it can include and more adequately represent various

speech act types. A view of illocution that would combine both of these elements would be able to deal with nuances that present with different types of acts, without inadvertently excluding some of them. Since illocution can appear in many forms and have different functions, notions of intention and convention seem to be in many ways connected. When one embraces either conventionalism or intentionalism, it can have an unwanted consequence of some types of acts being viewed as the paradigmatic cases of illocution. By doing so, others are somewhat excluded, since they do not satisfy some conditions. For instance, by placing more emphasis on ‘ceremonial’ acts, Austin’s theory can be understood as viewing other types as less representative of illocution. Analogously, intentionalists such as Strawson tend to focus more on cases in which the issue of intention seems to be more pertinent.

As a matter of fact, most speech act theories of pragmatic character seem to view convention, intention or both as cornerstones of illocution. Therefore, convention and intention appear consistently in those theories. Considering this, Harnish offers a classification of influential speech act theories on the basis of two aspects: a) the distinction between externalism and internalism and b) the distinction between rules and intention (Harnish 2009, p. 11). Both of these distinctions are based on the way those theories characterize speech acts and conditions of successful performance of speech acts that they identify (Harnish 2009, pp. 10-11).

The first distinction differentiates between externalism and internalism. The distinction in question is in that way transferred from philosophy of mind to the issue of speech acts, or more specifically, illocution (Harnish 2009, p. 9). In the context of illocution, Harnish (2009, p. 11) identifies theories that are mainly internalist (such as Grice’s), those that are mainly externalist (of which he identifies only Gerald Gazdar’s) and mixed theories that combine internalist and externalist elements. The third group is the largest group, since he views Austin’s (2018), Searle’s (1969) and Bach and Harnish’s (1979) as belonging to it. Internalist theories are marked by placing the most emphasis on mental states of the participants in determining the success of acts, and externalist by using predominantly conditions that relate to conditions that are in the ‘world’ (Harnish 2009, p. 10). However, he asserts that most theories are neither, but instead employ conditions from both (p. 10).

The second aspect that Harnish (2009, p. 11) brings forth is one between: a) those theories that deal with conventions, rules and norms and b) intentions and inference. He states Austin’s and

Searle's theories belong to the first group, and Grice's to the second, while mixed theories are Bach and Harnish (Harnish 2009, p. 11). Harnish's two-fold taxonomy of theories shows some overlap between two aspects, since there is, for some theories, a correspondence in that externalism can be connected to conventions, rules and norms, and internalism with intentions and inference. Finally, Harnish introduces a taxonomy that contains reference to different factors of both internal and external character, ranging from pure externalism to pure internalism, with mixed internalism-externalism being the middle ground (Harnish 2009, p. 11). In mixed internalism-externalism, some conditions of successful performance of speech acts are formulated in terms of mental states, and others are not (Harnish 2009, p. 11). From the fact that he finds elements of both internalism and externalism in many theories (Austin, Searle, Bach and Harnish), he concludes that speech act theories generally tend to agree on the fact that both external conditions and mental states figure prominently in the characterization of conditions of successful performance of speech acts.

Possibly the most direct expression of the aim to integrate convention and intention, and by association externalism and internalism, is found in Searle's early account of illocution. He states that he will approach language as "rule-governed intentional behaviour" (Searle 1969, p. 16). However, there is a possible ambiguity of the notion of rules, since they can be rules associated with convention and thus meant to be taken as socially determined factors, but also refer to semantics and the view that semantic rules predominantly affect how language is to be understood and illocution to obtain. In this way, it is not clear how Searle conceptualized these issues, since there is a plethora of different characterizations of his theory (Burkhardt 1990, p. 94 thus calls it a hybrid semantic-pragmatic theory, indicating that there are different elements of the theory that are not reducible to one another). Furthermore, he states that both intentional and conventional elements should be included in a speech act theory (Searle 1969, p. 45). This is part of the reason why Harnish (2009) places Searle's (1969) theory in the 'mixed' category.

The interrelation between conventionalist and intentionalist views is present in many speech act theories. I believe that mixed theories can provide the most appropriate analysis of illocutionary acts because it seems that both convention and intention is necessary to explicate them. Nonetheless, mixed theories differ in the way they approach illocution. This is due to the fact that they are a large group of accounts, wherein Austin's theory seem to place more emphasis on

conventional conditions than others. His felicity conditions are predominantly grounded in convention, whereas conditions associated with mental states and intention contribute only partially through the notion of abuses, nonetheless rendering the act carried out. If we take felicity conditions to be essentially conventional (which Austin states himself), then they do not provide an adequate way to deal with illocution. For illocutionary acts to be properly characterized, intention should play a larger, more equal role. Although Harnish's (2009) taxonomy of speech act theories is well-grounded, we need to differentiate between theories in the mixed category. I am of the opinion that Austin's account, albeit in the mixed category, does not include significant deal of intentional elements. It renders the theory unbalanced in favour of external and conventional elements, which means that the significance of internal and intentionalist ones is overlooked. Felicity conditions that Austin proposed should, therefore, be rejected in favour of conditions for successful performance of speech acts that incorporate both intentional and conventional elements.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have provided an overview of speech acts and illocutionary acts in particular. Speech acts were introduced by J. L. Austin, who determined that there are conditions that need to obtain in order for illocution to be successful. He called them ‘felicity conditions’ and based them, in large part, on convention. Apart from conventionalist approaches, intention forms the most common alternative to illocution in pragmatic speech act theories. Intentionalist theories were developed from H. P. Grice’s theories of meaning and implicature, as presented in *Studies in the Way of Words* (1989). Since then, a number of speech act theories have sided with conventional and intentional tendencies to account for conditions that determine successful performance of speech acts. I have presented Austin’s conventionalist theory, Grice’s intentionalist counterpart and examined Harnish’s (2009) taxonomy of speech acts that identifies mixed theories as well, i.e. those that possess both conventionalist and intentionalist elements on grounds of the distinction between externalism and internalism. Drawing on his taxonomy, arguments Harnish offers in favour of mixed theories and some further benefits of adopting such a view, I conclude that a mixed approach provides the most comprehensive view of illocution. There are many indications that intention plays a much larger role in illocution than Austin supposed, and there are compelling arguments in favour of integrating both intentional and conventional explications of illocutionary acts. For this reason, Austin’s conception of felicity conditions should be rejected.

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