

Zapovjedništvo Apija Klaudija Centona u Iliriku

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ZAPOVJEDNIŠTVO APIJA KLAUDIJA CENTONA U ILIRIKU

Apije Klaudije Centon, tada već iskusni zapovjednik, godine 170. prije Krista poslan je u Ilirik zbog bojazni da će kralj Gencije zaratiti protiv Rima. Na toj je dužnosti bio sve do 168. godine prije Krista i početka posljednjega ilirskog rata, kada ga je zamijenio, u našoj literaturi mnogo poznatiji, Lucije Anicije Gal. U Livijevim osvrtima na Klaudijeve aktivnosti u Iliriku postoji cijeli niz podataka koji do danas nisu razmatrani, a koji upućuju na rimsko nastojanje da stalnim vojnim posadama osigura dostignute granice u Iliriku. U radu se nastoji razriješiti neke proturječnosti nastale različitim interpretacijama pojedinih nepovezanih Livijevih dijelova teksta, ukazati na potencijalnu lokaciju Klaudijeva logora, smjer njegova napada na Uskanu te moguće zaduženje nakon odlaska iz Ilirika.

Ključne riječi: Apije Klaudije Centon, Ilirik, Lihnid, Uskana, Treći makedonski rat, Gencije

THE COMMAND OF APPIUS CLAUDIUS CENTHO IN ILLYRICUM

Appius Claudius Centho, by then an experienced commander, was sent to Illyricum in 170 BC for fear that King Genthius would go to war with Rome. He held this position until the beginning of the last Illyrian war in 168 BC, when he was replaced by – in Croatian literature much better-known – Lucius Anicius Gallus. Livy's comments on Claudius' activities in Illyricum include a number of hitherto unanalyzed pieces of information indicating Rome's efforts to secure its borders in Illyricum by deploying permanent garrisons there. The intention of this paper is to resolve some contradictions arising from different interpretations of isolated parts of Livy's text and suggest a possible location of Claudius' camp, the direction of his attack on Uskana and his possible new appointment upon his departure from Illyricum.

Key words: Appius Claudius Centho, Illyricum, Lychnidus, Uskana, Third Macedonian War, Genthius

U modernoj je historiografiji odavno poznato da završetkom Trećega ilirskog rata nekadašnje moćno Ilirsko Kraljevstvo dolazi do svojega nasilnog kraja. Ta snažna vojna i politička sila istočne obale Jadrana na prijelazu iz 3. u 2. stoljeće prije Krista bila je žrtvom pogrešne procjene njezina zadnjega vladara, Gencija. Suprotno politici svojih prethodnika,¹ taj je ilirski kralj sudbinu svojega kraljevstva vezao za Makedoniju. I to u posve pogrešnome trenutku. Gotovo tri ratne sezone bjesnio je rat između Rima i Perzeja kada je 169. godine pr. Kr. Gencije odlučio vojsku svojih podanika staviti u službu mladoga makedonskog vladara. Činilo mu se to kao dobra odluka. Gencije nije mogao dugo biti neutralan u sukobu nedaleko od granica Ilirskoga Kraljevstva.² Naši izvori pišu da su rimska izaslanstva nekoliko puta dolazila na ilirski dvor s otprilike istim upitom o njegovoj lojalnosti, a u zatišju rasprava na dvoru poslanici makedonskoga kralja privatno su nudili velike iznose novca za njegove ratne usluge.³ Karakterno neodlučan,⁴ ilirski je kralj dugo vagao između dviju opcija i na konačnu ga je odluku vjerojatno nagnao dotadašnji rimski ratni neuspjeh. Godine 170. pr. Kr. rimski konzul u Makedoniji bio je u nezavidnome položaju, okružen u tračkim planinama i grla puna vapaja prema Senatu za pojačanjima, dok je sjeverno od Lihnida Apije Klaudije Centon gotovo katastrofično izjavio izaslanicima Lucija Emilija Paula da se njegovu desetkovanu vojsku mora odmah povući s prve linije.⁵ Ono što Gencije nije znao (ili je propustio protumačiti kao prijetnju) jest da se u trenutku njegova premišljanja u Italiji skupljala najveća rimska vojska u posljednjih trideset godina. Više od 50 000 vojnika, Rimljana i saveznika, na čelu s dva konzula i jednim pretorom, smjeralo je prijeći Jadran i riješiti pitanje pobjednika u Trećemu makedonskom ratu.⁶ Upravo tada Gencije odlučuje prekinuti svoju vanjskopolitičku neodlučnost bacanjem u tamnicu rimskih izaslanaika prisutnih na njegovu dvoru. Potaknut Perzejevima obećanjem velikoga novca, teritorijalnim pretenzijama ili kombinacijom više stvari, tim je činom objavljen rat i Rim je odgovorio snažno i munjevito.⁷ Jedan dio rimske vojske u Brundiziju odvojen je i poslan prema Skodri na čelu s pretorom Lucijem Anicijem Galom.⁸ Gotovo dvadeset tisuća vojnika krenulo je i ubrzo okončalo rat koji

It has long been accepted in modern historiography that the once powerful Illyrian Kingdom met its violent end with the end of the Third Illyrian War. The kingdom that had been a mighty military and political force in Eastern Adriatic at the turn of the 3rd and the 2nd centuries BC fell victim to a miscalculation of its last ruler, Genthius. Contrary to the politics of his predecessors,¹ this Illyrian king linked the fate of his kingdom to Macedonia – and at a wrong time, for that matter. The war between Rome and King Perseus had been going on for almost three war seasons when, in 169 BC, Genthius decided to put his troops at the service of the young Macedonian ruler. He deemed it to be a good decision. Genthius was not in a position to stay neutral for a long time in the conflict so close to the borders of the Illyrian Kingdom.² According to our sources, Rome had sent several envoys to the Illyrian court asking more or less the same question – where his loyalty lied? In between discussions at the court, envoys of the Macedonian king would privately offer large sums for his military services.³ Being indecisive by nature,⁴ the Illyrian king wavered between the two options for a long time; it was probably the up-to-then Roman failures in the war that had a crucial impact on his final decision. The year 170 BC found the Roman consul in Macedonia in an unenviable position: stuck in Thracian mountains, he was imploring the Senate to send reinforcements, while at the same time, north of Lychnidus, the low-spirited Appius Claudius Centhos told the envoys of Lucius Aemilius Paullus that his decimated army should immediately pull back from the frontline.⁵ What Genthius did not now (or failed to perceive as a threat) was that, while he was pondering his options, a Roman army of a size not seen in the past thirty years was being assembled in Italy. More than 50,000 Roman and allied troops, headed by two consuls and a praetor, planned to cross the Adriatic and secure Roman victory in the Third Macedonian War.⁶ It was at that moment that Genthius decided to put an end to his indecisiveness in foreign policy by throwing the Roman envoys at his court into dungeon. Encouraged with Perseus' promise of large amounts of money, territorial aspirations or a combination of several things, he declared war to Rome with this act. Rome responded powerfully and swiftly.⁷ A part of the Roman army assembled in Brundisium was sent to Scodra under the leadership of

1 Liv. 42.37.1–2; A. Domic-Kunić 1993, 217; F. Milivojević 2021b, 450.

2 Pozicija Ilirskoga Kraljevstva nalagala je sudjelovanje ilirske vojske u svim rimskim intervencijama na istočnoj obali Jadrana, bilo kao saveznici bilo kao protivnici, što su rimsko-makedonski ratovi i pokazali.

3 Liv. 42.37.1–2, 43.18.1–4; App. III. 9; F. Milivojević 2021b, 449–450.

4 Kako Livije piše: *Genthius rex Illyriorum fecerat potius cur suspectus esset Romanis quam satis statuerat, utram foveret partem impetuque magis quam consilio his aut illis se adiuncturus videbatur*. Liv. 42.29.11.

5 Liv. 44.20.

6 Za pripremu vojske vidi Liv. 44.21.5–11.

7 Liv. 44.27.8–12.

8 Liv. 44.21.4.

1 Liv. 42.37.1–2; A. Domic-Kunić 1993, 217; F. Milivojević 2021b, 450.

2 The Illyrian Kingdom's geographical position forced its troops to take part in every Roman intervention in Eastern Adriatic, either as an ally or as an adversary, which was clearly manifested in the Roman-Macedonian wars.

3 Liv. 42.37.1–2, 43.18.1–4; App. III. 9; F. Milivojević 2021b, 449–450.

4 According to Livy: *Genthius rex Illyriorum fecerat potius cur suspectus esset Romanis quam satis statuerat, utram foveret partem impetuque magis quam consilio his aut illis se adiuncturus videbatur*. Liv. 42.29.11.

5 Liv. 44.20.

6 For preparations of the army, see: Liv. 44.21.5–11.

7 Liv. 44.27.8–12.

će postati poznat po tome što je vijest o njegovu kraju do Rima došla prije vijesti o njegovu početku.⁹

Jednom kada je Gencijeva prijetnja postala stvarnost, Rim je znao što činiti. Tijek Trećega ilirskog rata relativno je detaljno opisan u Livijevim osvrtima na općenite aktivnosti rimskih zapovjednika preko Jadrana, a rimska podjela pokorenoga teritorija i dugotrajne posljedice Anicijeva proglašenja odavno su znani domaćim i stranim istraživačima povijesti razdoblja srednje Rimske Republike. No iako trijumf Lucija Anicija Gala nad Gencijem i Ilirima naizgled čini posljednju stavku zaočružene priče rimsko-ilirskih sukoba, određene okolnosti samoga rata tek su odnedavno predmet modernih rasprava.¹⁰ Fragmentarnost Livijevih podataka i činjenice da informacije o iliričkim prostorima dobivamo rijetko, nepovezano, nepotpuno i u kontekstu za Rim mnogo značajnijega Trećeg makedonskog rata, dovele su do toga da mnogo Livijevih podataka nije valorizirano i analizirano. Ovdje se specifično misli na podatke o Apiju Klaudiju Centonu, rimskome zapovjedniku čije aktivnosti na području oko Lihnidškoga jezera vjerno dočaravaju postojanje drugoga fronta ratnih operacija u Trećemu makedonskom ratu i novonastale okolnosti koje su utjecale na Gencijevu odluku da proglasi rat Rimu, otpočne Treći ilirski rat i u konačnici dovede svoje kraljevstvo do njegova nasilnog kraja. Bilo bi pogrešno reći da određeni aspekti Centonove priče već nisu rasvijetljeni,¹¹ te ovaj rad nema namjeru ponavljati već rečeno. Štoviše, želja je ovim člankom ukazati na neke dosad nerazriješene probleme unutar Livijeva teksta oko Centonova zaduženja, u nadi da priča o okolnostima vojnoga pada i konačnoga zaborava jednoga sposobnog zapovjednika bude jasnija i objektivnija nego što je do sada bila.

TKO JE APIJE KLAUDIJE CENTON?

Ovaj je članak svojevrsna prozopografska crtica i ona mora početi od obitelji. Akter naše priče, Apije Klaudije Centon, rođen je tijekom perioda srednje Republike u jednome od najstarijih rimskih patricijskih rodova – *gens Claudia*. Bilo je to doba izraženih rodovskih konkurencija na svim razinama društvenoga i političkoga života Rima. Kontinuitet prisutnosti na najvišim magistraturama Rima cijenio se više od svega i u tome je zaista rijetko tko mogao parirati golemoj slavi i utjecaju Klaudijevaca. Bili su karakteristično arogantni i pretjerano nadmeni. Niebuhr bi ih kreativno opisao: „razlikovali su se po arogantnom prkosu, preziru prema zakonima i željeznom srcu, dok su

praetor Lucius Anicius Gallus.⁸ Almost 20,000 troops that were shipped there soon ended the war that would make history by the fact that Rome learned about its end sooner than it learned about its beginning.⁹

Once Genthius' threat became reality, Rome knew what to do. The course of the Third Illyrian War is described to detail in Livy's comments on the trans-Adriatic activities of Roman generals. The ensuing Roman division of the subdued territories and the long-lasting consequences of Anicius' proclamation have long been known to Croatian and international researchers of the period of the Roman Middle Republic. Still, while Lucius Anicius Gallus' triumph over Genthius and the Illyrians can be seen as the final piece in the puzzle of the Roman-Illyrian conflicts, some aspects of this war have only recently become a subject of discussion.¹⁰ As a result of the fragmented nature of Livy's accounts and of the fact that the information on Illyricum is scarce, incoherent, incomplete and usually in the context of the Third Macedonian Rome (much more relevant for Rome), a large portion of Livy's accounts has not been evaluated or analyzed. Specifically, this refers to the information on Appius Claudius Centho, the Roman commander whose activities in the area around Lake Lychnidus can be seen as clear evidence that there was a second theater of operations in the Third Macedonian War, and the circumstances that had influenced Genthius' decision to declare war to Rome, start the Third Illyrian War and, eventually, cause the violent end of his kingdom. As it would be wrong to say that certain aspects of Centho's story have not yet been elucidated,¹¹ this paper does not intend to repeat what is already known. Indeed, it aims at pointing at some hitherto unexplained problems concerning Livy's accounts on Centho's appointment, hoping that more light and objectivity would be cast on the circumstances of the end of the career and eventual fall into oblivion of a successful military commander.

WHO IS APPIUS CLAUDIUS CENTHO?

As this paper is, by its nature, a prosopographical note of a sort, it necessarily has to begin with the protagonist's family. Appius Claudius Centho was born during the Middle Republic to one of the oldest Roman patrician families – *gens Claudia*. It was a time when families competed with each other in all walks of social and political life in Rome. Continued presence on the highest levels of the government was appreciated in Rome more than anything else. In this, few could match the huge glory and influence of the Claudii. They were typically arrogant and

9 Liv. 44.32.5.

10 F. Milivojević 2021a; 2021b.

11 F. Milivojević 2021a, 42–57; 2021b, 460–470.

8 Liv. 44.21.4.

9 Liv. 44.32.5.

10 F. Milivojević 2021a; 2021b.

11 F. Milivojević 2021a, 42–57; 2021b, 460–470.

bili tirani u naravi i ponekad opasni demagozi¹²;¹² nadasve aristokratske vrline jednoga od rijetkih patricijskih rodova čiji je osnivač, iako sabinskoga podrijetla, u Vergilijevoj *Eneidi* anakrono stavljen uz bok Eneji.¹³

Duboko ukorijenjeni u republikansku baštinu rimske apeninske civilizacije, Klaudijevci su pažljivo brinuli o svome statusu unutar visokoga rimskog društva. On se više od svega odlikovao u ekskluzivnosti. Od osnutka Grada do njegova pada velikoj većini patricijskih rodova bilo je sasvim uobičajeno međusobno posvajanje muške djece.¹⁴ Ponekad iz nužde nakon prerane smrti glave obitelji, a često zbog političkih kompromisa, promjena rodovske afilijacije maloljetnika bila je urođen dio rimske kulture i svakodnevice. Ne i za Klaudijevce. U cijelome periodu Rimske Republike nijedan Klaudijevac nije posvojio dijete drugoga roda.¹⁵ Od osnivača roda, Atija Klauza, postojala je jedna neprekinuta rodovska linija.¹⁶ Ta isključiva aristokratska tradicija gubi na svojoj „vrijednosti“ uspostavljanjem principata i smanjivanjem razlika između viteškoga i senatorskoga staleža. Tada, više iz nužde nego društvenih promjena i liberalnijih pogleda, jedan Klaudijevac mijenja povijest svoga roda, ali posljedično i Rima. Radilo se o caru Klaudiju i posvajanju maloljetnoga Lucija Domicija Ahenobarba, u povijesti poznatijega kao car Neron. Tom rodu, s takvim aristokratskim virtusom, pripada naš Apije Klaudije Centon.

Ako bi se štogod trebalo reći o Centonovoj užoj obitelji, u želji da se prikaže popularnost roda neposredno prije Centonova rođenja, onda svakako treba spomenuti njegova pradjeda, Apija Klaudija Ceka (*cens.* 312., *cos.* 307., 296., *dict.* 285. g. pr. Kr.), vjerojatno jednoga od najpoznatijih Klaudijevaca svih vremena.¹⁷ Slavu besmrtnika u analima rimske povijesti Ceko je stekao na razne načine. Prije svega kao graditelj/financijer strateški izrazito važne Apijeve ceste (*Via Appia*), koja je povezivala Rim i Brundizij, te prvoga rimskog akvedukta (*Aqua Appia*).¹⁸ Popularnost mu se protezala na gotovo sve sfere rimskoga društveno-političkog života. Bio je diktator, dva puta konzul, reformator pravnih procedura struke, dokazano oštar govornik protiv Pira epirskoga te, čini se, autor jednoga od prvih literarnih djela rimske književnosti.¹⁹

very self-important. Niebuhr gives a creative description of them: [*Their family*] has been uniformly consistent in overbearing haughtiness, contempt of laws and liberty, and steel-hearted insensibility. They were all born-tyrants, and occasionally mean demagogues;¹² quite aristocratic virtues of one of very few patrician families whose founder, while of Sabine origin, was anachronistically placed on an even footing with Aeneas in Virgil's *Aeneid*.¹³

Deeply rooted in the republican legacy, the Claudii paid special consideration to their status in the highest echelons of the Roman society. This status was primarily characterized by exclusivity. From the founding of the City to its fall, mutual adoption of male children was very common among a large majority of patrician families.¹⁴ Sometimes, out of necessity due to untimely death of the head of the family, and often as a political compromise, change of the gens affiliation of minors would take place. It was an inherent part of the Roman culture and everyday life. Not for the Claudii, though. Throughout the existence of the Roman Republic, not one member of the family had adopted a child from another gens.¹⁵ The family could demonstrate its uninterrupted lineage dating back to its founder Attius Clausus.¹⁶ This exclusive aristocratic tradition lost its “value” with the establishment of the Principate and dwindling of the class differences between knights and senators. It was at that time that, more out of necessity than due to social changes and more liberal views, a member of the Claudii changed the history of his family and, consequently, of Rome. It was Emperor Claudius, who adopted the underaged Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, better known in history as Emperor Nero. It is this family, with such an aristocratic *virtus*, that our Appius Claudius Centho belonged to.

If there is something to be told about Centho's immediate family – in order to illustrate the popularity of the gens prior to Centho's birth – then we should certainly mention his great-grandfather, Appius Claudius Caecus (*cens.* 312., *cos.* 307., 296., *dict.* 285 BC), probably one of the best known Claudians of all time.¹⁷ Caecus gained his immortality in the annals of the Roman history in many ways. Above everything else, he was the builder/financier of the strategically very important *Via Appia* that connected Rome and

12 B. Niebuhr 1828, 530–531.

13 Verg. *Aen.* 7.706–707. Osnivač je Apije Klaudije Sabin Regil. Liv. 2.16. donosi ime *Attii(u)s Clausus*, iako postoje i drugačije verzije, poput *Atta Claudius* u Suet. *Tib.* 1.

14 Jedan je od poznatijih primjera Publije Kornelije Scipion Emilijan, rušitelj Kartage, pobjednik nad Numantincima i jedan od značajnijih Rimljana 2. st. pr. Kr. Iako mu ime naizgled govori da je pripadao rodu Kornelijevaca (*gens Cornelia*), Emilijan je zapravo rođenjem bio drugi sin Lucija Emilija Paula Makedonika, pobjednika nad Perzejem u Trećemu makedonskom ratu. Dakle, bio je Emilijevac, čemu i odaje čast nadimkom „Emilijan“ (*Aemilianus*).

15 Suet. *Claud.* 39; Tac. *Ann.* 12.25.

16 Kako Tacit napominje u *Ann.* 12.25.

17 F. Münzer 1899a, 2681–2685.

18 Doduše, Ceko je zaslužan za tzv. „prvu fazu“ Apijeve ceste do Kapue, a koju su Rimljani između 295. g. pr. Kr. (godina poraza Samnicana) i 264. g. pr. Kr. produljili do Brundizija.

19 Više u M. Humm 2005.

12 B. Niebuhr 1828, 530–531.


13 Verg. *Aen.* 7.706–707. The founder's name was Appius Claudius Sabinus Regillensis. Liv. 2.16. mentions the name *Attii(u)s Clausus*, but there are other versions, too, such as *Atta Claudius* in Suet. *Tib.* 1.

14 One of the best known such examples is Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, the destroyer of Carthage and conqueror of the Numantines, one of the most important Romans of the 2nd century BC. Although his name seemingly associates him with the Cornelii (*gens Cornelia*), Aemilianus was actually born as the second son of Lucius Aemilius Paullus Macedonicus, the conqueror of Perseus in the Third Macedonian War. He was thus from gens *Aemilia* – hence the nickname “Aemilian” (*Aemilianus*).

15 Suet. *Claud.* 39; Tac. *Ann.* 12.25.

16 According to Tacitus in *Ann.* 12.25.

17 F. Münzer 1899a, 2681–2685.



Slika 1. Klaudijevo rodovsko stablo

Figure 1. Appius Claudius Centho's family tree

prema / according to: E. Groag 1899, 2666.

Tako kratak opis Cekovih postignuća nije važan samo zbog toga što je Ceko jedna od prvih rimskih figura čiji se život može rekonstruirati do određene mjere povijesne sigurnosti.²⁰ Cekova popularnost bila je velika, samim time i klaudijevskoga roda, no nakon njegove smrti dolazi do vrlo važne podjele roda na dva ogranka – Centone i Pulhere. Brojnim sinovima obaju ogranaka Ceko je u nasljedstvo ostavio golemo bogatstvo i slavu,²¹ a vodeću ulogu unutar klaudijevskoga roda naslijedio je Gaj Klaudije Centon (konzul 240. g. pr. Kr.),²² djed našega Centona i prvi s kognomenom *Centho* (*Cento*).²³ No uspjeh klaudijevskoga ogranaka Centona bio je kratkoga vijeka. Otprilike od druge polovine 3. st. pr. Kr. ogranak roda drugoga Cekova sina, Publija Klaudija Pulhera (*Claudii Pulchri*), eksponencijalno je porastao po brojnosti potomaka, utjecaju i moći, čime su ubrzo postali vodeći Klaudijevci, predodređeni za najviše kurulske magistrature Rima. Centoni su postupno marginalizirani i „osuđeni“ na niže časti. Sljedećemu u liniji, ocu našega Centona, vrhunac političke i vojne karijere bila je funkcija legata, 200. g. pr. Kr., u Drugome makedonskom ratu. Zapovijedao je jednim dijelom ratne flote, ali ona gotovo da i nije sudjelovala u većim okršajima, te je njegova uloga u uspješnome ratovanju protiv Filipa V. bila sve samo ne značajna.²⁴

Brundisium and the first Roman aqueduct (*Aqua Appia*).¹⁸ His popularity extended through almost every sphere of the Roman social and political life. He was a dictator, two-time consul, reformer of legal procedures, sharp orator against Pyrrhus of Epirus and – it appears – the author of one of the first works of the Roman literature.¹⁹

This brief description of Caecus' achievements is important not only because he is one of the first Roman figures whose life can be reconstructed with some historical certainty.²⁰ Caecus – and thus his family – enjoyed great popularity. However, after his death, an important split in the family took place: it branched in two collateral lines – the Pulchri and the Centhones. Caecus bequeathed huge fortune and fame to the numerous sons of both lines,²¹ but it was Gaius Claudius Centho (consul in the year 240 BC) who inherited the leading role in the family.²² He was the grandfather of our Centho and the first known member of the gens to bear the cognomen *Centho* (*Cento*).²³ However, the success of the Centhones branch of the Claudii was short-lived. Around the second half of the 3rd century BC, the branch of Caecus' other son, Publius Claudius Pulcher – *Claudii Pulchri* – saw an exponential growth in the number of descendants, influence and power. This helped them assume the leading role among the Claudii and thus become predetermined for the positions of the highest curule magistracies in Rome. The Centhones would gradually be marginalized and “doomed” to lower honors. To our protagonist's father, next in the lineage, the peak of his political and military career was the function of legate in the Second Macedonian War in 200 BC. He commanded over part of the Roman navy but, as the navy did not participate in any major battle in the war, his role in this successful campaign against Philip V was nothing short of relevant.²⁴

It was at that time that our Appius Claudius Centho appeared in the Claudii lineage. He inherited a resounding name, but also a rather low starting position in the Roman political system. Not much is known about his military and political beginnings. He is first mentioned in 179 BC when he, as a curule aedile (together with Gnaeus Servilius Caepio), organized a religious festival in accordance with the prophecies of the current year.²⁵ He clearly moved up – albeit gradually – in the following years because, as early as

18 Actually, Caecus deserves credit for the so-called “first phase” of Via Appia, from Rome to Capua. It was extended to Brundisium between 295 BC (when they defeated the Samnites) and 264 BC.

19 More in M. Humm 2005.

20 M. Humm 2005.

21 Decades after Caecus' death, his sons occupied consular positions. T. Broughton 1951, 192 ff.

22 F. Münzer 1899b, 2694.

23 *Centho* (*Cento*) is a Latin word for the cap worn by soldiers under the helmet. Ammianus Marcellinus gives an interesting account about dehydrated soldiers who, having no bucket, used that hat as a sponge: they lowered it into the well to soak up water and then pulled it back up. Amm. Marc. 19.8.8.

24 F. Münzer 1899c, 2694–2695; Liv. 31.14.22.

25 Liv. 40.59.6–7.

20 M. Humm 2005.

21 Desetljećima nakon Cekove smrti njegovi sinovi zauzimali poziciju konzula. T. Broughton 1951, 192 i d.

22 F. Münzer 1899b, 2694.

23 *Centho* (*Cento*) u prijevodu znači ‘kapa koju su vojnici nosili ispod kacige’. Amijan Marcellin pripovijeda izuzetnu priču kada su vojnici, u trenutku velike žeđi i bez vjedra, iskoristili tu kapu kao spužvu koju su spustili u bunar tako da se namoči vodom. Amm. Marc. 19.8.8.

24 F. Münzer 1899c, 2694–2695; Liv. 31.14.22.

I tada na red u rodovskome nizu dolazi Apije Klaudije Centon, osoba koja je u nasljedstvo dobila veliko ime, ali i prilično nisku početnu poziciju u napredovanju kroz rimski politički sustav. O njegovoj ranoj vojnoj i političkoj karijeri nemamo mnogo podataka. Literarni izvori prvi ga put spominju u 179. g. pr. Kr. kada je kao kurulski edil, zajedno s Gnejem Servilijem Cepijem, organizirao vjerski festival u skladu s proročanstvima tekuće godine.²⁵ Sljedećih je nekoliko godina očito postupno i uspješno napredovao, jer već 175. g. pr. Kr. postaje pretor i dobiva priliku iskušati svoje ratno umijeće u poprilično teškim borbama s Keltiberima u Hispaniji. U trenutku Klaudijeva dolaska u Hispaniju bio je mir između zaraćenih strana, međutim prisutnost novoga zapovjednika dala je Keltiberima razloga za novi pokušaj oslobođenja od rimske vlasti. U okršajima što su uslijedili poznata nam je samo jedna bitka, i to ona odlučujuća. Iz opširnoga Livijeva izvještaja saznajemo da je nakon dva sata intenzivne borbe Klaudije uspio potpuno poraziti 15 000 Keltibera i oduzeti 32 bojna znaka.²⁶ Za svoje zasluge u okončanju rata Klaudije je odlukom Senata dobio *supplicatio*, a po povratku u Rim i *ovatio*.²⁷

Opisom Klaudijeve aktivnosti u Hispaniji Livije je stvorio sliku sposobnoga zapovjednika kojemu je Rim bio iznimno zahvalan na pokoravanju uvijek opasnih Keltibera. Dokazani i od Senata nagrađivani vojni zapovjednici sigurno su mogli očekivati nova zaduženja na brojnim rimskim ratištima diljem Mediterana, ali sve do početka Trećega makedonskog rata o Klaudiju nemamo nikakvih podataka. Načelno bi se moglo pretpostaviti da je imao neku manju ulogu u ratu protiv Ligura 173. g. pr. Kr.,²⁸ dok sa sigurnošću možemo reći da je 172. g. pr. Kr. bio dijelom izaslanstva upućenoga na dvor makedonskoga kralja Perzeja. Zadatak izaslanstva bio je „podsjetiti“ kralja na prethodni ugovor Rima s njegovim ocem, Filipom V., koji je novi vladar Makedonije morao potvrditi. Perzejevo naoružavanje ozbiljno je zabrinulo Rim, pa je izaslanstvo upozorilo mladoga kralja da temeljem prethodnoga ugovora po završetku Drugoga makedonskog rata njegova vojska ne smije izlaziti iz okvira „stare Makedonije“.²⁹ Livije piše da Perzej nikako nije mogao prihvatiti nametnute uvjete. Uzvratilo je optužbama i neprimjerenim jezikom, optuživši Rim za aroganciju i pohlepu, a nakon duge prepirke i nekoliko izmijenjenih uvreda izaslanstvo je službeno prekinulo prijateljske odnose između Rima i Makedonije.³⁰

in 175 BC, he became a praetor and thus had an opportunity to demonstrate his military skills in rather violent fighting with the Celtiberians in Hispania. At the moment of Claudius' arrival in Hispania there was a truce between the belligerents. However, the Celtiberians saw the arrival of the new commander as an opportunity for another attempt at liberating themselves from the Roman power. Of the battles that ensued only one is known – the decisive one. Livy's detailed account tells us that, after two hours of intensive fighting, Claudius defeated 15,000 Celtiberians and captured 32 of their standards.²⁶ For his role in this war, Claudius received the Senate's *supplicatio* and, upon returning to Rome, an *ovatio*.²⁷

Livy's account of Claudius' activities in Hispania pictures a capable commander to whom Rome owed a debt for vanquishing the always dangerous Celtiberians. Military commanders proven in battle and awarded by the Senate could expect new duties in Rome's numerous war theaters throughout the Mediterranean. However, we have no new information about Claudius until the beginning of the Third Macedonian War. In principle, we can assume that he played a minor role in the Ligurian War in 173 BC.²⁸ We know for a fact that, in 172 BC, he was part of the delegation sent to the court of Macedonian king Perseus. The delegation was sent to “remind” the king of the treaty that his father Philip V had made with Rome and that the new ruler of Macedonia was supposed to confirm. Perseus' arms build-up caused serious concerns in Rome, so the delegation warned the young king that, based on the treaty, his army should not exceed the outlines of the “old Macedonia”.²⁹ According to Livy, Perseus refused to accept the conditions imposed on him. He responded by using inappropriate language and accusing Rome of arrogance and greed. After a lengthy argument and exchange of insults, the delegation officially suspended friendly relations between Rome and Macedonia.³⁰

While this could be interpreted as if Claudius, a battle-tested and successful commander from the Celtiberian War, was also partly responsible for the official beginning of the Third Macedonian War, it should be noted that such interpretations cannot be seen as a true reflection of historical events. Roman delegations almost always acted in accordance with the instructions from the Senate and magistrates with imperium and, when in the field, they would never make decisions with far-reaching political effects without

25 Liv. 40.59.6–7.

26 Liv. 41.26.

27 Liv. 41.28. *Fasti Triumph. (Fasti Capit.)* u A. Degrassi 1954, 104: [174/3] – *Ap. Claudius C. f. Ap. n. Centho, pro [-], ovatio [k.Mart]*.

28 Jer se radi o jedinome literarno dokumentiranome ratu koji je Rim vodio između epizode s Keltiberima i početka rata s Perzejem. No radi se tek o pukome domišljanju jer o Klaudijevu angažmanu u ovome ratu nemamo podataka.

29 Puni opis vidi u Liv. 42.25. Ugovor između Rima i Filipa V. postoji od 185. g. pr. Kr. Liv. 39.27; F. Walbank 1940, 231–235.

30 Liv. 42.25.

26 Liv. 41.26.

27 Liv. 41.28. *Fasti Triumph. (Fasti Capit.)* u A. Degrassi 1954, 104: [174/3] – *Ap. Claudius C. f. Ap. n. Centho, pro [-], ovatio [k.Mart]*.

28 It is the only Roman war documented in literature that took place in the period between the Celtiberian episode and the beginning of the war against Perseus. But this is merely a speculation, for there is no information about Claudius' engagement in this war.

29 For a full description, see Liv. 42.25. The treaty between Rome and Philip V was signed in 185 BC. Liv. 39.27; F. Walbank 1940, 231–235.

30 Liv. 42.25.

Tako se čini da je Klaudije, od iskušanoga i uspješnoga zapovjednika u ratu protiv Keltibera, bio djelomice odgovoran i za službeni početak Trećega makedonskog rata. Ovdje se mora reći da takva tumačenja ipak nisu stvarni odraz povijesnih događaja. Rimska izaslanstva gotovo uvijek postupaju po nalogu Senata i magistrata s imperijem te na terenu ne donose dalekosežne političke odluke prije dodatnoga savjetovanja. Prekidanje prijateljskih odnosa sa suverenim i vojno stabilnim suverenim državama jedna je od takvih odluka. Kontekst Klaudijeva zaduženja na makedonskome dvoru upućuje na to da je – ako je izaslanstvo naposljetku i donijelo neku dalekosežnu odluku – takav slijed događaja unaprijed dogovoren u Rimu. Bilo bi to sasvim u skladu s rimskim diplomatskim načinom ponašanja: postavljanje ultimatum (često arogantnim tonom), provociranje reakcije koja se onda koristi kao razlog za prijetnju nakon koje se: 1) ili prihvaća ultimatum; 2) ili prekidaju prijateljski odnosi (u slučaju komunikacije s nepokolebljivim vladarima). Takvo tumačenje odgovaralo bi činjenici da okolnosti početka Trećega makedonskog rata još uvijek nisu do kraja rasvijetljene. Rimski povod za rat posve je nejasan i ako literarni izvori na nešto ukazuju, onda je to da je Rimu odgovaralo isprovocirati rat s Makedonijom zbog tadašnje geopolitičke situacije u Grčkoj.³¹ U svakom slučaju, Treći makedonski rat otpočeo je i Klaudije je naizgled imao savršenu priliku da novim zaduženjem i novim pobjedama dodatno poveća svoj ugled u rimskome društvu te povрати ugled svoga marginaliziranog ogranka klaudijevskoga roda. Dogodilo se upravo suprotno.

KLAUDIJE I LIHNID

Neovisno o kojemu se povijesnome razdoblju radilo, određeni postulati društvenoga vrednovanja vrijede za sve. Tako je slava sudjelovanja u važnim ratovima oduvijek bila preduvjet za društveno-politički napredak pojedinaca te za jednu mladu generaciju rimskih ambicioznih mladića nije bilo bolje prilike od sukoba s helenističkom kraljevino koja je još uvijek „živjela“ na slavi Aleksandra Velikoga. Vojnici su oštrili svoje mačeve, a povjesničari pera, te danas podosta znamo o tijeku Trećega makedonskog rata i uvjetima njegova kraja.³² No unatoč velikomu interesu kroničara povijesnih događaja za ovaj rat, o određenim ljudima koji su u njemu sudjelovali ne znamo mnogo. To se posebno odnosi na našega Klaudija. On je sigurno mogao očekivati angažman, barem u svojstvu podređenoga zapovjednika, ali posve je nejasno kada je i u kojemu svojstvu krenuo u rat. Moguće da je prema Makedoniji krenuo s ulogom jednoga od legata koji su, zajedno s velikim konzularnim vojskama, prešli Jadran u početnim fazama Trećega makedonskog rata – ili 171. g. pr. Kr. s Publijem Licinijem Krasom

additional consultations. Suspending friendly relations with sovereign and militarily stable countries would be one such decision. The context of Claudius' mission at the Macedonian court indicates that, if the delegation did make a decision with far-reaching effects, it must have been agreed on in advance while they were still in Rome. It would be consistent with the Roman diplomatic approach: presenting an ultimatum (often arrogantly) and provoking a reaction which is then used as a ground for a threat, followed either by acceptance of the ultimatum or by suspension of friendly relations (when dealing with unwavering rulers). Such interpretation would be consistent with the fact that the circumstances that gave rise to the Third Macedonian War have still not been fully explained. Rome's cause for the war is still obscure; if literary sources indicate anything, it is that provoking a war with Macedonia suited Rome because of the then geopolitical situation in Greece.³¹ In any case, the Third Macedonian War did break out and Claudius had a seemingly perfect opportunity to use his new appointment and new victories for enhancing his reputation in the Roman society and restoring the reputation of his marginalized branch of the Claudii. Yet, the opposite happened.

CLAUDIUS AND LYCHNIDUS

Regardless of historical period, certain postulates of social evaluation are universally applicable. Participation in important wars had always been a precondition for moving up socially and politically; a war with a Hellenistic kingdom that still lived on the glory of Alexander the Great was a perfect opportunity for a whole generation of Roman ambitious young men. While soldiers were sharpening their swords, historians were sharpening their quills. As a result, the course of the Third Macedonian War and circumstances of its end are rather well-known today.³² Still, despite the contemporary chroniclers' keen interest for this war, not much is known about some of its participants. This particularly goes for our Claudius. He could certainly count on a new appointment, as a subordinate commander at any rate, but it is not clear when and in what capacity did he go to war. It is possible that he was sent to Macedonia as one of the legates who crossed the Adriatic with massive consular armies in the early stages of the Third Macedonian War – either with Publius Licinius Crassus in 171 BC or with Aulus Hostilius Mancinus in 170 BC. We know for a fact that he crossed the Adriatic because in 170 BC we find him in Thessaly, from where he would move to Illyricum as a sole commander. The reason for this appointment was the Illyrian king Genthius' indecision as regards which side to support in the war. According to Livy, the Senate – still having had doubts as to the intentions of the Illyrian king – made

31 P. Derow 1989, 303–308; usp. Liv. 42.40; F. Milivojević 2021b, 447–448.

32 Sukus u N. Hammond 1988, 505–558.

31 P. Derow 1989, 303–308; cf. Liv. 42.40; F. Milivojević 2021b, 447–448.

32 For core of the matter, see N. Hammond 1988, 505–558.

ili 170. g. pr. Kr. s Aulom Hostilijem Mancinom. Činjenica je da je prešao Jadran jer ga 170. g. pr. Kr. nalazimo u Tesaliji, odakle je krenuo u Ilirik držati samostalno zapovjedništvo. Razlog je bio ilirski kralj Gencije i njegova neodlučnost na koju se stranu svrstati u ratu. Livije piše da je Senat još uvijek sumnjao u namjere ilirskoga kralja te je iz predostrožnosti donio dvije odluke. Jedna je bila iz Brundizija poslati osam potpuno opremljenih brodova na Isu. Tamo se nalazio Gaj Furije, legat zadužen za otok s dva isejska broda. Druga odluka odnosila se na Klaudijev angažman u ratu. Livije piše da je tadašnji konzul u Makedoniji, Aulo Hostilije Mancin, odlučio poslati Klaudija u Ilirik sa 4000 vojnika sa zadatkom da „zaštiti pogranične zajednice“. Klaudije očito nije bio zadovoljan vojskom koja mu je dana. Od okolnih saveznika zatražio je pojačanja i uspio skupiti ukupno 8000 vojnika različitoga podrijetla. Nakon što je prošao cijelu regiju, kao centar svojih operacija odabrao je Lihnid, pokraj Dasareta.³³

Ovim relativno kratkim objašnjenjem razloga senatske reakcije na zatečene okolnosti, započinje opsežan i vrlo važan Livijev izvještaj o Klaudijevim aktivnostima tijekom zime na prijelazu 170./169. g. pr. Kr. Njegova važnost nije samo u sadržaju, gdje se naglašava pozicija Ilirika za vođenje Trećega makedonskog rata, nego i za proučavanje Livijeve 43. knjige koja, zbog oštećenosti i minimalne sačuvanosti, u rijetkim slučajevima sadrži cjelovit opis specifičnih događaja. No, iako je Klaudijeva priča iznimka u inače prilično fragmentarnim Livijevim opisima ratnih aktivnosti spomenutih godina, ona nije bez svojih historiografskih nejasnoća. Primjerice, Livije naglašava opreznost prema Genciju i njegovoj sumnjivoj politici kao isključiv razlog Klaudijeva zaduženja, međutim čini se da je to tek jedan od aspekata mnogo kompliciranije priče o razlozima zašto je Rim smatrao nužnim poslati vojsku u Ilirik na čelu s već dokazanim zapovjednikom.

Livijeva formulacija u opisu razloga Klaudijeva zaduženja – *suspectum tamen Gentium, Illyriorum regem, habebant* – sasvim jasno upućuje na to da vijest koja je isprovocirala dodatnu sumnju Senata u ilirskoga kralja nije bila prva takvoga karaktera. Dapače, Gencije je već 172. g. pr. Kr. (navodno) podmitio rimskoga izaslanika Gaja Decimija u namjeri da se ne izjasni poštuje li prethodno sklopljen saveznički ugovor između Rima i njegova oca, Pleurata.³⁴ Iste godine isejsko izaslanstvo u Rimu iskazalo je nezadovoljstvo Gencijem koji navodno pustoši njihove teritorije. Da stvar bude ozbiljnija, isto isejsko izaslanstvo upozorilo je Senat da su ilirski izaslanici u Rimu u službi špijuna makedonskoga kralja.³⁵ Čini se da je bilo ponešto

two decisions, out of precaution. One was to send eight fully equipped ships from Brundisium to Issa, where legate Gaius Furius was in charge of the island with a force of two ships. The other decision concerned Claudius' engagement in the war. Livy says that Aulus Hostilius Mancinus, the then consul in Macedonia, decided to send Claudius to Illyricum with 4,000 troops in order to "protect the people dwelling on its borders". Clearly not content with the force he had been given, Claudius asked the neighboring allies for reinforcements and managed to gather a total of 8,000 troops of various ethnic backgrounds. Having scouted the entire region, he chose Lychnidus near Dassaretia as the center of his operations.³³

It is this relatively short explanation of the reasons for the Senate's reactions to the circumstances of the day that marks the beginning of Livy's extensive and very important report on Claudius' activities in the winter of 170–169 BC. It is important not only because of its content, emphasizing the relevance of Illyricum's position for Rome's third campaign against Macedonia, but also for studying Livy's 43rd book which, being poorly preserved, rarely gives full descriptions of specific events. However, while being an exception among Livy's rather fragmented descriptions of the war-related activities of those years, the story of Claudius also lacks historiographic clarity. For example, Livy says that skepticism about Genthius' dubious politics was the only reason for Claudius' mission. Nevertheless, it seems to be but one aspect of a much more complicated situation and there must have been other reasons that made Rome send to Illyricum an army headed by a battle-tested commander.

The phrase that Livy uses when describing the reasons for Claudius' appointment – *suspectum tamen Gentium, Illyriorum regem, habebant* – clearly indicates that the news that had raised the Senate's additional doubts about the Illyrian king was not the first of such nature. Indeed, back in 172 BC, Genthius had (allegedly) bribed Roman envoy Gaius Decimius in order to avoid expressly committing himself to honoring the alliance between Rome and his father, Pleuratus.³⁴ That same year, an Issaeian delegation sent to Rome complained about Genthius, who had allegedly sacked their territories. To make the matter more serious, the same delegation warned the Senate that the Illyrian envoys in Rome were actually spies of the Macedonian king.³⁵ It seems that there was some truth in it because the Illyrian delegation, when summoned to the Senate, failed to give a satisfactory explanation as to why they had not reported their arrival to Rome to proper authorities.³⁶

33 Liv. 43.9.4–7. O Furiju još vidi Liv. XLI, 1, Lihnid = Ohrid; N. Proeva 1996; F. Milivojević 2021b, 456.

34 Liv. 42.37.1–3. O ishodu izaslanstva vidi Liv. 42.45.8. Za drugačije mišljenje vidi A. Domić-Kunić 1993, 215.

35 Liv. 42.26.2–7.

33 Liv. 43.9.4–7. For more on Furius, see Liv. XLI, 1, Lychnidus = Ohrid; N. Proeva 1996; F. Milivojević 2021b, 456.

34 Liv. 42.37.1–3. For the delegation's outcome, see Liv. 42.45.8. For a different opinion, see A. Domić-Kunić 1993, 215.

35 Liv. 42.26.2–7.

36 F. Milivojević 2021b, 456.

istine u riječima Isejaca, jer je ilirsko izaslanstvo, pozvano pred Senat, bilo bez zadovoljavajućega objašnjenja zašto svoj dolazak u Rim nisu prijavili nadležnim službama.³⁶

Iz Livijeva je teksta jasno da se Gencijeva neodlučnost smatrala problemom za koji treba naći rješenje. No ostaje nejasno, ako Klaudijevo zaduženje treba dovesti u vezu s opasnošću od Gencija, zašto Klaudije bira Lihnid za centar svojih operacija. Iako strateški bitno, područje oko današnjega Ohridskog jezera nije bilo najprikladniji centar operacija za zapovjednika čiji je zadatak podrazumijevao preventivno pozicioniranje u slučaju Gencijeva napada. Osim što je prilično udaljeno u odnosu na Skodru i ostatak ilirskih pozicija, Lihnid je već bio prirodno zaštićen na sjeveru teško prohodnim planinama Šar i Korab, uvjetnim granicama Ilirskog Kraljevstva (Karta 1).³⁷ Potencijalni napad Gencijevih snaga nije se ni mogao očekivati u regiji s takvim obrambenim potencijalom. Kako će početak Trećega ilirskog rata pokazati, ilirske snage napredovale su preko mnogo pristupačnijega i bližega terena – iz smjera Lisa prema Dirahiju.³⁸ Time se željela steći kontrola nad priobalnim pojasom čime bi se, u kontekstu istovremenih operacija u Tesaliji i Makedoniji, Rimljanima nanijeli puno teži teritorijalni gubitci nego napadom na Lihnid i pogranično područje. A u tome slučaju, ako je Klaudijeva zadaća doista bila adekvatno odgovoriti na neprijateljev napad, područje oko Dirahija, Apolonije ili doline rijeke Škumbin (*Genusus*) bilo je itekako prikladniji i strateški opravdaniji centar operacija nego Lihnid.

Odgovor na to pitanje leži u strateškoj važnosti područja oko Lihnida, vidljivoj u prethodnim aktivnostima rimskih zapovjednika u regiji. Već prije samoga početka Trećega makedonskog rata, 172. g. pr. Kr., Rim je uputio pretora Gneja Sicinija preko Jadrana kako bi: 1) preraspodijelio svoju vojsku u garnizone u priobalne gradove poput Apolonije te 2) osigurao područje oko Lihnida.³⁹ Rimu je priobalni pojas oko Apolonije bio važan vojni mostobran iz Brundizija, dok je osiguravanje Lihnida učinjeno naizgled kako bi se zaštitile utvrde Dasareta i Ilira od njihovih makedonskih susjeda. Pravi razlog, naravno, bio je drugačiji. U jeku Gencijeve neodlučnosti i opasnosti od Perzeja, Rim je slanjem trupa na područje oko Lihnida želio kontrolirati kopnenu komunikaciju između ilirskog i makedonskoga kraljevstva, zaštititi ulaz u rimski protektorat i ostaviti mogućnost prodora u zapadnu Makedoniju, ako bude bio potreban (Karta 1 i 2).⁴⁰ Odabirom

It is clear from Livy's account that Genthius' indecision was considered a problem that had to be dealt with. What remains unclear is, if Claudius' appointment is to be perceived as a reaction to the Genthius threat, why did Claudius choose Lychnidus as the center of his operations? Although of strategic importance, the area around present-day Lake Ohrid was not particularly suitable for a commander whose mission was to deploy his troops in order to prevent Genthius' attack. Besides being relatively far from Scodra and other places where the Illyrian troops were stationed, the impenetrable Šar and Korab Mountains – the tentative borders of the Illyrian Kingdom (Map 1) – protected it from the north.³⁷ A potential attack of Genthius' forces could not be expected in such a protected area. As the beginning of the Third Illyrian War was to show, the Illyrian forces would advance across a much more accessible and less distant terrain – from the direction of Lissus towards Dyrrhachium.³⁸ The goal was to gain control over the coastal strip of land and thus – in the context of the simultaneous operations in Thessaly and Macedonia – inflict on the Romans much heavier territorial losses than by attacking Lychnidus and the border areas. In such case – if Claudius' task indeed was to ensure adequate reaction to the enemy's attack – the area around Dyrrhachium, Apollonia or the Shkumbin (*Genusus*) River valley would seem to be a much more appropriate and strategically justified center of operations than Lychnidus.

The answer to this question was the strategic importance of the Lychnidus area, of which the Romans were aware, as indicated by earlier activities of Roman commanders in the region. In 172 BC, just before the onset of the Third Macedonian War, Rome sent praetor Gnaeus Sincinius to the Eastern Adriatic in order to: 1) redeploy his army to the garrisons in the coastal cities such as Apollonia, and 2) secure the area around Lychnidus.³⁹ The coastal strip around Apollonia was important for Rome as a military bridgehead from Brundisium. As for Lychnidus, securing it was necessary in order to protect Dassaretian and Illyrian fortifications from the neighboring Macedonians. The real reason, of course, was different. As a precaution due to Genthius' indecision and the Perseus threat, Rome sent its troops to Lychnidus area in order to control the roads between Illyrian and Macedonian kingdoms, protect access to its protectorate and enable incursion into Western Macedonia should it become necessary (Maps 1 and 2).⁴⁰ Claudius' decision to place his center of operations in

36 F. Milivojević 2021b, 456.

37 F. Milivojević 2021a, 43.

38 Liv. 44.30.14–15.

39 Liv. 42.36.8–9. Dio 20. = Zon. 9.22. O broju vojnika koje je Sicinije prebacio vidi F. Milivojević 2019b.

40 F. Milivojević 2021a, 43–44; 2021b, 451–451. Tom regijom putovali su makedonski izaslanici na ilirski dvor: Liv. 43.19.13–14; Polyb. 28.8. Kasnije će Perzej izjaviti da su Iliri na ovom prostoru dali Rimljana dobre pozicije. Liv. 43.18.3.

37 F. Milivojević 2021a, 43.

38 Liv. 44.30.14–15.

39 Liv. 42.36.8–9. Dio 20. = Zon. 9.22. For the number of troops deployed by Sincinius, see F. Milivojević 2019b.

40 F. Milivojević 2021a, 43–44; 2021b, 451–451. Macedonian envoys travelled through this region on their way to the Illyrian court: Liv. 43.19.13–14; Polyb. 28.8. Perseus will later claim that the Illyrians allowed the Romans to secure favorable positions in this area. Liv. 43.18.3.

Lihnida kod Dasareta za svoj glavni operativni centar, Klaudijevo zaduženje u svojoj osnovi predstavlja nastavak rimske politike prividnoga altruizma i zaštite zajednica na pograničnim područjima protektorata od strateške važnosti. Tendencija je vidljiva od samoga početka Trećega makedonskog rata – Gencijeva neodlučnost i neminovni rat s Perzejem razlozi su Sicinijevih akcija, a Klaudijev dolazak u Lihnid uzrokovan je sve većom sumnjičavošću Senata prema ilirskome kralju. U tome je Livije u pravu, Gencijeva dvojbenost odanost nije bila jednako štetna po rimski cilj početkom rata i 170. g. pr. Kr. Sicinijev zadatak 172. g. pr. Kr. oblikovan je u trenutku kada još uvijek nije bilo velike konzularne vojske u Makedoniji, dok Klaudijevo zaduženje 170. g. pr. Kr. dolazi nakon dvije potpuno neuspješne ratne sezone u kojima se rimska vojska, zbog Perzejeve nadmoćne strategije, ograničila na pljačkanje grčkih gradova.⁴¹ Inicijativa je bila na makedonskoj strani 170. g. pr. Kr. i za Rim u dotadašnjemu vođenju rata nije postojao gori trenutak da Gencije stane na Perzejevu stranu.

Razumljivo je stoga da Klaudijev dolazak u Ilirik treba promatrati kao nužnu reakciju na nove indikacije Gencijeva ponašanja, međutim također vrlo vjerojatno potenciranu i Perzejevim aktivnostima 170. g. pr. Kr. Indirektno preko jednoga Livijeva podatka saznajemo o uspješnome Perzejevu pohodu protiv Dardanaca koji se, sudeći po kontekstu, dogodio u drugoj polovini 170. g. pr. Kr.⁴² Opis je izgubljen u oštećenoj Livijevoj 43. knjizi, ali namjera makedonskoga kralja bila je zaštititi svoje sjeverozapadne granice. Prisutnost makedonskoga kralja u blizini lihnidskoga područja sigurno je podrazumijevala i opasnost za područje koje je Sicinije prethodno osigurao. Iz rimske perspektive, Perzejev napad na Dardance mogao je biti uvod u mnogo šire operacije s kulminacijom u eliminaciji rimskih pozicija u regiji. Rimski odgovor bio je potreban i u skladu s pojačanim oprezom prema ilirskom kralju (što će se na kraju pokazati opravdanim), Senat i konzul zadužen za rat protiv Perzeja, Aulo Hostilije Mancin, donose jasnu odluku – u Ilirik šalju već dokazanoga zapovjednika, Apija Klaudija Centona, da bi dodatno osigurao pogranično područje i ulaz u protektorat – isto područje koje će zbog svoje pozicije u narednim Livijevim podacima biti poprište sukoba drugoga fronta ratnih operacija Trećega makedonskog rata.

Lychnidus near Dassaretia was, in essence, continuation of Rome's policy of feigned altruism and alleged protection of the population living in the border areas of the strategically important protectorate. This tendency had been manifested from the very beginning of the Third Macedonian War: Sicinius' actions were instigated by Genthius' hesitance and the inevitability of war with Perseus, and Claudius' arrival to Lychnidus was caused by the Senate's growing suspicion about the Illyrian king. Livy has a point here – Genthius' dubious loyalty was not equally harmful to Roman intentions at the onset of the war and in 170 BC. In 170 BC it was the Macedonians who had the initiative, so Genthius' decision to side with Perseus came in the worst possible moment for the Roman war efforts. Sinicius' 172 BC mission was planned while large consular army was still not in Macedonia. As for Claudius' appointment in 170 BC, it took place after two very unsuccessful war seasons in which the Roman army, faced with Perseus' superior strategy, confined itself to pillaging Greek cities.⁴¹ In 170 BC it was the Macedonians who had the initiative, thus Genthius' decision to side with Perseus came in the worst possible moment for the Romans.

It is therefore easy to understand that Claudius' arrival to Illyricum should be perceived as an imperative reaction to the new shift in Genthius' behavior, but also – very likely – to Perseus' activities in 170 BC. Livy's unrelated entry tells us about Perseus' successful campaign against the Dardanians which, by all indications, took place in the second half of 170 BC.⁴² Its description is lost (it was in Livy's damaged 43rd book), but the intention of the Macedonian king was to protect his northwestern border. The presence of his army in the Lychnidus area must have posed a threat to the area secured earlier by Sinicius. From Rome's perspective, Perseus' assault on the Dardanians could have been a prelude for much more extensive operations that would culminate with elimination of Roman strongholds in the region. Another reason for Rome's reaction was its increased caution about the Illyrian king (quite justified, as it will eventually turn out). Both the Senate and Aulus Hostilius Mancinus – the consul in charge of the war against Perseus – made a clear decision: they will send the battle-tested commander Appius Claudius Centho to Illyricum to additionally secure the border areas and the access to the protectorate – the area that, due to its geographical location, will become the scene of the fighting on the second front in the theater of operations of the Third Macedonian War.

41 P. Derow 1989, 308–316. Sve do dolaska Lucija Emilija Paula u Makedoniju rimska je vojska bila u velikim problemima.

42 Liv. 43.19.14; N. Hammond 1988, 521; F. Papazoglu 2007, 130. Za referencu u Diod. 30.4 vidi F. Papazoglu 2007, 129, bilj. 127. Moguće da je u sklopu toga pohoda Perzej oduzeo Rimljanima neke bitne pozicije. F. Milivojević 2019a, 100–103.

41 P. Derow 1989, 308–316. The Roman army was in deep trouble until Lucius Aemilius Paullus' arrival to Macedonia.

42 Liv. 43.19.14; N. Hammond 1988, 521; F. Papazoglu 2007, 130. For reference in Diod. 30.4 see F. Papazoglu 2007, 129, n. 127. It is possible that it was during this campaign that Perseus took some important positions from the Romans. F. Milivojević 2019a, 100–103.


KLAUDIJEV LOGOR?

Stoga, niti je Rim tek 170. g. pr. Kr. konkretno reagirao na Gencijevu neodlučnost, niti je Klaudije poslan u Ilirik isključivo zbog opasnosti od ilirskoga kralja. Njegov zadatak bio je slojevit i važan te bi u povijest vjerojatno ušao upisan kao zaslužan zapovjednik u ratu da nije bio, kako Livije kaže, obuzet pohlepom koja zasljepljuje um. Nедуgo nakon dolaska u Lihnid saznajemo da je napao Uskanu, najveći grad Penesta.⁴³ Naspram činjenice da je Uskana u tom trenutku bila unutar Perzejeva teritorija i zaštićena makedonskom posadom, Livije piše da je glavni poticaj za napad bila tajna poruka upućena direktno Klaudiju. Navodno su stanovnici Uskane bili spremni izdati Perzeja pod uvjetom da rimska vojska dođe dovoljno blizu gradu. Zasljepljen potencijalnim plijenom, kako Livije osuđuje, a da nije zatražio taoce, provjerio istinitost poruke ili barem zadržao ljude koji su ju donijeli, na dogovoreni dan Klaudije je krenuo i podignuo logor dvanaest rimskih milja od grada (cca 17 km). Naredne noći ostavio je 1000 vojnika kao straže, dok je s ostatkom krenuo u napad koji je naposljetku završio jednim od težih rimskih poraza u Trećemu makedonskom ratu. Iznenadni neprijatelj je juriš već u prvome naletu u potpunosti je razbio njegovu vojsku, jedva 2000 vojnika uspjelo je pobjeći i vratiti se u logor, a iako

CLAUDIUS' CAMP?

For this reason, neither Rome waited until 170 BC to take concrete action against the wavering Genthius nor was Claudius sent to Illyricum only because of the threat posed by Genthius. His mission was complex and important. Had it not been for what Livy calls his self-deceiving greed, he would probably have been remembered by history as a commendable general. Soon after his arrival in Lychnidus, he attacked Uscana, the biggest city of the Penestae.⁴³ Explaining the reasons for the attack – Uscana being part of Perseus' territories at the time and having a Macedonian garrison in it – Livy says that the principal cause was a secret message sent directly to Claudius by its citizens. They were supposedly ready to betray Perseus if the Roman army took up position in the immediate vicinity of the city. Blinded by potential spoils and failing to take hostages, verify if the message was genuine or at least hold in custody those who brought the message – criticizes Livy – Claudius moved his troops and made camp 12 Roman miles (approx. 17km) from the city. The following night, having left 1,000 men to guard the camp, he attacked the city with the rest of his force. What ensued was one of the most crushing Roman defeats in the Third Macedonian War. A sudden onslaught of the enemy wiped his entire army; barely 2,000 soldiers managed to escape back to the camp. Not

Karta 1. Operacije
Apija Klaudija
Centona
Map 1. Appius
Claudius Centho's
operations.
izradio / made by:
F. Milivojević



43 Kičevo. Vidi N. Proeva, O. Branković 2002; N. Proeva 2014; N. Hammond 1972, 43, i d.


43 Kičevo. See N. Proeva, O. Branković 2002; N. Proeva 2014; N. Hammond 1972, 43, ff.

su ranjenici još uvijek pristizali, Klaudije je istoga trenutka povukao ostatak svoje vojske u Lihnid.⁴⁴

Livije je vrlo jasan u definiranju Klaudijeva napredovanja prema Uskani i zaista nije teško rekonstruirati trasu kojom je krenuo u napad. Komunikacije na tom području uvjetovane su planinsko-kotlinskim terenom zbog čega između današnjega Ohrida (Lihnid) i Kičeva (Uskana) postoji samo jedan konkretan pravac (Karta 1), cesta koja treba postati dio planirane autoceste A2 (Skopje – Tetovo – Gostivar – Kičevo – Ohrid). Teren se od antike do danas nije značajno mijenjao u tom pogledu i velika je vjerojatnost da je Klaudije krenuo na Uskanu spomenutom trasom. Međutim, dodatno intrigira Livijev podatak da je Klaudije podignuo logor 12 rimskih milja od Uskane (cca 17 do 18 kilometara). Pogleda li se teren i moguće udoline gdje bi Klaudije postavio logor, nameće se jedini zaključak: Klaudije je vrlo vjerojatno postavio svoj logor na prostoru između trokuta današnjih sela Laktinje – Vrbjani – Slivovo (Karta 2). Radi se o zadnjoj udolini između Lihnida i Uskane gdje je bilo pogodno podići logor te nakon koje prema Uskani

waiting for the survivors, Claudius withdrew the remnants of his army to Lychnidus.⁴⁴

As Livy is very exact in defining Claudius' advance towards Uscana, it is easy to recreate the route he used for the attack. Road communications in this area are conditioned by the mountain-valley terrain, which is why there is only one route between today's Ohrid (Lychnidus) and Kičevo (Uscana) (Map 1), the road that should become part of the planned A2 highway (Skopje – Tetovo – Gostivar – Kičevo – Ohrid). The terrain has not changed much since the Antiquity and it is very likely that Claudius used this route to reach Uscana. Intriguing, however, is Livy's claim that Claudius made camp 12 Roman miles from Uscana (approx. 17–18 kilometers). Given the characteristics of the terrain and the valleys suitable for Claudius' camp, there is but one conclusion to be made – his camp was very likely within the triangle formed by present-day villages of Laktinje, Vrbjani and Slivovo (Map 2). This was the last valley between Lychnidus and Uscana suitable for a camp; beyond that valley, only a narrow trail



**Karta 2. Moguća lokacija
Klaudijeva logora**
Map 2. Possible location of
Claudius' camp.

izradio / made by: F. Milivojević

44 Liv. 43.10; N. Hammond 1988, 522 prenosi krive podatke jer spominje da je Klaudije napao grad sa 12000 vojnika, te da se nakon poraza vratio u Lihnid sa 3000 ranjenika, što ne može biti točno. Livije jasno piše da je Klaudije u Lihnidu imao 8000 vojnika i da se povukao u Lihnid sa 2000 ranjenika. Senatsku reakciju na Klaudijev poraz vidi u Liv. 43.11; F. Milivojević 2021b.

44 Liv. 43.10; N. Hammond 1988, 522 gives incorrect facts: He says that Claudius attacked the city with a force 12,000 strong and that, after the defeat, he returned to Lychnidus with 3,000 wounded men. This cannot be because Livy specifically says that Claudius had 8,000 troops in Lychnidus and that he retreated there with 2,000 wounded soldiers. For the Senate's reaction to Claudius' defeat, see Liv. 43.11; F. Milivojević 2021b.



Slika 2. Proširenje između Lihnida i Uskane

Figure 2. Plateau between Lychnidus and Uscana

obradio / edited by: F. Milivojević

vodi užu planinski prolaz. Štoviše, ta pozicija odgovara Livijevu opisu: udaljena je od Lihnida otprilike duljinu jednoga dana marša rimskih vojnika (cca 30 km) te upravo 17 do 18 kilometara od Uskane, tj. cca Livijevih 12 rimskih milja (Sl. 2).⁴⁵

Nadalje, analizira li se поближе teren udoline i potencijalne mikrolokacije postavljanja logora, već na prvi pogled ističe se njezina strateški najdominantnija pozicija (Sl. 3). Riječ je o povišenju/platou koje je sa svoje tri strane (S, J, I) vjerojatno formirano dvjema danas isušanim vododerinama, dok se sa zapadne strane nadvija dodatno povišenje koje je u nekoj ranijoj fazi naseljavanja moglo poslužiti kao dodatna obrambena pozicija.⁴⁶ Ta pozicija u potpunosti

leads to Uscana through the mountains. Indeed, this location corresponds with Livy's description – it is about a day's march from Lychnidus (Roman soldiers could cover approx. 30km in a day) and 17–18km (Livy's 12 Roman miles) from Uscana (Fig. 2).⁴⁵


Also, if we analyze in detail the terrain in the valley and potential microlocations for the camp, the strategically most dominant position is readily observable (Fig. 3). It is a plateau surrounded with two gullies – former streambeds – on three sides (N, S, E) and high ground to the west (in earlier times possibly used as an additional defense position).⁴⁶ This position allows full control of access to

45 Duljina jednoga dana rimskoga marša varirala je između 20 i 30 kilometara, ovisno o tome jesu li u maršu bile zaprežne životinje, opsadne sprave itd. Kilometražom kraći dnevni marševi obično su oni gdje rimska vojska tek trebala odabrati logistički centar i ovisno o brzini zaprežnih životinja. Budući da je Klaudije to imao u Lihnidu, kilometrima nešto dulji marš čini se sasvim opravdan, tim više jer je tih 30 km mogao prevaliti u kraćem vremenu (moguće i bez životinja, s obzirom na opis operacije koju je očito trebao brzo izvesti) te zbog toga što teren do spomenutoga proširenja nije suviše zahtjevan. Detaljnije o nastupanju rimske vojske na terenu u Goldsworthy 2011.

46 Mora se priznati da je cijelo ovo povišenje zaista veliko (duljina povišenja je oko 2 km) i postavlja se pitanje branjivosti lokacije, tj. razine obrambenih sposobnosti koje bi potencijalni naseljenici morali imati (broja vojnika itd.), a da dugoročno održavanje naselja ima smisla.

45 The length of a day's march varied from 20 to 30 kilometers, depending on whether marching units had with them harness animals, siege engines etc. Shorter day's marches were usually undertaken when Roman army were yet to set up its logistics center and when they included harness animals which limited the marching speed. Since Claudius had already organized such a center in Lychnidus, a longer march seems justified, all the more so because these 30 kilometers could be covered in a shorter period of time (possibly even without animals, as the description of the operation indicates that it was to be carried out swiftly) and because the terrain leading to the abovementioned plateau was not too demanding. For more on Roman troops' movements in the field, see Goldsworthy 2011.

46 Admittedly, as this high ground is a massive feature (approx. 2 kilometers long), the question arises if such a location was defensible – in other words, what defense capacity would potential settlers have to have (the number of soldiers etc.) in order to enable long-term sustainment of their settlement.



Slika 3. Moguća pozicija rimskoga logora

Figure 3. Possible location of Roman camp

obradio / edited by: F. Miliwojević

kontrolira ulaz u udolinu iz smjera Lihnida i, najvažnije – zatvara planinski prolaz prema Uskani.⁴⁷ S obzirom na Livijev opis Klaudijeva napredovanja, postavljanje pohodnoga logora na toj lokaciji čini se vrlo mogućim. Naravno, ovdje se radi o strateškoj pretpostavci, no ako se jednoga dana ispostavi da je ideja o postavljanju logora u toj udolini točna, predložena mikrolokacija logora svakako je najlogičniji izbor.⁴⁸

Tako se cijela priča oko Klaudijeva napredovanja prema Uskani raspetljava. Radilo se o zapovjedniku koji je odabrao vrlo logičnu točku logora iz kojega se relativno brzo, za antičke standarde, moglo doći do Uskane (Sl. 4). Njegov poraz pak, vidjet ćemo, imao je velikoga odjeka u Rimu.

the valley from the direction of Lychnidus and – most importantly – closes the mountain trail leading to Uscana.⁴⁷ Based on Livy's description of Claudius' advance, choosing this location for setting up a marching camp seems like a very realistic possibility. Of course, this is merely a strategic assumption. However, if it turns out one day that the theory that the camp was set up in this valley is correct, the proposed microlocation will certainly be the most logical choice.⁴⁸


The story about Claudius' advance towards Uscana thus begins to disentangle. He chose a very logical location for the camp, from where Uscana could be reached relatively quickly for the standards of the day (Fig. 4). His defeat, as we will see, resonated in Rome.

47 Vidi na sl. 3 broj 1 i pogled s platoa prema planinskom prolazu.

48 Pohodni logori rijetko ostavljaju trajnije tragove u prirodi i pitanje je u kojoj mjeri arheologija može pomoći.

47 See fig. 3 under 1 and the mountain trail as seen from the plateau.

48 Since no lasting traces of marching camps are usually found in nature, it is questionable if archaeology can be of assistance here.



Slika 4. Klaudijev napad na Uskanu

Figure 4. Claudius' attack on Uscana

obradio / edited by: F. Milivojević

APIJE KLAUDIJE ILI LUCIJE CELIJE?

Livijeve riječi o Klaudiju imaju jasnu subjektivnu „notu“ u procjeni njegova rasuđivanja, formulirane očito naknadno, kada su posljedice poraza kod Uskane bile vidljive.⁴⁹ U kojoj god mjeri Livijeve riječi bile doista točne te neopreznost, pohlepa i tajne poruke dovele do pogrešnoga Klaudijeva pristupa cijeloj situaciji, jedno je sigurno – napad se dogodio tijekom zime, na samome kraju 170. g. pr. Kr., i bio je strateški opravdan. Uskana je kontrolirala tri važna puta: a) prema istoku i ulazu u zapadnu Makedoniju (smjer Makedonski Brod – Prilep); b) na sjever prema Pološkoj dolini, padinama Šar-planine i granici s Ilirskim Kraljevstvom (smjer Gostivar – Tetovo); c) prema jugozapadu i ulasku u rimski protektorat (Drugovo – Popoec – Pesočani – Struga/Ohrid).⁵⁰ Kao jedna od najvažnijih pozicija regije, ovisno tko ju je posjedovao, Uskana je davala značajnu stratešku prednost u vojnim sukobima i kontroli nad operativnim

APPIUS CLAUDIUS OR LUCIUS COELIUS?

Livy's comments on Claudius' judgements are clearly subjective; obviously, he chose his wording when the aftereffects of Claudius' defeat were still tangible.⁴⁹ Regardless of how correct Livy's comments are and whether Claudius' carelessness, greed and secret messages really affected his judgements in the whole situation, one thing is certain – the attack took place in winter at the end of 170 BC and was justified from strategic point of view. Uscana controlled three important routes: a) to Western Macedonia to the east (Makedonski Brod – Prilep direction); b) to Polog Valley, Šar Mountain foothills and border of Illyrian Kingdom to the north (Gostivar – Tetovo direction), and c) to the Roman protectorate to the southwest (Drugovo – Popoec – Pesočani – Struga/Ohrid).⁵⁰ As one of the most important positions in the region – for whoever possessed it at any given time –

49 Vijest o Klaudijevu porazu uznemirila je Senat do te mjere da su izaslanici Marko Fulvije Flak i Marko Kaninije Rebil poslani istražiti što se točno dogodilo kod Uskane. Izaslanici su pokušali umanjiti sramotu Klaudijeva poraza izjavom da je poginulo vrlo malo italjskih vojnika (većinom su saveznici stradali), što se posebno nije sviđalo Senatu. Liv. 43.11.1–2; F. Milivojević 2021a, 46.

50 F. Milivojević 2021a, 43. To se dodatno može vidjeti na Karti 1 i Slici 3. F. Milivojević 2021b, 458.

49 The Senate was so alarmed by the news of Claudius' defeat that it sent two envoys, Marcus Fulvius Flaccus and Marcus Caninius Rebilus, to investigate what exactly happened at Uscana. The envoys tried to diminish Claudius' shame by reporting that there were very few casualties among the troops from Italy (most of the casualties were from Allied ranks), which was not to the Senate's liking. Liv. 43.11.1–2; F. Milivojević 2021a, 46.

50 F. Milivojević 2021a, 43. This can also be seen in Map 1 and Figure 3. F. Milivojević 2021b, 458.

pravicima. Uzme li se u obzir relativno kratka udaljenost od Lihnida, Klaudijeva odluka da iznenadnim napadom odzme Perzeju bitnu točku u daljemu vođenju rata s Rimom sasvim je razumljiva u kontekstu Trećega makedonskog rata. Ono što je u najmanju ruku dvojbena i nejasno općenita je kronologija Klaudijevih aktivnosti, započeta spomenutim napadom.

Postoji, naime, jedan historiografski problem, uvelike uzrokovan kontradiktornim Livijevim podacima o razdoblju između 170. i 169. g. pr. Kr.: izvještaj o Klaudijevu napadu na Uskanu preklapa se s drugim Livijevim podacima gdje, bez kontekstualnoga objašnjenja, stoji da je izvjesni Lucije Celije pokušao osvojiti isti grad. Celije je navodno bio u Lihnidu i zadužen za Ilirik (*legatus Romanus*). Nije se usudio na određene poteze dok je kralj još uvijek bio u blizini, ali kada je Perzej napustio regiju, pokušao je povratiti Uskanu od Makedonaca. Neprijateljski garnizon odbio je njegov napad i Celije se vratio u Lihnid s velikim brojem ranjenih vojnika. Nakon nekoliko dana poslao je Marka Trebelija iz Fregele sa snažnim odredom među Peneste kako bi primio taoce od onih gradova koji su ostali vjerni Rimu. Također, Trebelije je posjetio Partine jer su i oni obećali dati taoce. Uspješno završivši zadatak, vitezovi Penesta poslani su u Apoloniju, a oni od Partina u Dirahij.⁵¹

Sličnost izvještaja o Klaudijevu i Celijevu porazu bio je poticaj velikome broju suvremenih autora da zaključe da je Livije podatke o Celiju i Klaudiju dobio iz dva različita izvora te pomiješao identitet zapovjednika koji je bio zadužen za napad na Uskanu.⁵² No čini se da nema potrebe za takvim zaključcima. Prije svega, Livije doista govori o dva različita događaja. Kada piše o Celijevu napadu, jasno je da općenito dokumentira aktivnosti rimskih zapovjednika poslanih da zaštite Ilirik. Radi se o kompilaciji sporednih podataka o aktivnostima tijekom Trećega makedonskog rata, prikladno smještenih na sam kraj Livijeve 43. knjige kao „ostali“ događaji godine. Kada izvještaj o Celijevu napadu i porazu završava, počinje priča o Klaudijevu neuspjelom napadu na Fanotu u Epiru.⁵³ U istome paragrafu Livije čini jasnu razliku između dva različita zapovjednika s dva različita zadatka. Štoviše, Livijevo objašnjenje zašto je Klaudije uopće odlučio napasti Fanotu daje odlučujući argument – potencijalnim osvajanjem toga snažno utvrđenog grada Klaudije je namjeravao izbrisati sramotu svoga poraza u Iliriku.

Uscana provided important advantages in military conflicts and control over operational routes. Given its relatively close vicinity to Lychnidus, Claudius' decision to make a sudden attack on Uscana and thus deprive Perseus of a stronghold important for his further actions was perfectly understandable in the context of the Third Macedonian War. What remains questionable and uncertain is the general chronology of Claudius' activities that followed the attack.

There is one historiographic problem here, largely caused by some contradictions in Livy's account of the period between 170 and 169 BC – he reports that Claudius attacked Uscana while mentioning at the same time – without any contextual explanation – that certain Lucius Coelius also tried to take the same city. Apparently, Coelius was in charge of Illyricum (*legatus Romanus*) and was based in Lychnidus. He did not dare make certain moves while Perseus was still in vicinity, but the moment the king left the region he tried to retake Uscana from the Macedonians. However, the enemy garrison fended off his attack and Coelius returned to Lychnidus with many wounded soldiers. After a few days he sent Marcus Trebellius of Fregellae with a strong detachment among the Penestae to take hostages from those cities that remained loyal to Rome. He also paid a visit to the Parthini because they, too, had promised to provide hostages. His mission was successful. The knights of the Penestae were sent to Apollonia and those of the Parthini to Dyrrhachium.⁵¹

The similarity of the accounts of the defeats of Claudius and Coelius led some contemporary authors to conclude that Livy had obtained information about them from two different sources and had been mistaken about the identity of the commander in charge of the attack on Uscana.⁵² It seems, however, there is no need for such conclusions. First of all, Livy does talk about two different events. It is clear that his account of Coelius' attack is part of his general notes on the activities of the Roman commanders sent to protect Illyricum. It is a compilation of less important facts about various activities during the Third Macedonian War, suitably placed at the end of Livy's 43rd book, in the section about "other" events of the year. Thus, where the account on Coelius' attack and defeat ends, the story of Claudius' failed attack on Phanote in Epirus begins.⁵³ In the same section, Livy makes a clear distinction between two commanders with two different tasks. Indeed, Livy's explanation why Claudius decided to attack Phanote in the first place contains the crucial argument – by capturing this strongly fortified city,

51 Liv. 43.21.1–4. U P. Meloni 1953, 274, bilj. 1 Celije je nazvan nasljednikom Sicinija, međutim ipak se Klaudijeve aktivnosti nastavljaju na Sicinijeve, dok o samome Celiju nemamo drugih podataka.

52 Autori koji misle da se radi o dupliciranome izvještaju su J. Komayer 1907, 261; G. De Sanctis 1917, 296; R. Broughton 1951, 422; H. Scullard 1951, 201; P. Meloni 1953, 279–280. Autori koji u to sumnjaju (ali bez odlučujućih argumenata): B. Niese 1903, 142, 144; E. Pais 1931, 282; N. Vulić 1934, 223; N. Hammond 1972, 45, bilj. 1.

53 Liv. 43.21.4–5.

51 Liv. 43.21.1–4. In P. Meloni 1953, 274, n. 1, Coelius is referred to as the successor of Sicinius; however, it was Claudius' activities that succeeded the ones of Sicinius, while we have no other information about Coelius himself.

52 The authors who believe these are two accounts about the same event include: J. Komayer 1907, 261; G. De Sanctis 1917, 296; R. Broughton 1951, 422; H. Scullard 1951, 201; P. Meloni 1953, 279–280. The authors doubting it (but not substantiating their doubts with relevant arguments): B. Niese 1903, 142, 144; E. Pais 1931, 282; N. Vulić 1934, 223; N. Hammond 1972, 45, n. 1.

53 Liv. 43.21.4–5.

Stoga nema dvojbe da je Livije znao razliku između zapovjednika i nije pomiješao identitet onoga koji je napao Uskanu. Bila su dva napada – Klaudijev i potom Celijev. No kada datirati Celijev napad na Uskanu? Klaudijev se dogodio u zimu, na kraju 170. g. pr. Kr., dok je datacija Celijeva napada otežana zbog manjka drugih podataka. Naznaka bi mogla biti u Livijevu analističkom pristupu zapisivanja istovremenih događanja,⁵⁴ čime bi vremenski okvir Celijeva napada ovisio o dataciji Klaudijeva napada na Fanotu. A za to, unatoč Livijevu opsežnom opisu bitke bez ikakve kronološke natuknice, imamo komplementarne podatke koji upućuju na drugu polovinu 169. g. pr. Kr. Preciznije, Polibije donosi posve izolirani podatak da je konzul Marcije saznao za Klaudijev zahtjev Ahajcima za pojačanjem (5000 pješaka). Kako bi osigurao da se to ne dogodi, konzul je na ahajsku skupštinu u Sikion poslao osobno Polibija koji je, u poprilično dugome govoru, naveo da ni jedan saveznik nije obvezan slati pojačanja rimskom zapovjedniku ako to ne traži po odluci Senata. Očito iz opreznosti, skupština je diplomatski odlučila prepustiti odluku Marciju koji na kraju odbija Klaudijev zahtjev iz, kako Polibije piše,⁵⁵ teško dokučivih razloga. Situacija je bila posve nejasna i Polibije se našao u nezgodnoj poziciji između dva rimska zapovjednika.⁵⁶ Konteksta nema, ni dodatnih objašnjenja. Iz cijele priče pak najvažnije su dvije stavke: 1) zahtjev za pojačanjem dovodi se u vezu s Klaudijevim operacijama u Epiru; 2) odbija ga upravo Kvint Marcije Filip, konzul 169. g. pr. Kr. i vrhovni zapovjednik rimskih snaga u Makedoniji.⁵⁷ Sukladno tome, Klaudijev napad na Fanotu (kao i Celijev na Uskanu) treba datirati u period nakon što je Marcije uopće došao u Makedoniju i preuzeo funkciju vrhovnoga zapovjednika – kako Livije piše – tek u proljeće 169. g. pr. Kr.⁵⁸ Kronologija je jasna. Potaknut sramotom poraza kod Uskane, Klaudije je odlučio na svoju ruku napasti grad gdje se nalazio Klen, Perzejev zapovjednik. Jednako kao i Celijeva inicijativa kod Uskane, napad je završio povlačenjem nazad u Ilirik s velikim gubitcima, stavljanjem preostalih garnizona u zimovnike i odlaskom u Rim da bi ponudio žrtve bogovima.⁵⁹ Na kraju, oba zapovjednika dočekala su kraj 169. g. pr. Kr. u vrlo teškoj situaciji, poraženi i bez pojačanja.

Claudius hoped to clear his name from the shame brought upon him by his defeat in Illyricum.

There is no doubt Livy knew the difference between the two commanders and did not misidentify the one who attacked Uscana. There were two attacks – that of Claudius and then that of Coelius. But when should we date Coelius' attack on Uscana? Claudius' attack took place in winter, at the end of 170 BC, while dating Coelius' attack is difficult due to the lack of other information. Perhaps some indication might be found in Livy's analytical approach in recording simultaneous events,⁵⁴ in which case the timeframe of Coelius' attack would depend on the dating of Claudius' attack on Phanota. As regards the latter attack, despite Livy's extensive description of the battle that lacks any chronological note, complementary data indicate that it took place in the second half of 169 BC. Specifically, out of any context, Polybius mentions that consul Marcius found out that Claudius had made a request to the Achaeans to send him 5,000 infantrymen as reinforcement. In order to prevent that, consul sent Polybius to the Achaean assembly in Sicyon. In a lengthy speech, Polybius pointed out that no ally of Rome is obligated to send reinforcements to a Roman commander if such a request had not been approved by the Senate. As an obvious precaution, the assembly diplomatically left the decision to Marcius. Eventually, he rejected Claudius' request for, as Polybius puts it,⁵⁵ unfathomable reasons. The situation was unclear and Polybius found himself in an awkward position in between two Roman commanders.⁵⁶ The context is lacking and so is any additional explanation. But two things are the most important in the whole story: 1) The request for reinforcements was associated with Claudius' operations in Epirus; 2) It was Quintus Marcius Philippus, the supreme commander of Roman forces in Macedonia and a consul in 169 BC – who rejected it.⁵⁷ Consequently, Claudius' attack on Phanote (and Coelius' on Uscana) should be dated to the period following Marcius' arrival to Macedonia to assume the function. This was not before the spring of 169 BC.⁵⁸ The chronology is clear. On his own initiative, disgraced by his defeat at Uscana, Claudius attacked the city where Perseus' commander Clenas had his headquarters. Just like Coelius' initiative at Uscana, the attack ended with heavy losses, withdrawal to Illyricum, confining the remaining garrisons to their winter quarters and his departure for Rome to make sacrifices to gods.⁵⁹ At the end of 169 BC, both commanders found

54 Celije i Klaudije povukli su se u Ilirik u isto vrijeme – kada je zima već počela. Vidi bilj. 50 i 52.

55 Polyb. 28.13.7–14. Daljni Polibijev tekst otkriva da je Marcije podmitio ljude koji su ga htjeli optužiti pred Klaudijem. J. Kromayer 1907, 265, bilj. 1, 293, 338; E. Gruen 1984, 509.

56 Polyb. 28.13.8–10. Marcije je privatno dao naputke Polibiju.

57 Liv. 43.15.2 (podatak da je Marcije ždrijebom dobio zaduženje u ratu protiv Perzeja).

58 Liv. 44.1.1.

59 Liv. 43.23.2–7. Klaudije je Fanotu napao sa 6000 vojnika, ali Klen, Perzejev zapovjednik, uspio je odbiti njegov napad; P. Meloni 1953, 283; N. Hammond 1967, 630.

54 Coelius and Claudius withdrew to Illyricum at the same time – when winter was already setting in. See n. 50 and 52.

55 Polyb. 28.13.7–14. Further in the text, Polybius reveals that Marcius bribed those who wanted to accuse him in front of Claudius. J. Kromayer 1907, 265, n. 1, 293, 338; E. Gruen 1984, 509.

56 Polyb. 28.13.8–10. Marcius privately gave instructions to Polybius.

57 Liv. 43.15.2 (according to Livy, Marcius received his assignment in the war against Perseus after drawing lots).

58 Liv. 44.1.1.

59 Liv. 43.23.2–7. Claudius attacked Phanote with 6,000 troops, but Clenas, Perseus' commander, managed to fend off the attack; P. Meloni 1953, 283; N. Hammond 1967, 630.

USPJEH I PAD

Unatoč uzastopnim porazima kod Uskane i Fanote, čini se da Klaudijeve ratne aktivnosti 170./169. g. pr. Kr. nisu bile baš tako loše – postoji mogućnost da je Klaudije ipak uspio zauzeti Uskanu prije nego je napao Fanotu. Naznaka toga postoji u Livijevu izvještaju o Perzejevu protunapadu na rimske pozicije.⁶⁰ Kako piše, na početku zime Perzej se nije usudio napustiti Makedoniju zbog straha da bi Rimljani mogli prodrijeti u njegovo kraljevstvo. No čim je snijeg blokirao planinske prolaze iz smjera Tesalije, odlučio je napasti područje koje, eksplicitno, omogućava pristup Makedoniji iz Ilirika i gdje su Iliri davali Rimljanima dobre pozicije. Dodatan Perzejev motiv za napad bila je misao da bi pokoravanjem tih Ilira potaknuo Gencija na savezništvo. S tim na umu, krenuo je sa 12 000 vojnika i 500 konjanika te uskoro došao do Stubere.⁶¹ Iz grada je uzeo namirnice, opadnu opremu i krenuo u pohod koji je na kraju završio predajom rimskoga garnizona u Uskani (4000 vojnika), osvajanjem gradova Draudakija i Oneja,⁶² a posredovanjem rimskih zapovjednika iz Uskane makedonski je kralj prihvatio predaju 11 utvrda i 1500 rimskih vojnika. Uspješno završivši te poslove, Perzej je poslao izaslanike na Gencijev dvor kod Labeata, vratio se u regiju, pojačao garnizone u Uskani i ostalim osvojenim gradovima te se najzad povukao u Makedoniju.

Unatoč fragmentarnom stanju Livijeve 43. knjige, iz kronološkoga slijeda izvještaja koji opisuju razdoblje od 170. g. pr. Kr. nadalje, sasvim je jasno da se taj Perzejev kontranapad dogodio u zimu, na samome početku 169. g. pr. Kr.⁶³ Uzrok je naizgled poznat. Rimske pozicije u regiji prijetile su zapadnoj Makedoniji te se njezin kralj morao pozabaviti osiguravanjem granica da bi u proljeće izbjegao rat na dva fronta. Radilo se o rijetkoj situaciji kada je Perzej mogao obratiti pozornost na rimske aktivnosti izvan okvira Tesalije, pri čemu treba naglasiti da se čini kako ga je, naspram dobrih rimskih pozicija, konkretniji događaj u regiji oko Lihnida nagnao na akciju. Naime, putem izvještaja o Klaudijevu porazu kod Uskane poznato je da je grad imao makedonski garnizon, dok početkom 169. g. pr. Kr. Perzej napada isti grad, ali s rimskim garnizonom. To upućuje na opravdanu pretpostavku da je u kratkome roku od nekoliko mjeseci između Klaudijeva poraza i Perzejeva

themselves in a very difficult situation, defeated and without reinforcements.

THE TRIUMPH AND THE FALL

Despite his successive defeats at Uscana and Phanote, it seems that Claudius' operations in 170/169 BC were not unsuccessful altogether – it is possible that Claudius managed to take Uscana after all, before attacking Phanote. This is indicated in Livy's account on Perseus' counterattack on Roman positions.⁶⁰ He says that Perseus did not dare leave Macedonia in early winter fearing that the Romans could penetrate his kingdom. But as soon as snow blocked the mountain passes leading to Thessaly, he decided to attack the region that – explicitly – enables access from Illyricum to Macedonia and where the Illyrians had allowed the Romans to occupy strategic positions. Another Perseus' motive for the attack was the idea that subjugation of these Illyrians would encourage Genthius to form an alliance with him. With this in mind, the Macedonian king headed towards Stuberra with 12,000 infantrymen and 500 cavalrymen.⁶¹ There he supplied his troops with provisions and siege engines and set out to the campaign that eventually ended with the surrender of the Roman garrison in Uscana (4,000 troops), taking of Draudacium and Oaneum,⁶² and, through the mediation of Roman commanders from Uscana, surrendering of 11 forts and 1,500 Roman troops. Having accomplished all this, Perseus sent his envoys to Genthius' court in the land of the Labeatae, returned to the region, reinforced the garrisons in Uscana and other conquered cities and then withdrew back to Macedonia.

Despite the fragmentary condition of Livy's 43rd book, the chronology of the events describing the period from 170 BC on clearly indicates that this counterattack of Perseus took place in early 169 BC, in winter.⁶³ The reason for it is seemingly known. The Roman troops deployed in the region posed a threat to Western Macedonia, so its king had to secure its borders in order to avoid having to fight on two fronts in the spring. It was a rare situation when Perseus could pay attention to Roman activities outside Thessaly. It should be noted here that, in addition to mere presence of Roman troops, there was a specific individual event in the

60 Liv. 43.18–20; N. Hammond 1967, 629–630; J. Wilkes 1996, 172–173; F. Milivojević 2021a, 46–48.

61 Najvjerojatnije Čepigovo. P. Meloni 1953, 275; F. Papazoglu 1953; N. Hammond 1972, 67–68; V. Kalpakovska 1999.

62 Najvjerojatnije Gostivar i Tetovo. O raznim prijedlozima lokacije vidi F. Milivojević 2021a, 47, bilj. 168.

63 Primjerice, u paragrafu koji prethodi opisu Perzejeva protunapada, vidljivo je da Livije opisuje kraj 170. g. pr. Kr. kada su rimski saveznici bili u stanju političkoga nemira koji je vrlo lako mogao eskalirati u ozbiljan problem. Zbog toga su rimski izaslanici upućeni u Ahaju, Etoliju i Akarnaniju te su po završetku zadatka pristigli u Larisu gdje se nalazio prokonzul Hostilije (konzul 171. g. pr. Kr., prokonzul 170. g. pr. Kr.). Kako je zima na kraju godine već počela, Hostilije je u zimovališta u Ambrakiji poslao 1000 vojnika i jednoga od izaslanika, Popilija. Liv. 43.17.

60 Liv. 43.18–20; N. Hammond 1967, 629–630; J. Wilkes 1996, 172–173; F. Milivojević 2021a, 46–48.

61 Čepigovo, most likely. P. Meloni 1953, 275; F. Papazoglu 1953; N. Hammond 1972, 67–68; V. Kalpakovska 1999.

62 Gostivar and Tetovo, most likely. For various propositions for the location, see F. Milivojević 2021a, 47, n. 168.

63 For example, in the section preceding the description of Perseus' counterattack, it is obvious that Livy describes late 170 BC, when Roman allies were in a state of political turmoil which could easily escalate into a serious problem. This is why Roman envoys were sent to Achaea, Aetolia and Acarnania. Having completed their task, they reached Larissa, where they were received by proconsul Hostilius (consul in 171 BC, proconsul in 170 BC). As the year was coming to its end and winter was setting in, Hostilius sent 1,000 troops and one of the envoys (Popilius) to the winter quarters in Ambracia. Liv. 43.17.

kontranapada Uskana postala rimska. Iako nemamo podataka o rimskim uspjesima u regiji, doista nema razloga ne povjerovati da ih je bilo. Oštećenost Livijeve 43. knjige ne dopušta detaljnije upoznavanje s povijesnim događajima spomenutoga razdoblja, tako da ovisimo o povremenim naznakama događaja o kojima su direktni podatci izgubljeni. A u ovom slučaju naznake su jasne – Klaudije napada makedonsku Uskanu, dok ubrzo nakon toga Perzej osvaja rimsku Uskanu. U međuvremenu se nešto jednostavno moralo dogoditi.⁶⁴

Moguća su dva scenarija. Prvi bi podrazumijevao da je nakon povlačenja u Lihnid Klaudije uspio reorganizirati svoju vojsku, od saveznika dobiti pojačanje i ponovnim napadom osvojiti grad. Budući da je zima već počela, ostavio je jaku posadu i povukao se u zimovalište u Lihnidu. Drugi scenarij pretpostavlja da su stanovnici Uskane doista imali namjeru svrstati se na rimsku stranu, naknadno izbacili makedonsku posadu iz grada i ovoga puta s garancijama vjernosti primili Klaudijevu posadu u grad. Oba scenarija imaju svoje kritike. Ona ponovljenoga napada je – vrijeme. Klaudije je načelno mogao dobiti pojačanja od saveznika u regiji, ili čak mobilizirati dio garnizona koji je Sicinije prethodno postavio, ali uzme li se u obzir da je vrlo brzo nakon poraza uslijedio Perzejev protunapad, pitanje je koliko je Klaudije imao vremena za pribavljanje pojačanja i ponovni napad. Isto tako, kritika naknadnoga svrstavanja stanovnika Uskane uz Rim je Livijev opis Klaudijeva napada na grad. Iz njega se može iščitati da je većinsko stanovništvo sudjelovalo u razbijanju rimske vojske. Ako su stanovnici bili naklonjeni Makedoniji, što opravdava njihovu brzu promjenu vjernosti nakon pobjede u bitci koja ih je samo još više ohrabrila? Koji god scenarij bio točan, činjenica je da je Uskana postala rimska te bi upravo takav razvoj događaja potaknuo Perzeja na protunapad. Gubitak strateški bitnoga grada koji kontrolira ulaz u zapadnu Makedoniju nije bio zanemariv te kao glavni cilj svojih operacija, u zimu 169. g. pr. Kr., Perzej postavlja osvajanje Uskane.⁶⁵

Kad je riječ o ostalim pozicijama koje je Perzej osvojio, manje je vjerojatno da prisutnost posada u 11 utvrda treba povezati s Klaudijevim aktivnostima, kao što su neki znanstvenici skloni.⁶⁶ Osiguravanje Uskane, zbog svoje relativne blizine Lihnidu, još je bilo moguće s obzirom na težak poraz krajem 170. g. pr. Kr., međutim sumnjam da je Klaudije imao dovoljno snaga i, najvažnije, vremena utvrditi široko područje od Lihnida do padina Šar-planine. Takve opsežne aktivnosti radije bi trebalo vezati za jednoga drugog zapovjednika – Klaudijeva prethodnika – Gneja Sicinija koji 172. g. pr. Kr. šalje 2000 vojnika u utvrde Dasareta i Ilira. Uz Klaudijevo osvajanje Uskane u zimu 170. g. pr. Kr., dvogodišnje

vicinity of Lychnidus that forced him to take action. Owing to the account on Claudius' defeat at Uscana, it is known that there was a Macedonian garrison in the city; however, in early 169 BC, when Perseus attacked Uscana, there was a Roman garrison there. It is therefore safe to presume that, in the short period of a few months between Claudius' defeat and Perseus' counterattack, Uscana was taken by the Romans. While there are no sources substantiating it, we can safely conclude that the Romans did have some success in the region. As Livy's damaged 43rd book does not provide details of the historical events of the period, we depend on occasional indications referring to the events the details of which are lost. In this case, indications are clear: Claudius attacked the Macedonian-held Uscana and soon after that Perseus took the Roman-held Uscana. Logically, something must have happened in the meantime.⁶⁴

There are two possible scenarios. The first one would presume that, upon withdrawing to Lychnidus, Claudius managed to regroup his army, obtain reinforcements from the allies and take the city at second try. As the winter had already set in, he left a strong garrison behind and withdrew to the winter quarters in Lychnidus. According to the second scenario, the inhabitants of Uscana indeed intended to side with the Romans, so they subsequently ousted the Macedonian garrison and – this time with a guarantee of loyalty – welcomed Claudius' garrison. Both scenarios have met with criticism. In the case of the one with the repeated attack, the problem is – time. In principle, Claudius could have received reinforcements from the regional allies, or even mobilize part of the garrison deployed earlier by Sicinius, but the question remains how much time did Claudius had for getting the reinforcements and attacking again if we take into account that Perseus' counterattack took place soon after the defeat? As for the scenario based on subsequent siding of the Uscana's inhabitants with Rome – it doesn't add up if we keep in mind Livy's description of the attack. According to Livy, a majority of Uscana's population took part in crushing of the Roman army. If they were inclined to Macedonia, what caused this sudden twist in their loyalty after the victory that would logically encourage them to keep supporting the Macedonians? Whichever scenario was correct, the fact is that Uscana became Roman and such course of events would encourage Perseus' counterattack. The loss of a strategically important city that controlled access to Western Macedonia was not something to be ignored, which is why, in the winter of 169 BC, Perseus set retaking of Uscana as the main objective of his operations.⁶⁵

As regards other positions taken by Perseus, it is less likely that the presence of garrisons in 11 forts can be connected

64 Uostalom, Livije piše da je sam Celije pokušao povratiti grad od Makedonaca (*Uscanam retinere*). Vidi bilj. 50.

65 F. Milivojević 2019b, 95–98.

66 N. Hammond 1988, 524.

64 Besides, Livy says that Coelius himself tried to retake the city from the Macedonians (*Uscanam retinere*). See n. 50.

65 F. Milivojević 2019b, 95–98.

grupiranje rimskih snaga potaknulo bi makedonskoga kralja da napokon riješi problem na području gdje, kako Livije piše, Iliri daju Rimljanima dobre pozicije.

Dosadašnja je kronologija Klaudijevih aktivnosti sljedeća:

1. 170. g. pr. Kr. – Klaudije dolazi u Ilirik na kraju godine i napada Uskanu
2. 170./169. g. pr. Kr. – poražen se vraća u Lihnid, ali ipak uspijeva staviti rimski garnizon u Uskanu
3. 169. g. pr. Kr. – potaknut vijestima iz regije, Perzej se odlučuje na napad i osvaja Uskanu, Draudakij, Onej i 11 utvrda
4. 169. g. pr. Kr. – nakon proljeća Klaudije napada Fanotu ne bi li vratio čast svom imenu, dok Celije iz Lihnida pokušava vratiti Uskanu u rimske ruke. Oba su zapovjednika poražena i vraćaju se u Ilirik tijekom zime te dočekuju kraj godine bez pojačanja i u teškoj poziciji.

Zadnje podatke o Klaudiju dobivamo u kontekstu 168. g. pr. Kr. i oni ukazuju na posljedice Klaudijeva poraza kod Uskane i Fanote, kao i na općenite posljedice dotadašnjega vođenja Trećega makedonskog rata po rimski cilj. Na oba fronta ratnih operacija, u Tesaliji i oko Lihnida, Rim se našao u nezavidnoj situaciji. Perzejev protunapad na Uskanu i sjevernije pozicije eliminirao je sve rimske garnizone u regiji, otpočeli su pregovori između Gencija i Perzeja oko uključivanja ilirskoga kralja u rat protiv Rima, istovremeno dok se rimska konzularna vojska u Tesaliji našla u opasnoj situaciji, odsječena i bez provizija. To znamo jer je novoizabrani konzul, Lucije Emilije Paulo, prije nego što je s novom vojskom krenuo u Makedoniju i preuzeo zapovjedništvo u ratu protiv Perzeja (u proljeće iste godine), poslao svoje izaslanike u Lihnid i Tesaliju da bi se bolje upoznao sa situacijom na terenu. Povratne informacije bile su zabrinjavajuće. Konzul Marcije našao se u okruženju, s izmorenim vojnicima i dovoljno zaliha za tek šest dana, a Klaudije je izjavio da nije imao dovoljno jaku vojsku u Lihnidu da bi Perzeju odvratio pozornost ratom na dva fronta. Ako mu se ne bi poslala pojačanja ili se postojeća vojska ne bi povukla na druge položaje, navodno je opasnost po Klaudija i njegove vojnike bila značajna.⁶⁷ Senat je reagirao istoga trenutka i donio odlučne mjere. Jedna od njih bila je da Paulo odmah krene u Makedoniju, a drugom je mjerom Apije Klaudije Centon razriješen dužnosti vrhovnoga zapovjednika u Lihnidu. Kao njegov zamjenik poslan je, u našoj historiografiji itekako poznat pretor – Lucije Anicije Gal.⁶⁸

U međuvremenu, do Anicijeva prelaska Jadrana, ispostavilo se da su sve sumnje iz prethodnih godina u

with Claudius' activities, as some scholars tend to believe.⁶⁶ As Uscana is relatively close to Lychnidus, securing it was still possible given the crushing defeat in 170 BC. However, I doubt Claudius had enough manpower and – most importantly – time to fortify the vast area between Lychnidus and Šar Mountain. It is more logical to associate such extensive activities with another commander – Claudius' predecessor Gnaeus Sicinius, who sent 2,000 troops to Dassaretian and Illyrian fortifications in 172 BC. In addition to Claudius' taking of Uscana in the winter of 170 BC, the grouping of Roman forces over two years would also instigate the Macedonian king to finally deal with the problem in the area where, according to Livy, the Illyrians were relinquishing strategic positions to the Romans.

The following is the chronology of Claudius' activities until this moment:

1. 170 BC – Claudius arrives in Illyricum late that year and attacks Uscana;
2. 170/169 BC – He returns to Lychnidus defeated, but manages to install a Roman garrison at Uscana;
3. 169 BC – Encouraged by news from the region, Perseus launches an attack and takes Uscana, Draudacim, Oa-neum and 11 fortifications;
4. 169 BC – Claudius attacks Phanote after spring in order to restore his good name, while Coelius launched an attack from Lychnidus in order to retake Uscana. Defeated, both commanders return to Illyricum in winter. The end of the year finds them without reinforcements and in a difficult situation.

The final information about Claudius is found in the context of 168 BC, describing the aftermath of Claudius' defeats at Uscana and Phanote and the way the up-to-then Roman efforts in the Third Macedonian War affected the Roman cause. Rome found itself in an unenviable situation on both fronts – in Thessaly and around Lychnidus. Perseus' attack on Uscana and Roman positions north of the city eliminated all Roman garrisons in the region. Genthius and Perseus began their negotiations on the Illyrian king's entering the war against Rome. At the same time, the Roman consular army found itself in a dire situation, cut off and without provisions. We know this because Lucius Aemilius Paullus, the newly appointed consul, had sent his envoys to Lychnidus and Thessaly to brief him on the situation in the field before he set out to Macedonia with a new army and took over command in the war against Perseus in the spring of that year. The feedback he received was disconcerting. Consul Marcius was surrounded, with exhausted troops and supplies for only six days, while Claudius claimed his forces in Lychnidus were not strong enough to split Perseus'

67 Liv. 44.20.5.

68 Liv. 44.21.1–5.

66 N. Hammond 1988, 524.

ilirskoga kralja bile opravdane – Gencije je ipak odlučio udružiti svoje snage s Perzejem i objaviti rat Rimu. Pripreme za dolazak nove rimske vojske u Makedoniju zabrinule su Perzeja do te mjere da više nije odgađao pregovore s ilirskim kraljem.⁶⁹ Isplatom dijela obećanih talenata, makedonski kralj uspio je na prijeveru natjerati Gencija da pokaže otvoreno neprijateljstvo prema Rimu. Gencije je zatvorio Marka Perpenu i Lucija Petilija, rimske izaslanike koji su se u tome trenutku nalazili na ilirskome dvoru,⁷⁰ čime je službeno otpočeo Treći ilirski rat – u suvremenoj historiografiji zaista važan vojni sukob čiji su tijekom i kraj značajno utjecali na proučavanje iliričkoga prostora. A iako je Anicijevo ime povezano s njegovim završetkom i pričom o rušenju i podjeli Ilirskoga Kraljevstva, Klaudije u njoj ima počasno mjesto. Zadnji povijesni podatak o Apiju Klaudiju, posljednjemu pripadniku klaudijevskoga ogranka Centona, govori da je, čim je saznao za Gencijev čin i objavu rata, krenuo uz dolinu rijeke Škumbin obračunati se s ilirskim kraljem. Bila je to prilika da napokon svojem imenu „pripriše” pobjedu i zasluži trijumf potencijalnim okončanjem Trećega ilirskog rata. Mobilizirao je dodatne savezničke vojnike od Bulina te građana Apolonije i Dirahija, krenuo u napad na Gencija, međutim upravo u tome trenutku Anicije dolazi u Apoloniju, naređuje Klaudiju da zaustavi napredovanje i pričekava njegov dolazak.⁷¹ Nakon toga, Klaudijev trag u povijesti se gubi.

DODATAK HISTORIOGRAFSKOJ ANALIZI – KLAUDIJE I CELIJE NAKON RATA

Tako je jedan nekad sposoban zapovjednik neslavno skončao svoju ilirsku epizodu. U vrlo kratkome vremenu od rata s Keltiberima do zapovjedništva u Iliriku Klaudije je doživio ushit rimskih počasti i gorčinu poraza te možemo samo pretpostavljati do koje su mjere nesmotrene odluke kod Uskane utjecale na njegovu kasniju karijeru. Činjenica je da nikada nije postao konzul i da u nama poznatome popisu rimskih magistrata nakon 168. g. pr. Kr. nema njegova imena.⁷² No je li zaista tako? Pomoću izoliranih podataka iz Polibija saznajemo za još jedan događaj koji povezuje zapovjednike iz Trećega ilirskog rata – Klaudija i Anicija. Naime, između godina 156. i 154. pr. Kr. u Maloj Aziji odvijao

army by opening a second front. Allegedly, Claudius and his troops would face a serious threat if no reinforcements would come to him or if his current troops would not withdraw to other positions.⁶⁷ The Senate reacted promptly and resolutely: Paullus was immediately sent to Macedonia and Appius Claudius Centho was relieved as the supreme commander in Lychnidus. He was replaced by – in Croatian literature much better-known – praetor Lucius Anicius Gallus.⁶⁸

In the meantime, by the time Anicius crossed the Adriatic, it had turned out that the earlier suspicions about the Illyrian king were justified – Genthius chose to join forces with Perseus and declare war to Rome. The preparations for arrival of a new Roman army to Macedonia made Perseus concerned to the extent that he stopped procrastinating negotiations with the Illyrian king.⁶⁹ By paying him part of the promised talents, the Macedonian king tricked Genthius into showing open hostility to Rome. Genthius imprisoned Marcus Perpenna and Lucius Petillius, the Roman envoys at the Illyrian court at the time.⁷⁰ This marked the official beginning of the Third Illyrian War, a very important military conflict for modern historiography, as its course and end have contributed significantly to the study of the Eastern Adriatic in Roman times. Anicius' name may be associated with the end of that war and with the story of the fall and division of the Illyrian Kingdom, but it is Claudius who has a place of honor in that story. The last thing we learn about Appius Claudius, the last of the Centho branch of the Claudii, is that, as soon as he found out about Genthius' move and the declaration of war, he led his army up the Shkumbin River valley to deal with the Illyrian king. It was an opportunity for him to finally “score” a victory and deserve credit for ending the Third Illyrian War. He mobilized additional allied troops from the Bullini and from the cities of Apollonia and Dyrrhachium and was about to launch an attack on Genthius. However, at that particular moment, Anicius arrived in Apollonia and ordered Claudius to stop his advance and wait for his arrival.⁷¹ After this, Claudius is no longer mentioned in historical annals.

69 Liv. 44.22. Rečeno je da su pregovori počeli odmah nakon što je Perzej osvojio regiju iznad Lihnida. Liv. 43.20; usp. Plut. *Aem.*, 13; F. Papazoglu 2007, 129–130; F. Milivojević 2021a, 49.

70 Liv. 44.27.8–12. Genciju je obećano 300 talenata, ali dobio je samo 10. Perzeju mu je obećao ostatak nakon što Rimu objavivši rat, što, naravno, nikada nije napravio.

71 Liv. 44.30.10–12. Za nekoliko pretpostavki bez značajnijih dokaza da je izaslanik Perpenna bio Klaudijev klijent vidi F. Münzer 1920, 66–68; E. Rawson 1977, 341. Također, da je bio patron Epiraca (na temelju Dio 40.17.5) vidi E. Albertini 1904, 247; E. Rawson 1973, 228; F. Milivojević 2021a, 50. Anicijeva inicijalna zapovijed nije bila voditi rat s Gencijem, već poboljšati situaciju u kojoj se nalaze rimske snage u Lihnidu tako da zamijeni Klaudija. U suprotnome, bilo bi jasno naznačeno da Paulo ide u rat s Perzejem, a Anicije s Gencijem. U međuvremenu je otpočeo Treći ilirski rat te se Anicijevim dolaskom u Apoloniju njegov inicijalni zadatak promijenio.

72 T. Broughton 1951.

67 Liv. 44.20.5.

68 Liv. 44.21.1–5.

69 Liv. 44.22. Livy says that the negotiations began immediately after Perseus had conquered the region above Lychnidus. Liv. 43.20; cf. Plut. *Aem.*, 13; F. Papazoglu 2007, 129–130; F. Milivojević 2021a, 49.

70 Liv. 44.27.8–12. Genthius was promised 300 talents but he only received 10. Perseus promised him the rest after he had declared war to Rome but, of course, he failed to keep his word.

71 Liv. 44.30.10–12. For a few (not particularly substantiated) hypotheses that the envoy Perpenna was Claudius' client, see F. Münzer 1920, 66–68; E. Rawson 1977, 341. Also, for the hypothesis that he was a patron of the Epirotes (based on Dio 40.17.5), see E. Albertini 1904, 247; E. Rawson 1973, 228; F. Milivojević 2021a, 50. Anicius' initial order was not to go to war with Genthius but to improve the position of the Roman forces in Lychnidus by replacing Claudius. Otherwise, it would be clearly specified that Paullus was going to war with Perseus and Anicius with Genthius. As the Third Macedonian War began in the meantime, his initial task was changed when Anicius arrived in Apollonia.



Slika 5. Denar (RRC, 154/1)

Figure 5. Denar (RRC, 154/1)

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se sukob između kraljevstva Bitinije i Pergama, na čelu s kraljevima Prusijom II. odnosno Atalom II. Rimu nikako nije odgovarao spomenuti rat i znamo da je nekoliko izaslanstava pokušalo spriječiti Prusiju da napadne Pergam. Prvo izaslanstvo smješta se u 155. g. pr. Kr. i u njemu su sudjelovali Gaj Klaudije Centon, Lucije Hortenzije i Gaj Arunkulej, ali Prusija ih nije htio poslušati.⁷³ Stoga je naredne godine Rim poslao izaslanstvo koje je za naše prostore izrazito zanimljivo po sastavu – od devetero izaslanika dvojica su povezana s istočnom obalom Jadrana: radi se o Luciju Aniciju Galu, pobjedniku nad Gencijem, te Gaju Faniju Strabonu, izaslaniku kojeg je Rim nekoliko godina prije poslao Dalmatima da bi spriječio njihove napade na isejski teritorij i Daorse.⁷⁴ Deveteročlano izaslanstvo nije uspjelo spriječiti rat i naredili su Atalu II. od Pergama da brani svoj teritorij dok oni pokušavaju razbiti savezništvo koje je Prusija sklopio protiv njega. Nemamo podataka jesu li u tome uspjeli, no zasluge za okončanje rata svakako pripadaju izaslanstvu koje je u Malu Aziju krenulo sljedeće, sastavljeno od izvjesnoga Apija Klaudija, Lucija Opija te Aula Postumija Albina. O kojem se Apiju Klaudiju radi? Uz našega Apija Klaudija Centona tada je u rodu Klaudijevaca, s takvim prenomenom, bio poznat još Apije Klaudije Pulher. No Klaudije Pulher čini se kao manje vjerojatna opcija. On bi u to izaslanstvo išao u poznim godinama i od 174. g. pr. Kr. nije zabilježen na nekoj dužnosti.⁷⁵ Stoga se najvjerojatnije radi upravo o našem Apiju Klaudiju Centonu. Bio je dijelom izaslanstva koje je prisililo Prusiju na potpisivanje mirovnoga ugovora i plaćanje ratne odštete grčkim gradovima u regiji. Manje je vjerojatno da je tim činom „isprao sramotu poraza kod Uskane“, kako je pokušao kod Fanote, no sigurno se radilo o uspjehu koji su Rimljani cijenili.

A SUPPLEMENT TO THE HISTORIOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS – CLAUDIUS AND COELIUS AFTER THE WAR

This was how a once capable commander ended his Illyrian episode in shame. In the very short period between the war against the Celtiberians and his command in Illyricum, Claudius experienced both the honors from his fellow Romans and the bitterness of defeat. We can only assume to what extent did his reckless decisions at Uscana affect his later career. The fact is that he never became a consul; his name cannot be found in the list of Roman magistrates after 168 BC.⁷² But was it really so? Outside this context, Polybius tells us about another event connecting the two commanders from the Third Illyrian War – Claudius and Anicius. Between 156 BC and 154 BC, Asia Minor saw a conflict between the kingdoms of Bithynia and Pergamon, then headed by Kings Prusias II and Attalus II, respectively. As this war did not serve Rome's purposes, it sent several delegations to prevent Prusias II from attacking Pergamon. The first delegation, consisting of Gaius Claudius Centho, Lucius Hortensius and Gaius Arunculeius, came to Prusias II in 155 BC but he refused to hear them out.⁷³ This is why, in the following year, Rome sent a delegation which, because of its composition, was of special interest to this region, as two of its nine members were connected with the eastern Adriatic: Lucius Anicius Gallus, who had conquered Genthius, and Gaius Fannius Strabo, an envoy who had been sent to the Dalmatae a few years earlier to stop their attacks on the territory of Issa and the Daorsi.⁷⁴ As the nine-member delegation failed to prevent the war, they ordered King Attalus II of Pergamon to defend its territories while they attempt to break the alliance made against him by Prusias. We do not know if they succeeded in this attempt, but the next delegations sent to Asia Minor, consisting of certain Appius Claudius, Lucius Oppius and Aulus Postumius Albinus, certainly deserved credit for ending this war. Who is this Appius Claudius? The only other Appius Claudius known to us in the Claudii gens at the time (other than our Appius Claudius) was Appius Claudius Pulcher. But he seems like a less likely option. He was in an advanced age when the delegation was sent; also, there are no records of him holding any relevant office after 174 BC.⁷⁵ It therefore very likely that the person with this praenomen is our Appius Claudius Centho. He was a member of the delegation that forced Prusias to sign a peace agreement with the Greek cities in the region and pay war reparations to them. It is less likely that this helped him “clear his name from the Uscana defeat” – as he had attempted at Phanota – but the Romans must have appreciated this success nevertheless.

73 Polyb. 33.1.2. i 7.1. App. *Mith.* 3; T. Broughton 1951, 449. Nepoznata je veza između Gaja Klaudija i našega Apija Klaudija.

74 Polyb. 32.9 i 13; T. Broughton 1951, 446, 450.

75 Klaudije Pulher svoju je vojnu karijeru započeo kao vojni tribun 197. g. pr. Kr. Ako je tada bio u ranim dvadesetim godinama, što bi bila minimalna dob za tu dužnost, u ovo bi izaslanstvo išao u kasnim šezdesetim godinama. T. Broughton 1951, 450.

72 T. Broughton 1951.

73 Polyb. 33.1.2. and 7.1. App. *Mith.* 3; T. Broughton 1951, 449. The connection between Gaius Claudius and our Appius Claudius remains unknown.

74 Polyb. 32.9 and 13; T. Broughton 1951, 446, 450.

75 Claudius Pulcher began his military career as a tribune in 197 BC. If he was in his twenties then (a minimum age for such a position), he would join this delegation in his late sixties. T. Broughton 1951, 450.

Naposljetku, koliko god malo znali o Klaudiju i njegovu životu izvan okvira događanja Trećega makedonskog rata, o Luciju Celiju, zapovjedniku s kojim je bio kod Uskane, znamo još manje. No postoji mogućnost da se radi o dužnosniku zaduženom za kovanje jedne emisije rimskoga denara između 189. i 180. g. pr. Kr. Na aversu denara pojavljuje se oblik *L. COIL* (*Coilius*), što je u osnovi drugi naziv za Celijev rod (*Coelius/Coilius*).⁷⁶ Datacija kovanja novca išla bi u prilog tome da se radi istoj osobi, međutim ne smije se odbaciti mogućnost da je taj dužnosnik zapravo otac našeg Celija, zapovjednika pod Uskanom.⁷⁷ Mnogo više intrigira pretpostavka u modernoj historiografiji da je Celije u ratu, bez obzira na poraz kod Uskane, stekao nadimak *Antipater*, jer sljedeća osoba u obiteljskoj liniji nosi taj nadimak, vjerojatno kao ostavštinu oca.⁷⁸ Radi se o povjesničaru Luciju Celiju Antipateru, kojega Ciceron spominje kao elegantna pisca i izvrsna pravnik.⁷⁹ Takva pretpostavka zbunjuje jer nadimak *Antipater* (grč. *Ἀντίπατρος*) teško možemo vezati za određene zasluge u ratu, kakve god one bile. Radi se o vrlo popularnome imenu među helenističkim svijetom, zbog čega mi se čini vjerojatnijom pretpostavka da je Lucije Celije Antipater bio grčkoga podrijetla i oslobođenik nekoga Lucija Celija.⁸⁰ Sama konstrukcija njegova imena upućuje na uobičajenu praksu preuzimanja imena svoga patrona, uz zadržavanje vlastitoga. Posve je drugo pitanje kada je Grk Antipater pao u ropstvo određenomu Luciju Celiju. S obzirom na pretpostavke da je rođen između 180. i 170. g. pr. Kr.,⁸¹ aktivnosti Trećega makedonskog rata i naš Lucije Celije nameću se kao realne opcije. Naravno, ovdje se radi tek o ideji i ako bih krenuo korak dalje u promišljanju, prikladno smještenomu na kraj ovoga priloga, vojevanje oko Uskane ne bi nužno trebalo biti događaj kada bi Antipater pao u ropstvo. Celije je u toj epizodi poražen i tijekom povlačenja s ranjenicima sigurno nije bilo pregršt prilika za sporedne stvari. Radije bi tu epizodu i stvaranje okolnosti za nastanak jednoga od autoriteta rimske historiografije, kojega car Hadrijan preferira čitati više od Salustija,⁸² trebalo vezati za neku aktivnost gdje je Celije pokušao „izbrisati sramotu svog poraza u Iliriku“. Baš kao naš Klaudije, samo što bi Celije uspio u tome naumu.

As little as we know about Claudius and his life outside the context of the Third Macedonian War, we know even less about Lucius Coelius, the commander who fought at Uscana together with him. However, the person in question could have also been the official in charge of minting an issue of Roman denarius between 189 and 180 BC. Its obverse includes the text *L. COIL* (*Coilius*), designating Coelius' gens (*Coelius/Coilius*).⁷⁶ Although the dating of the minting could support the hypothesis that this official was our Coelius, the commander at Uscana, there is also a possibility that it was actually his father.⁷⁷ Much more intriguing proposition in modern historiography is that Coelius, despite his defeat at Uscana, was also known as Antipater after the war because the next person in his lineage received such a nickname, probably as a legacy of his father.⁷⁸ This person was the historian Lucius Coelius Antipater, described by Cicero as an elegant writer and excellent jurist.⁷⁹ This assumption is confusing because the nickname Antipater (from Greek *Ἀντίπατρος*) can hardly be associated with war-related credits, whichever they may be. As it was a very popular name in the Hellenistic world, I find more likely the hypothesis that Lucius Coelius Antipater was of Greek origin and a freedman of certain Lucius Coelius.⁸⁰ The very structure of his name reflects the common practice of adopting the name of one's patron while keeping one's own at the same time. When was it that a Greek named Antipater became a slave of one Lucius Coelius is a whole different question. Given the hypothesis that he was born between 180 and 170 BC,⁸¹ the involvement in the Third Macedonian War and our Lucius Coelius seem like realistic options. Of course, this is merely an idea and, if I can speculate further at the end of this paper, the Uscana campaign was not necessarily the event during which Antipater could have been enslaved. Since Coelius was defeated in this episode and retreated with wounded soldiers, there cannot have been many opportunities for lesser things. It seems more likely to link this episode and the creation of circumstances for the rise of one of the authorities of Roman historiography, favored by Emperor Hadrian even over Sallust,⁸² with an activity by which Coelius sought to “clear his name of defeat in Illyricum”. Just like our Claudius – only that Coelius would be successful in this.

76 H. Mattingly 1969, 104; RRC, 154/1.

77 Ipak se radi o gotovo 20 godina razlike, što bi monetaru „dalo“ više od 40 godina kada je bio legat u Iliriku, dok bi bilo taman da stasa nova generacija mladih ljudi koji bi zdušno prihvatili poziciju legata kao odskočnu dasku za daljnju karijeru.

78 G. Sumner 1973, 56–57.

79 Cic. *Brut.* 102. Navodno je napisao kvalitetno djelo o Drugome punskom ratu. Antipater je bio i jedan od izvora Plinija Starijega za istočnu obalu Jadrana. Zahvaljujem dr. sc. Alki Domic-Kunić što mi je ukazala na ovu informaciju.

80 Kao i P. Gensel 1900, 185.

81 P. Gensel 1900, 185.

82 Navodno je Hadrijan volio arhaični stil pisanja te više volio Celija nego Salustija, Katona nego Cicerona i Enija nego Vergilija. Ad *Scriptores Hist. Aug. Hadr.* 16.

76 H. Mattingly 1969, 104; RRC, 154/1.

77 There is a 20-year difference involved here, which would make the minter more than 40 years old when he was a legate in Illyricum. There was just about enough time for a new generation of young people to come of age and readily accept the position of legate as a stepping-stone for further career.

78 G. Sumner 1973, 56–57.

79 Cic. *Brut.* 102. He allegedly wrote a high-quality work on Second Punic War. Antipater was also one of the sources that Pliny the Elder used for Eastern Adriatic. I wish to express my gratitude to Alka Domic-Kunić for drawing my attention to this fact.

80 So does P. Gensel 1900, 185.

81 P. Gensel 1900, 185.

82 Hadrian was allegedly fond of archaic style of writing, for which reason he preferred Coelius to Sallust, Cato to Cicero and Ennius to Vergil. Ad *Scriptores Hist. Aug. Hadr.* 16.

Kratice / Abbreviations

RRC – *Roman Republican Coinage*, Vol. I., Michael H. Crawford, Cambridge University Press, 1974.

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