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Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason
Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 20 (2020), 59; 199-214. urn:nbn:hr:186:703744
Baccarini, Elvio

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Baccarini, E. (2020). Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 20. (59), 199-214. Preuzeto s https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:703744

Baccarini, Elvio. "Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason." Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 20, br. 59, 2020, str. 199-214. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:703744

Baccarini, Elvio. "Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason." Croatian Journal of Philosophy 20, br. 59 (2020): 199-214. https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:703744

Baccarini, E. (2020) 'Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason', Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 20(59), str. 199-214. Preuzeto s: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:703744 (Datum pristupa: 16.06.2024.)

Baccarini E. Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason. Croatian Journal of Philosophy [Internet]. 2020. [pristupljeno 16.06.2024.];20(59):199-214. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:703744

E. Baccarini, "Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason", Croatian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 20, br. 59, str. 199-214, 2020. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://urn.nsk.hr/urn:nbn:hr:186:703744. [Citirano: 16.06.2024.]

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Podaci o radu
Naslov (engleski)Which Theory of Public Reason? Epistemic Injustice and Public Reason
AutorElvio Baccarini
Autorova ustanovaSveučilište u Rijeci
Filozofski fakultet
Znanstveno / umjetničko
područje, polje i grana		HUMANISTIČKE ZNANOSTI
Filozofija
Sažetak (engleski)
Rawlsian public reason requires public decisions to be justified through reasons that each citizen can accept as reasonable, free and equal. It has been objected that this model of public justification puts unfair burdens on marginalized groups. A possible version of the criticism is that the alleged unfairness is constituted by what Miranda Fricker and other authors call epistemic injustice. This form of injustice obtains when some agents are unjustly treated as not reliable, or when they are deprived of epistemic resources to utter their claims or burdened when they need to express demands. I show that the Rawlsian model can stand the objection. Restricting justificatory reasons, at least when basic issues of human rights, liberties and opportunities are at stake, is needed in order to warrant a stable society as a fair system of cooperation among free and equal citizens.
Ključne riječi (engleski)
Jezikengleski
Vrsta publikacijeZnanstveni rad - Izvorni znanstveni rad
Status objaveObjavljen
Vrsta recenzijeRecenziran
Verzija publikacijeObjavljena verzija rada (izdavačev PDF)
Naslov časopisaCroatian Journal of Philosophy
Brojčani podacivol. 20, br. 59, str. 199-214
p-ISSN1333-1108
e-ISSN1847-6139
URN:NBNurn:nbn:hr:186:703744
Datum objave publikacije2020
URL dokumentahttps://hrcak.srce.hr/253654
Vrsta resursaTekst
Prava pristupaOtvoreni pristup
Uvjeti korištenjaIkona licence Zaštićeno autorskim pravom.
Datum i vrijeme pohrane2022-12-15 13:45:39