The Notion Of Apperception throughout Modern Philosophy

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Završni rad

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IZJAVA

Kojom izjavljujem da sam završni rad naslova *The Notion Of Apperception throughout Modern Philosophy: a Diachronic Review Focusing on Descartes, Leibniz and Kant* izradio/la samostalno pod mentorstvom doc. dr. sc. Zdenke Brzović.

U radu sam primijenila metodologiju znanstvenoistraživačkoga rada i koristila literaturu koja je navedena na kraju završnoga rada. Tuđe spoznaje, stavove, zaključke, teorije i zakonitosti koje sam izravno ili parafrazirajući navela u diplomskom radu na uobičajen način citirala sam i povezala s korištenim bibliografskim jedinicama.

Studentica Potpis

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Introduction

The focal point of this paper is the notion of apperception, first designated by Gottfried Willhelm Leibniz, one of the leading thinkers of the late 17th and early 18th century. The first time Leibniz used the term was encountered in his famous 1714 scriptures 'Principles of Nature and Grace' specifically, in their fourth section. He mentions apperception again in his seminal work, "The New Essays on Human Understanding", published posthumously in 1765.

However, the imposing question remains: what does apperception mean? By the definition that stands in the *Principles*, it is what we refer to as consciousness, or 'the reflective knowledge of our internal states'. He later expounds upon this and adds that it is 'the perception of what lies inside us' (Kulstad, 2020)

It is important to note that although Leibniz cemented the term, he is not the originator of this idea. Its birth is rooted in René Descartes' first principle "*Cogito, ergo sum*." (originally, in French: "*Je pense, donc je suis*") exhibited in 1637 "Discourse on Method", one of two Descartes' most significant written works. As Leibniz's writing and philosophy develop, he becomes continually reliant on Cartesian thought, which he does not fail to comment on or argue against. One of these commentaries will be exhibited in later sections of my thesis.

However, Leibniz is also not where the discussion finds its conclusion. In fact, his successor, one of the greatest philosophers of all time, who represents the meeting point of all that comes before and what comes next, Immanuel Kant, famously transforms apperception into a central notion of "The Critique of Pure Reason" using the *Transcendental Deduction of Categories* argument. He also uses apperception to refute idealism in the B edition of *CPR*, which may or may not have been unsuccessful. Kant clarifies the idea as self-consciousness or as the understanding of mental states, frequently referred to as representations. In other words, he says it is the 'self-assignment of mental objects'. In short, Kant utilises apperception to prove the objective validity of the categories (pure concepts of the understanding), as one of the sole transcendental conditions of possible experience. This will be explained more thoroughly thereon. David Hume's scepticism is where he draws inspiration for such proof, especially our understanding of causal relations, which Kant opposes by giving causality a categorial status.

Hume, however, thinks there is no such empirical guarantee that would aid in determining causality to be objectively valid.

As aforementioned, apperception not only enables the *Transcendental Deduction of Categories* but also becomes his weapon in the *Refutation of Idealism*, a B-version article in the *First Critique*, where he tries to undermine Descartes' so-called 'problematic' idealism and strengthen, as well as promote his own idea of transcendental idealism. This will be concisely discussed.

This paper will thoroughly analyse the course of development of the notion of apperception, starting with its roots in Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum*, moving on to Leibniz and his *Principles of Nature and Grace*, as well as *New Essays on the Human Understanding*, and finally through Kant's arguments in the *First Critique*. I will briefly, but in as many details as possible go over Kant's Transcendental Deduction.

1. ‘I think, therefore I am’... and where it all began

René Descartes marks the beginning of one of the most fruitful periods in philosophy, or the era of ‘Modern Philosophy’. It concludes with Kant, whose philosophy then becomes the fertile ground for the upcoming German thinkers such as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, or the notorious German Idealists. But for now, we will be focusing on Descartes.

First, let us go through some background information about the author. René Descartes was born on March 31 1596 in La Haye, France, a town which now bears his name. He was a polymath, touching upon various fields in mathematics, including physics and geometry; anatomy, specifically optics; meteorology; and numerous domains of philosophy, in which he was most noted for his original inputs in metaphysics. The latter is what is currently most significant for our discourse.

One of Descartes’ more important contributions to philosophy was the method of doubt which calls upon a thinking subject to doubt every and any knowledge one possesses systematically. This would cause one to separate all dubitable from indubitable, and hopefully in the end reach all the unquestionable certainties that knowledge can be founded upon. By doing so, Descartes had reached his own Archimedean point, or absolute knowledge from which spurts all other knowledge. In other words, the “Cogito, ergo sum” argument, which translates to “I am thinking, therefore I exist.”

Essentially, and in the shortest of terms, the argument may be displayed as such:

1. I am thinking.
2. If I am thinking, then there must exist a thinking subject.
3. The thinking subject is me.

∴ I am thinking, therefore I exist.

Usually, this is translated to “I think, therefore I am.” but if we look deeper into Descartes’ perspective, using notes from other works such as “Principia Philosophiae” or “Meditations on First Philosophy”, we will find that he accentuates the performativity of thinking, as Maclean (2006) explains, noting from the *Principia;* Descartes does not refer to being as essence (what makes the entity the entity that it is. In this context, Descartes is not saying I think, and thinking is what makes me this particular entity or in this case, human; however, he is saying as is popularly translated: I think, therefore I exist), and thus to suppose that the subject that thinks, but does not simultaneously exist, would be a contradiction. He continues to expound upon this point, and adds that we must keep in mind that the precondition of (the) deduction is doubt: the first step being “Dubio”, or in other words “I am doubting, therefore I am existing”.

The argument itself first appeared in the 1637 “Discourse on Method”, one out of two of Descartes’ seminal, more eminent papers. He completes its story in the second of his “Meditations on First Philosophy” from 1641 where he claims, as we already mentioned, that it is the only knowledge completely immune to doubt, supported by the Evil Demon Scenario. This argument claims that even if an all-powerful Evil Demon were placing thoughts into his mind, and deceiving him by making him think that he exists when he does not, he would still have to exist, for the Demon to be able to try to deceive him. Therefore, he thinks, and whenever he does, he exists.

The reader may be able to anticipate the traces of apperception in Descartes’ *Cogito* argument. If you just glance at the sheer idea being developed, you may notice that Descartes is talking about consciousness. It is the moment in which we perceive that we do, in fact, have thoughts and that there is an “I” which perceives. However, that is not the only significance of this argument: it is also one of the foremost displays of consciousness as an entirely psychological concept, as well as its utilisation for defining and describing thought, explains Jorgensen (2020). What does that mean, essentially? Descartes explains **thought** as “everything which is within us in such a way that we are immediately aware of” so all *psychological* acts that we may be conscious of including the will, the intellect, senses and imagination. Of course, Descartes deepens the discussion by differentiating between thought and objects of thought as well as forms of thought, such as **ideas**, which are forms of thought the perception of which makes us aware of the thought they are representing. The **object of thought** is what is represented in the thought.

Descartes does not analyse consciousness, for that task is left for his proponents to toil upon, but he does leave us with three general ideas which go on to clarify why consciousness is a psychological concept:

1. **Consciousness makes thoughts *transparent* to the mind:** Are we aware of all our thoughts? When we are aware of having a thought, can we doubt that we are having that thought?

2. **Consciousness involves *reflection*.** Is consciousness essentially constituted by a perception distinct from the original perception? Does consciousness necessarily involve memory or reflection? Is all consciousness a form of *self*-consciousness?

3. **Conscious thought is *intentional.*** Are all thoughts representational? What is the nature of intentionality and what is its relation to consciousness?

   (Jorgensen, 2020)

All of these inquiries and beliefs, as proposed by Descartes' views, have acted as a catalyst for further discourse even to this day.

In conclusion, Descartes paved the way for all thinkers who then approached the concept of consciousness from a psychological standpoint; as well as for those who had let the idea of it blossom into fundamental theories that perhaps aided us in researching, contemplating, understanding and eventually knowing about our minds more entirely and exhaustively.

We shall now take a look at another philosopher, a man who was considered a universal genius: Gottfried W. Leibniz. He was the first thinker to truly analyse the concept of consciousness; build a proper theory of consciousness, and give it the name that will ultimately lead us into an open discussion of the topic of this paper: the notion of apperception.

2.1 Leibniz, the father of apperception

We may have already introduced Leibniz, but let us get to know him a bit more thoroughly. He was born on the 1st of July 1646, in Leipzig to a severely educated family on both sides and died in 1716. His father was a juror and professor of Moral Philosophy and his mother was a daughter of a professor of Law. He is considered the 'last universal genius', trying himself in numerous fields such as metaphysics, logic, epistemology, and philosophy of religion on one hand and mathematics, physics, history, geology and jurisprudence on the other. He is one of the rare men who had given himself the task of witnessing the whole universe and analysing every and all of its corners, including the darkest and most mysterious. Diderot writes,

> "Perhaps never has a man read as much, studied as much, meditated more, and written more than Leibniz… What he has composed on the world, God, nature, and the soul is of the most sublime eloquence. If his ideas had been expressed with the flair of Plato, the philosopher of Leipzig would cede nothing to the philosopher of Athens"
> (Look, Brandon C., 2020)

One of Leibniz's most prominent works is 1704 "New Essays on Human Understanding" a metaphysical answer to Locke's earlier work "Essays on Human Understanding". Then comes "Theodicy" from 1710[1], which was one of the most important works in the field of philosophy of religion, now a term used for arguments which support the existence of God, usually those dealing with the most problematic counterattack towards the existence of God, in other words, the problem of evil. Lastly, "Monadology", a 1714 metaphysical treatise discussing substance, the matter that is presumably the most tackled query by philosophers of the time.

Consciousness, or Lebniz's apperception is relevant for all three works, including a cluster of letters called "Principles of Nature and Grace", also from 1714. In the Fourth Part of the Principles, Leibniz, following his theory of monads, tries to explain the difference between perception and awareness. Let us take a look at a quote from the Principles:

[1] theodicy: arguments supporting divine providence in spite of the existence of evil; Leibniz coined the term (from greek, theos + dike - God + justice) literally meaning: justifying God

> "It is good to distinguish between *perception*, which is the internal state of the monad [i.e., simple substance] representing external things, and *apperception*, which is *consciousness*, or the reflective knowledge of this internal state, something not given to all souls, nor at all times to a given soul. Moreover, it is because they lack this distinction that the Cartesians have failed, disregarding the perceptions that we do not apperceive, in the same way that people disregard imperceptible bodies. This is also what leads the same Cartesians to believe that only minds are monads, that there are no souls in beasts, still less other *principles of life*." (Leibniz, 1714)

To clarify, Leibniz represented a monadic model of metaphysics, meaning that the world comprises an infinite number of individual elementary immaterial substances called monads, each unique. These substances are mental and imperishable, they are not in any causal relation with other monads, yet they co-exist in unison in a preestablished harmony[2], as ordered by God. There are different levels of monads, with different levels of perceptions and appetites. Those monads which remain at the top of the hierarchic pyramid, have larger sums of perceptions. For such beings, monads are called **souls**.

Going back to the Fourth Section of the *Principles*, the discourse on perception and apperception begins with the very postulate written at the end of the previous paragraph. Leibniz makes sure to differentiate those beings that have **feelings** (perceptions stored in memory), naming them **animals**. Animals have souls. Those animals that are at the "sub-animal level of bare living things, and their souls at the level of mere ·unelevated· monads" as illustrated by Leibniz (1714) himself, are the inspiration behind the distinction because unremembered perceptions might be recovered. So, what does the distinction articulate?

Perception is "the internal state of a monad that represents external things", whereas, **apperception** or **awareness** is "consciousness, or the reflective knowledge of internal states". He continues that not all souls have awareness, and not all that do, have it all the time. This is

[2] Preestablished harmony in monadology is a postulate that explains change in a non-causally related structure of monads, where God synchronised the universe insofar as if a change happens in one monad, all other monads reflect that change. (Britannica, 2017)

where Leibnoz goes against Cartesian beliefs that animals are soulless, machinal creatures. It is the level of perception and consciousness that discerns different monads, notably *souls*.

Leibniz persists in discussing the difference between animals and human beings, who have a slightly higher level of consciousness. The main difference, between a dog and a human for example, is that some creatures, namely humans, have the property of rationality, meaning they can have an insight into a priori, necessary and eternal truths of logic and mathematics. Their (our) souls are called minds. Now this is where it gets interesting, as well as relevant for our discussion, Leibniz goes on to say

> "These souls are capable of performing reflective acts, and capable of considering what is called "I", substance, soul, mind – in brief, immaterial things and immaterial truths. And that is what makes us capable of the sciences of demonstrative knowledge." (L)

In essence, human beings are rational animals, because they have the ability to form a conception of the *self*, by the utilisation of apperception. Therefore, rationality comes out of this reflective capacity, so where apperception begins so do we, and from there we persist to contemplate metaphysical questions about being, God, and so on.

This is, in short terms, the grounding point of our discussion. We began our journey with Descartes and his Cogito and reached a fully manifested theory in Leibniz's philosophy, which gave consciousness a new, and yet extremely relevant dimension, that helps define beings by their mental capacity. Soon, we shall be dealing with Immanuel Kant, who drew plenty of inspiration from this theory, as well as assumed the term apperception. Subsequently, we will grapple with what is notoriously the most difficult argument in the history of philosophy: The Transcendental Deduction of Categories argument.

2.2 Leibniz on Descartes and his followers - from the Monadology

I previously asserted 'Monadology' as Leibniz's possibly most ground-breaking piece of writing and briefly explained its central idea. Naturally, somewhere along the way, he takes it upon himself to comment on the Cartesian vision of apperception. He does this in the 14th thesis of Monadology. So, let us take a look at his remarks:

> "The passing condition, which involves and represents a multiplicity in the unit [unité] or in the simple substance, is nothing but what is called Perception, which is to be distinguished from Apperception or Consciousness, as will afterwards appear. In this matter the Cartesian view is extremely defective, for it treats as non-existent those perceptions of which we are not consciously aware. This has also led them to believe that minds [esprits] alone are Monads, and that there are no souls of animals nor other Entelechies. Thus, like the crowd, they have failed to distinguish between a prolonged unconsciousness and absolute death, which has made them fall again into the Scholastic prejudice of souls entirely separate [from bodies], and has even confirmed ill-balanced minds in the opinion that souls are mortal. " (Leibniz, 1898)

The first idea Leibniz presents is that perception and apperception are two separate things, which Descartes fails to notice by equating the unconscious perceptions to nonexistent ones. He goes on to criticise Cartesian views on animals being soulless, mindless, material automata, as well as other lower-level Monads, which are/do contain Entelechies.[3] Entelechies (or Monads), as Leibniz explains in the 19th section of the Monadology, are those substances that contain solely bare perception. This leads the Cartesians to believe that dreamless sleep and death are the exact same thing since in both cases there is a void of perceptions. But what Leibniz is trying to postulate here is that the mind is *always* active (there is consistently an infinity/multiplicity of perceptions), even when some perceptions are incognizant or inaccessible to the Consciousness of the mind; and even if we or any other conscious Monad are in a dreamless sleep, or any other perception-less state.

[3] ENTELECHY: simple, self-sufficient substances/perfection that actualises what is potential in a being/a sort of purpose of function, in some terms the final cause of a being; all Monads are Entelechies, but not all Entelechies are Souls → souls have more distinct perceptions, accompanied by memory and feelings.

3. The Role Of Apperception in Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

Now that we are introduced to the term and have pithily accounted for its history and emergence, we will be focusing on apperception and its use thoroughly through Kant's philosophy.

As aforementioned, the principal role of apperception is in the transcendental deduction of categories, as told by Dicker (2004) - the argument whose goal is to prove the objective validity of categories as a priori conditions of possible experience. Specifically, Kant focuses on the categories of relation, the spotlight taking the first two, namely the category of causality, as well as the category of inherence and subsistence (*substantia et accidens*).

The inspiration for Kant's engagement in the discussion is David Hume's scepticism about causality. In the *Prolegomena for Any Future Metaphysics (1783)*, Kant famously states it was Hume's attack on metaphysics that 'awakened him from his dogmatic slumber', as he entertains the idea of a response to Hume's provocations. In essence, Hume claims that what we are holding at our disposal are mental representations or impressions, that are completely unconnected. What he meant is that there is no objectively necessary link between what we call "cause" and what we refer to as "consequence". Dicker (2004) displays Hume's elementary validities of experience with the following two premises:

(1) Items of experience are subjective.
(2) Items of experience are unconnected.

Essentially, what we perceive are just "fleeing and private" impressions in 'constant conjunction'. Meaning, these impressions repeatedly appear together. Hume postulates **imagination** here, as a type of cognitive faculty (*cognitive power*) that links event C with event E. However, if we imagine that these two events appear frequently and always successively one after the other; then the faculty of imagination 'perceives' their constant conjunction. It does it per the principle of association, merely out of the custom of repetitive understanding in contiguity. It also understands them as cause and effect, despite their nonexistent necessary relation (necessary connexion). Therefore, experience is just a flux of subjective and unconnected items.

On the other hand, for Kant, causal relations are given the status of a category. The categories, just to be clear, are pure, a priori concepts of Understanding, which hold a significant role in the process of constructing empirical experience. Indeed, they are a priori indispensable for the cognition of the object, but keep in mind that any cognition of the outside world is directly connected to **phenomena**, in other words, the world as we perceive it/as it appears to us; and not **noumena**, i.e. thing-in-itself, which is incognisable and unattainable to our mind.

But this is exactly why **categories** are the necessary conditions of *possible* experience; our empirical experience is *just the experience of appearances*, and the world of appearances is as is because of the *concepts of the understanding* (as well as *pure intuitions of sensibility,* i.e. **space and time**; which consist the remaining necessary conditions of possible experience). Hence, they are objective and necessary, and they serve as the link that connects every thinking (human) being with perceptive power, which consequently leads to intersubjectivity.

But what does all of that really tell us? Well, to paraphrase Kant's main proposition upon which the Transcendental Deduction Argument is built, since we are so privileged to possess the categories, that allow us to maintain experience, they should have objective validity. In simpler terms: if experience is possible, then categories have objective validity. For Dicker this conditional bears the name of "The Principle of the Deduction". (2004)
Here is why this is important for our discussion. According to the interpretation of many authors, and the preferred interpretation of Dicker, "experience" in this argument gains a very particular meaning, which becomes the focal point of our research. The thing is, Kant's "experiences" are notorious for being an interpretative nightmare because they carry several different meanings, and this argument is the primary example of that. One of the most intuitive as well as frequent readings of "experience", though depending on different contexts, is empirical knowledge of appearances. However, in the Transcendental Argument, experience refers to internal experience or in other words, the experience of consciousness/awareness. Dicker (2004) adds that Kant's introductory paragraph to the First Critique (B version) begins with the sentence "There is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins with experience;...", followed by "...no cognition is us precedes experience, and with experience every cognition begins." which leads us to believe that Kant truly is

referring to consciousness when noting experience.[4] Either way, the Argument remains stable if consciousness is what he meant, otherwise the success of the argument becomes debatable. Why is it so important that experience equals consciousness? Namely, if we accept this assertion, and as the Principle of Deduction states, it (consciousness) is possible; then all of experience is founded upon the laws and principles prescribed by the categories. This means that the claim supporting the objective validity of categories lies exclusively on the fact of consciousness. So, according to all of that, consciousness, which is recast by Kant as apperception, is the necessary and sufficient condition for proving the objective validity of categories.

What is consciousness like? How can we characterise it? Dicker (2004) writes that when Kant speaks about consciousness, he alludes to the following two things:

(1) "consciousness[5] about" something
(2) "consciousness about the *manifold*"

We can derive from this the fact that consciousness has the property of aboutness and a referential quality in sight of the manifold. So, what is this *manifold*? Kant uses the word manifold to refer to a manifold of representations, which also includes both a priori and empirical concepts and intuitions. Depending on the context, it can suggest "awareness of the manifold of perceptive impressions" or "awareness of the manifold of phenomena". This is where Kant postulates apperception. The main idea is that if consciousness is possible, and it is the type of consciousness that recognises the multiplicity of representations, then they cannot be contained in more than one consciousness, but merely one and the same. If every representation were to be contained in its own consciousness, there would not be one that regards the manifold. R.P. Wolff expounds upon this thought with several examples:

> "What is the characteristic to which Kant is trying to call our attention? Light may be thrown on the problem if we make use of a trick first suggested by Brentano. Imagine, then, that we have written a six-word sentence on two different pieces of paper. We tear up the first piece so that each scrap contains just one word. (Suppose, for example, that the sentence is "The

[4] "There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. For how could our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse the activity of our understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience?" (B 1); (Dicker, 2004)
[5] awareness

> unicorn is a mythical beast.") The other piece we leave intact. Then we line up six people on one side of the room, each with a scrap of the first piece, and opposite them we stand a seventh person, to whom we give the whole sentence written on the untorn paper. Each member of the group of six reads the word which he has been given. Jones reads "The," Brown reads "unicorn," and so on. Smith, the seventh man, reads "The unicorn is a mythical beast." Now, every word of the sentence is contained in the consciousness of some member or other of the group of six. Similarly, every word of the sentence is contained in Smith's consciousness. But the two cases are absolutely different, for while in the former it is true that the separate parts of the sentence are contained in some consciousness, they are not contained in the same consciousness, and hence there is no unity of consciousness of them, as there is in the case of Smith." (Dicker, 2004)

Furthermore, it should be mentioned that for Kant, the transcendental unity of apperception is the unity of the manifold given in our intuitions, in the concept of the object. In other words, it is self-consciousness and consciousness/awareness of those states that are a consequence of the mere act of perception. Contrary to that, empirical (self) consciousness and consciousness of our inner psychological states is an internal sense. It is also exclusively subjectively valid, despite being derived from pure apperception, since it depends on the conditions of empirical circumstances, due to which it cannot be necessary and universal. (Kant, 1998) We are mostly interested in *transcendental apperception.* The term itself is used in two separate ways, just the way Kant likes it, one aforementioned and the second being "I think", or in other words, the consciousness of our very Self, as a particular subject. (Brook & Wuerth, 2020)
Moreover, it is important to note that apperception includes consciousness about representations, but also the fact that someone holds these representations and that someone is "I".

Does that not remind us of something? It appears we have gone back a full circle.

Conclusion - Overview

To sum up, we have reviewed the theories of consciousness, whose harbinger we have detected to be Rene Descartes with his most prominent argument, the 'Cogito, ergo sum.' This argument is recognised for multiple reasons and productive for a variety of his ideas; however, we will concentrate on its significance for a budding idea of apperception. We noticed that although Descartes was not directly involved in creating a theory solely focused on consciousness, he did still mull over the idea of it through his epistemology. We saw how he contemplated consciousness through ideas about perception and thought. Thought, which we are immediately aware of, has a straightforward link to our perception of it. The same is true with ideas. As Jorgensen (2020) explained, Descartes also propertied consciousness as:

1. *transparent*: every thought is evident to the mind
2. *reflective*: all of them embody knowledge of ourselves (self-consciousness!!)
3. *intentional*: thoughts are about something; they represent something.

This is important because it paved the way for G. W. Leibniz, who was not only the first philosopher with a proper and developed theory of consciousness but who was very explicit about forming a psychological theory of consciousness. We can see obvious traces of Descartes - namely, in his many critiques of the earlier thinker and his disciples. Leibniz is also the philosopher who gave consciousness the name 'apperception', in the Fourth Section of the 'Principles of Nature and Grace' from 1714. He also scrutinises Cartesians for not taking into account, or rather dismissing, non-conscious states. They are important for those souls which have no conscious states, and those which shift between the two types of states. For Leibniz, who uses *representation* as a building block for this theory, all natural beings with a mind or something mind-like are representational, meaning that perception is not so closely connected to awareness, but represents "external things".

In the end, we have Immanuel Kant, who, inspired by Hume's scepticism in terms of causality, came to think about the conditions of possible experience and consequently the objective validity of categories. He presented these ideas in his famous argument: The Deduction of Categories. From the Deduction, we learn that the objective validity of categories, categories being the concepts of the understanding which alongside the intuitions

of space and time, frame our experience of phenomena - the world of appearances. We then interpreted experience in terms of consciousness, which allowed us to prove the objective validity of categories. We learned that consciousness, or apperception, the term Kant claimed from Leibniz, has two main features: it is intentional and it is about the manifold; the manifold depicts the manifold of representations. This suggests that each representation is not separated into unique consciousness, but that one consciousness can contain an infinite magnitude of representations. Moreover, a transcendental unity of apperception, Kant postulates, is a unity of the manifold of impressions given to us in our intuitions; it is in fact a joint term for both self-consciousness and consciousness of representations stemming from perception of phenomena. Empirical apperception is not as important since it is only subjectively valid, dependant on empirical experience which disables it from being necessary and universal. Once again, apperception is not only mere consciousness, but from where we may derive the concept of "I" as a subject, which brings us back to Descartes' Cogito, and self-discovery through the process of thinking.

Keywords

English: apperception, consciousness, mind, awareness, objective validity

Hrvatski: apercepcija, svijest, samosvijest, um, objektivna valjanost

Summary

(ENG) In this thesis, I exhibit the emergence of the concept of consciousness (and self-consciousness) through René Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum* argument. After a brief discussion about this argument and its significance, by analysing relevant background information concerning Descartes' metaphysics, I move on to Gottfried W. Leibniz who is credited with creating the first substantial and fully formed theory of consciousness. The main topic of this part of the paper is Leibniz's insertion of apperception - a new term for consciousness - and his understanding of the word, which I examine from the 'Principles of Nature and Grace' as well as incorporate into a succinct breakdown of his observations on the subject in his famous metaphysical script, the Monadology. I thus demonstrate the connection between Descartes and Leibniz by integrating Leibniz's sentiment towards the thought of the former scholar. Since Leibniz paved the way for his successors, he led us to Immanuel Kant, who developed *his* version of apperception: which he operated as a weapon in proving the objective validity of categories, in his notoriously complex argument *The Transcendental Deduction of Categories* from the 'Critique of Pure Reason'. In this part of the paper, I illustrate the motivation and inspiration behind the argument as well as what it is designed to ascertain, in order to present Kant's contribution to this discussion.

(HR) U svom završnom radu, prikazala sam pojavu i razvoj koncepcije svijesti, odnosno kasnije samosvijesti, koristeći se primjerom argumenta *Cogito, ergo sum* Renéa Descartesa koji označava početak razmišljanja o toj temi. Zatim sam analizirala začetak prve potpuno formirane teorije svijesti za koju je zaslužan Gottfried W. Leibniz, te koji daje koceptu svijesti ime "apercepcija" pri čemu sam se osvrnula na primarnu literaturu, za početak skup pisama pod nazivom "Principi prirode i milosti", gdje to prvi put objavljuje, a zatim i "Monadologiju". Na "Monadologiju" se posebno osvrćem u sljedećem dijelu razrade, gdje razmatram odnos Descartesa i Leibniza, te pokazujem Leibnizov stav prema kartezijanskoj struji mišljenja. Nakon toga, bavim se Immanuelom Kantom, koji se pak nadovezuje na ovu raspravu koristeći apercepciju kao svoje glavno oružje u dokazivanju objektivne valjanosti kategorija, u svom poznato-kompleksnom argumentu iz "Kritike Čistog Uma" pod nazivom Transcedentalna Dedukacija Kategorija.

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