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Scientific paper - Original scientific paper
Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason
Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 20 (2020), 59; 199-214. urn:nbn:hr:186:703744
Baccarini, Elvio

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Baccarini, E. (2020). Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 20. (59), 199-214. Retrieved from https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:703744

Baccarini, Elvio. "Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason." Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 20, no. 59, 2020, pp. 199-214. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:703744

Baccarini, Elvio. "Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason." Croatian Journal of Philosophy 20, no. 59 (2020): 199-214. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:703744

Baccarini, E. (2020) 'Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason', Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 20(59), pp. 199-214. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:703744 (Accessed 26 June 2024)

Baccarini E. Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason. Croatian Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 2020 [cited 2024 June 26];20(59):199-214. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:703744

E. Baccarini, "Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason", Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 20, no. 59, pp. 199-214, 2020. [Online]. Available at: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:703744. [Accessed: 26 June 2024]

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Metadata
Title (english)Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason
AuthorElvio Baccarini
Author's institutionUniversity of Rijeka
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Scientific / art field,
discipline and subdiscipline		HUMANISTIC SCIENCES
Philosophy
Abstract (english)
Rawlsian public reason requires public decisions to be justified through reasons that each citizen can accept as reasonable, free and equal. It has been objected that this model of public justification puts unfair burdens on marginalized groups. A possible version of the criticism is that the alleged unfairness is constituted by what Miranda Fricker and other authors call epistemic injustice. This form of injustice obtains when some agents are unjustly treated as not reliable, or when they are deprived of epistemic resources to utter their claims or burdened when they need to express demands. I show that the Rawlsian model can stand the objection. Restricting justificatory reasons, at least when basic issues of human rights, liberties and opportunities are at stake, is needed in order to warrant a stable society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens.
Keywords (english)
Languageenglish
Publication typeScientific paper - Original scientific paper
Publication statusPublished
Peer reviewPeer review
Publication versionPublished version
Journal titleCroatian Journal of Philosophy
Numberingvol. 20, no. 59, pp. 199-214
p-ISSN1333-1108
e-ISSN1847-6139
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:186:703744
Publication2020
Document URLhttps://hrcak.srce.hr/253654
Type of resourceText
Access conditionsOpen access
Terms of useLicence In copyright icon
Created on2022-12-15 13:45:39